But Mao was not yet ready to abandon either his power or
his dream of an egalitarian society. In 1966, he returned
to the attack, mobilizing discontented youth and disgruntled
party members into revolutionary units known
as Red Guards who were urged to take to the streets to
cleanse Chinese society—from local schools and factories
to government ministries in Beijing—of impure elements
who in Mao’s mind were guilty of “taking the capitalist
road.” Supported by his wife, Jiang Qing, and other
radical party figures, Mao launched China on a new
forced march toward communism.
The so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
lasted for ten years, from 1966 to 1976. Some Western observers
interpreted it as a simple power struggle between
Mao and some of his key rivals such as head of state Liu
Shaoqi (1898–1969) and Deng Xiaoping (1904 –1997),
the party’s general secretary. Both were removed from
their positions, and Liu later died, allegedly of torture,
in a Chinese prison. But real policy disagreements were
involved. One reason Mao had advocated the Great Leap
Forward was to bypass the party and government bureaucracy,
which in his view had lost their revolutionary zeal
and were primarily concerned with protecting their
power. Now he and his supporters feared that capitalist
values and the remnants of “feudalist” Confucian ideas
and practices would undermine ideological fervor and betray
the revolutionary cause. Mao himself was convinced
that only an atmosphere of constant revolutionary fervor
(what he termed “uninterrupted revolution”) could enable
the Chinese to overcome the lethargy of the past and
achieve the final stage of utopian communism. “I care
not,” he once wrote, “that the winds blow and the waves
beat. It is better than standing idly in a courtyard.”
His opponents, on the other hand, worried that Mao’s
“heaven-storming” approach could delay economic
growth and antagonize the people. They argued for a
more pragmatic strategy that gave priority to nation
building over the ultimate Communist goal of spiritual
transformation. But with Mao’s supporters now in power,
the party carried out vast economic and educational reforms
that virtually eliminated any remaining profit incentives,
established a new school system that emphasized
“Mao Zedong Thought,” and stressed practical
education at the elementary level at the expense of specialized
training in science and the humanities in the universities.
School learning was discouraged as a legacy of
capitalism, and Mao’s famous Little Red Book (a slim volume
of Maoist aphorisms to encourage good behavior
and revolutionary zeal) was hailed as the most important
source of knowledge in all areas.
Such efforts to destroy all vestiges of traditional society
were reminiscent of the Reign of Terror in revolutionary
France, when the Jacobins sought to destroy organized
religion and even replaced the traditional
Christian chronological system with a new revolutionary
calendar. Red Guards rampaged through the country attempting
to eradicate the “four olds” (old thought, old
culture, old customs, and old habits). They destroyed
temples and religious sculptures; they tore down street
signs and replaced them with new ones carrying revolutionary
names. At one point, the city of Shanghai even
ordered that the significance of colors in stoplights be
changed, so that red (the revolutionary color) would indicate
that traffic could move.
But a mood of revolutionary enthusiasm is difficult to
sustain. Key groups, including party bureaucrats, urban
professionals, and many military officers, did not share
Mao’s belief in the benefits of “uninterrupted revolution”
and constant turmoil. Many were alienated by the arbitrary
actions of the Red Guards, who indiscriminately accused
and brutalized their victims in a society where legal
safeguards had almost entirely vanished. Whether the
Cultural Revolution led to declining productivity is a
matter of debate. Inevitably, however, the sense of anarchy
and uncertainty caused popular support for the movement
to erode, and when the end came with Mao’s death
in 1976, the vast majority of the population may well
have welcomed its demise.
Personal accounts by young Chinese who took part in
the Cultural Revolution clearly show that their initial enthusiasm
often turned to disillusionment. According to
Liang Heng, author of a book titled Son of the Revolution,
at first he helped friends organize Red Guard groups:
“I thought it was a great idea. We would be following
Chairman Mao just like the grownups, and Father would
be proud of me. I suppose I too resented the teachers who
had controlled and criticized me for so long, and I looked
forward to a little revenge.” 4 Later, he had reason to repent.
His sister ran off to join the local Red Guard group.
Prior to her departure, she denounced her mother and the
rest of her family as “rightists” and enemies of the revolution.
Their home was regularly raided by Red Guards, and
their father was severely beaten and tortured for having
three neckties and “Western shirts.” Books, paintings,
and writings were piled in the center of the floor and
burned before his eyes. On leaving, a few of the Red
Guards helped themselves to his monthly salary and his
transistor radio.