In their weakened state, the Qing rulers finally began to
listen to the appeals of reform-minded officials, who
called for a new policy of “self-strengthening,” under
which Western technology would be adopted while Confucian
principles and institutions were maintained intact.
This policy, popularly known by its slogan “East for essence,
West for practical use,” remained the guiding standard
for Chinese foreign and domestic policy for decades.
Some people even called for reforms in education and in
China’s hallowed political institutions, but such radical
proposals were rejected.
During the last quarter of the century, the Manchus attempted
to modernize their military establishment and
build up an industrial base without touching the essential
elements of traditional Chinese civilization. Railroads,
weapons arsenals, and shipyards were built, but the value
system remained essentially unchanged.
In the end, the results spoke for themselves. During
the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the European
penetration of China, both political and military,
intensified. At the outer edges of the Qing Empire, rapacious
imperialists began to bite off territory. The Gobi
Desert north of the Great Wall, Chinese Central Asia,
and Tibet, all inhabited by non-Chinese peoples and
never fully assimilated into the Chinese Empire, were
now gradually removed totally from Beijing’s control. In
the north and northwest, the main beneficiary was Russia,
which took advantage of the dynasty’s weakness to
force the cession of territories north of the Amur River in
Siberia. In Tibet, competition between Russia and Great
Britain prevented either power from seizing the territory
outright but at the same time enabled Tibetan authorities
to revive local autonomy never recognized by the Chinese.
On the southern borders of the empire, British and
French advances in mainland Southeast Asia removed
Burma and Vietnam from their traditional vassal relationship
to the Manchu court.
Even more ominous developments were taking place
in the Chinese heartland, where European economic
penetration led to the creation of so-called spheres of
influence dominated by diverse foreign powers. Although
the imperial court retained theoretical sovereignty
throughout the country, in practice its political, economic,
and administrative influence beyond the region of
the capital was increasingly circumscribed.
The breakup of the Manchu dynasty accelerated during
the last five years of the nineteenth century. In 1894,
the Qing went to war with Japan over Japanese incursions
into the Korean peninsula, which threatened China’s
long-held suzerainty over the area (see the box on p. 48
and “Joining the Imperialist Club” later in this chapter).
To the surprise of many observers, the Chinese were
roundly defeated, confirming to some critics the devastating
failure of the policy of self-strengthening by halfway
measures.
More humiliation came in 1897, when Germany, a
new entrant in the race for spoils in East Asia, used the
pretext of the murder of two German missionaries by
Chinese rioters to demand the cession of territories in the
Shandong peninsula. The approval of this demand by the
imperial court set off a scramble for territory by other interested
powers. Russia now demanded the Liaodong
peninsula with its ice-free harbor at Port Arthur, and
Great Britain weighed in with a request for a coaling station
in northern China.
The latest scramble for territory had taken place at a
time of internal crisis in China. In the spring of 1898, an
outspoken advocate of reform, the progressive Confucian
scholar Kang Youwei, won the support of the young emperor
Guangxu for a comprehensive reform program patterned
after recent changes initiated in Japan. Without
change, Kang argued, China would perish. During the
next several weeks, the emperor issued edicts calling for
major political, administrative, and educational reforms.
Not surprisingly, Kang’s ideas for reform were opposed by
many conservatives, who saw little advantage to copying
the West. Most important, the new program was opposed
by the emperor’s aunt, the Empress Dowager Cixi, the
real source of power at court. Cixi had begun her political
career as a concubine to an earlier emperor. After his
death, she became a dominant force at court and in 1878
placed her infant nephew, the future emperor Guangxu,
on the throne. For two decades, she ruled in his name as
regent. Cixi interpreted Guangxu’s action as a Britishsupported
effort to reduce her influence at court. With
the aid of conservatives in the army, she arrested and ex-
ecuted several of the reformers and had the emperor incarcerated
in the palace. Kang Youwei succeeded in fleeing
abroad. With Cixi’s palace coup, the so-called One
Hundred Days of reform came to an end.