Under New Democracy—patterned roughly after Lenin’s
New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia in the 1920s (see
Chapter 4)—the capitalist system of ownership was retained
in the industrial and commercial sectors. A program
of land redistribution was adopted, but the collectivization
of agriculture was postponed. Only after the
party had consolidated its rule and brought a degree of
prosperity to the national economy would the difficult
transformation to a socialist society begin.
In following Soviet precedent, Chinese leaders tacitly
recognized that time and extensive indoctrination would
be needed to convince the Chinese people of the superiority
of socialism. In the meantime, the party would rely
on capitalist profit incentives to spur productivity. Manufacturing
and commercial firms were permitted to remain
in private hands, but they were placed under stringent
government regulations and were encouraged to
form “joint enterprises” with the government. To win the
support of the poorer peasants, who made up the majority
of the population, the land reform program that had long
been in operation in “liberated areas” was now expanded
throughout the country. This strategy was designed not
only to win the gratitude of the rural masses but also to
undermine the political and economic influence of counterrevolutionary
elements still loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.
In some ways, New Democracy was a success. About
two-thirds of the peasant households in the country received
property under the land reform program and thus
had reason to be grateful to the new regime. Spurred by
official tolerance for capitalist activities and the end of
the civil war, the national economy began to rebound, although
agricultural production still lagged behind both
official targets and the growing population, which was
increasing at an annual rate of more than 2 percent. But
there were a number of blemishes in the picture. In the
course of carrying out land redistribution, thousands
if not millions of landlords and rich farmers lost their
lands, their personal property, their freedom, and sometimes
their lives. Many of those who died had been tried
and convicted of “crimes against the people” in tribunals
set up in towns and villages around the country. As Mao
himself later conceded, many were innocent of any
crime, but in the eyes of the party, their deaths were necessary
to destroy the power of the landed gentry in the
countryside (see the box on p. 217).