Nowhere was this uneasy balance between the old and
the new more clearly demonstrated than in politics and
government.
In its broad outlines, the new political system followed
the Soviet pattern. Yet from the start, CCP leaders made
it clear that the Chinese model would differ from the Soviet
in important respects. Whereas the Bolsheviks had
severely distrusted nonrevolutionary elements in Russia
and established a minority government based on the radical
left, Mao and his colleagues were more confident that
they possessed the basic support of the majority of the
Chinese people. Under New Democracy, the party attempted
to reach out to all progressive classes in the population
to maintain the alliance that had brought it to
power in the first place.
The primary link between the regime and the population
was the system of “mass organizations,” representing
peasants, workers, women, religious groups, writers, and
artists. The party had established these associations during
the 1920s to mobilize support for the revolution. Now
they served as a conduit between party and people, enabling
the leaders to assess the attitude of the masses
while at the same time seeking their support for the
party’s programs. Behind this facade of representative institutions
stood the awesome power of the CCP.
Initially, this “mass line” system worked fairly well.
True, opposition to the regime was ruthlessly suppressed,
but on the positive side, China finally had a government
that appeared to be “for the people.” Although there was
no pretense at Western-style democracy, and official corruption
and bureaucratic mismanagement and arrogance
had by no means been entirely eliminated, the new ruling
class came preponderantly from workers and peasants and
was more willing than its predecessors to listen to the
complaints and aspirations of its constituents.
A good example of the party’s mass line policy was the
land reform program, which redistributed farmland to the
poor. The program was carried out at the village level by
land reform cadres who urged local farmers to establish
tribunals to confiscate the lands of the landlord class and
assign them to poor or landless peasants, thus giving the
impression that the policy was locally inspired rather
than imposed, Soviet-style, from the top down.
But the adoption of the Great Leap Forward betrayed
a fundamental weakness in the policy of the mass line.
While declaring his willingness to listen to the concerns
of the population, Mao was also determined to build
a utopian society based on Marxist-Leninist principles.
Popular acceptance of nationalization and collectivization
during the mid-1950s indicates that the Chinese
people were not entirely hostile to socialism, but when
those programs were carried to an extreme during the
Great Leap Forward, many Chinese, even within the
party, resisted and forced the government to abandon
the program.
The failure of the Great Leap Forward split the CCP
and led to the revolutionary disturbances of the following
decade. Some of Mao’s associates had opposed his radical
approach and now sought to adopt a more cautious road
to nation building. To Mao, such views were a betrayal of
the party’s revolutionary principles. The Cultural Revolution,
which he launched in 1966, can be seen above all
as his attempt to cleanse the system of its impurities and
put Chinese society back on the straight road to egalitarian
communism.
Many of his compatriots evidently shared his beliefs.
Young people in particular, alienated by the lack of
job opportunities, flocked to his cause and served with
enthusiasm in the Red Guard organizations that became
the shock troops of the revolution. But the enthusiasms
aroused by the Cultural Revolution did not last. As in the
French Revolution, the efforts to achieve revolutionary
purity eventually alienated all except the most radical elements
in the country, and a period of reaction inevitably
set in. In China, revolutionary fervor gave way to a new
era in which belief in socialist ideals was replaced by a
more practical desire for material benefits.