Once the Japanese takeover was completed, Japanese policy
in the occupied areas of Asia became essentially defensive
as Japan hoped to use its new possessions to meet
its burgeoning needs for raw materials, such as tin, oil,
and rubber, as well as an outlet for Japanese manufactured
goods. To provide an organizational structure for the new
Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a Ministry for
Great East Asia, staffed by civilians, was established in
Tokyo in October 1942 to handle relations between Japan
and the conquered territories.
The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia had been accomplished
under the slogan “Asia for the Asiatics,” and
many Japanese sincerely believed that their government
was bringing about the liberation of the Southeast Asian
peoples from European colonial rule. Japanese officials in
the occupied territories made contact with nationalist elements
and promised that independent governments
would be established under Japanese tutelage. Such governments
were eventually set up in Burma, the Dutch
East Indies, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
In fact, however, real power rested with the Japanese
military authorities in each territory, and the local Japanese
military command was directly subordinated to the
Army General Staff in Tokyo. The economic resources of
the colonies were exploited for the benefit of the Japanese
war machine, while natives were recruited to serve in local
military units or conscripted to work on public works
projects. In some cases, the people living in the occupied
areas were subjected to severe hardships. In Indochina,
for example, forced requisitions of rice by the local Japanese
authorities for shipment abroad created a food shortage
that caused the starvation of more than a million
Vietnamese in 1944 and 1945.
The Japanese planned to implant a new moral and social
order as well as a new political and economic order
in the occupied areas. Occupation policy stressed traditional
values such as obedience, community spirit, filial
piety, and discipline that reflected the prevailing political
and cultural bias in Japan, while supposedly Western
values such as materialism, liberalism, and individualism
were strongly discouraged. To promote the creation of
this new order, occupation authorities gave particular
support to local religious organizations but discouraged
the formation of formal political parties.
At first, many Southeast Asian nationalists took Japanese
promises at face value and agreed to cooperate with
their new masters. In Burma, an independent govern-
ment was established in 1943 and subsequently declared
war on the Allies. But as the exploitative nature of Japanese
occupation policies became increasingly clear, sentiment
turned against the new order. Japanese officials
sometimes unwittingly provoked resentment by their arrogance
and contempt for local customs. In the Dutch
East Indies, for example, Indonesians were required to
bow in the direction of Tokyo and recognize the divinity
of the Japanese emperor, practices that were repugnant to
Muslims. In Burma, Buddhist pagodas were sometimes
used as military latrines.
Like German soldiers in occupied Europe, Japanese
military forces often had little respect for the lives of their
subject peoples. In their conquest of Nanjing, China, in
1937, Japanese soldiers had spent several days in killing,
raping, and looting. Almost 800,000 Koreans were sent
overseas, most of them as forced laborers, to Japan. Tens
of thousands of Korean women were forced to be “comfort
women” (prostitutes) for Japanese troops. In construction
projects to help their war effort, the Japanese
also made extensive use of labor forces composed of both
prisoners of war and local peoples. In building the Burma-
Thailand railway in 1943, for example, the Japanese used
61,000 Australian, British, and Dutch prisoners of war
and almost 300,000 workers from Burma, Malaya, Thailand,
and the Dutch East Indies. An inadequate diet and
appalling work conditions in an unhealthy climate led to
the death of 12,000 Allied prisoners of war and 90,000
native workers by the time the railway was completed.
Such Japanese behavior created a dilemma for many
nationalists, who had no desire to see the return of the
colonial powers. Some turned against the Japanese, and
others lapsed into inactivity. Indonesian patriots tried
to have it both ways, feigning support for Japan while
attempting to sabotage the Japanese administration. In
Indochina, Ho Chi Minh’s Indochinese Communist
Party established contacts with American military units
in South China and agreed to provide information on
Japanese troop movements and rescue downed American
fliers in the area. In Malaya, where Japanese treatment of
ethnic Chinese residents was especially harsh, many
joined a guerrilla movement against the occupying forces.
By the end of the war, little support remained in the region
for the erstwhile “liberators.”