On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke
Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, Sophia, were assassinated
in the Bosnian city of Sarajevo. The assassination
was carried out by a Bosnian activist who worked for the
Black Hand, a Serbian terrorist organization dedicated to
the creation of a pan-Slavic kingdom. Although the Austrian
government had no proof the Serbian government
had been directly involved in the archduke’s assassination,
it saw an opportunity to “render Serbia innocuous
once and for all by a display of force,” as the Austrian foreign
minister put it. Austrian leaders sought the backing
of their German allies, who gave their assurance that
Austria-Hungary could rely on Germany’s “full support,”
even if “matters went to the length of a war between
Austria-Hungary and Russia.”
On July 23, Austrian leaders issued an ultimatum to
Serbia in which they made such extreme demands that
Serbia felt it had little choice but to reject some of them
to preserve its sovereignty. Austria then declared war on
Serbia on July 28. Still smarting from its humiliation in
the Bosnian crisis of 1908, Russia was determined to support
Serbia’s cause. On July 28, Tsar Nicholas II ordered
a partial mobilization of the Russian army against Austria
(see the box on p. 67). The Russian general staff informed
the tsar that their mobilization plans were based on a war
against both Germany and Austria simultaneously. They
could not execute a partial mobilization without creating
chaos in the army. Consequently, the Russian government
ordered a full mobilization on July 29, knowing that
the Germans would consider this an act of war against
them. Germany responded by demanding that the Rus-
sians halt their mobilization within twelve hours. When
the Russians ignored the ultimatum, Germany declared
war on Russia on August 1.
Under the guidance of General Alfred von Schlieffen,
chief of staff from 1891 to 1905, the German general staff
had devised a military plan based on the assumption of a
two-front war with France and Russia, which had formed
a military alliance in 1894. The Schlieffen Plan called
for only a minimal troop deployment against Russia. Most
of the German army would execute a rapid invasion of
France before Russia could become effective in the east
or the British could cross the English Channel to help
France. To achieve this rapid invasion, the Germans
would advance through neutral Belgium, with its level
coastal plain, where the army could move faster than on
the rougher terrain to the southeast. After the planned
quick defeat of the French, the German army would then
redeploy to the east against Russia. Under the Schlieffen
Plan, Germany could not mobilize its troops solely
against Russia; therefore, on August 2, Germany issued
an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the right of German
troops to pass through Belgian territory and, on August 3,
declared war on France. On August 4, Great Britain declared
war on Germany, officially in response to this violation
of Belgian neutrality but in fact because of Britain’s
desire to maintain its world power. As one British diplomat
argued, if Germany and Austria were to win the war,
“What would be the position of a friendless England?”
Thus by August 4, all the great powers of Europe were
at war.