In the nineteenth century, a new phase of Western expansion
into Asia and Africa began. Whereas European
aims in the East before 1800 could be summed up in
the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama’s famous phrase
“Christians and spices,” in the early nineteenth century,
a new relationship took shape: European nations began to
view Asian and African societies as a source of industrial
raw materials and a market for Western manufactured
goods. No longer were Western gold and silver exchanged
for cloves, pepper, tea, silk, and porcelain. Now the prodigious
output of European factories was sent to Africa and
Asia in return for oil, tin, rubber, and the other resources
needed to fuel the Western industrial machine.
The reason for this change, of course, was the Industrial
Revolution. Now industrializing countries in the West
needed vital rawmaterials that were not available at home
as well as a reliable market for the goods produced in their
factories. The latter factor became increasingly crucial as
capitalist societies began to discover that their home markets
could not always absorb domestic output. When consumer
demand lagged, economic depression threatened.
As Western economic expansion into Asia and Africa
gathered strength during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, it became fashionable to call the process
imperialism. Although the term imperialism has many
meanings, in this instance it referred to the efforts of capitalist
states in the West to seize markets, cheap raw materials,
and lucrative sources for the investment of capital
in the countries beyond Western civilization. In this interpretation,
the primary motives behind the Western
expansion were economic. The best-known promoter of
this view was the British political economist John A.
Hobson, who published a major analysis, Imperialism: A
Study, in 1902. In this influential book, Hobson maintained
that modern imperialism was a direct consequence
of the modern industrial economy. In his view, the industrialized
states of the West often produced more goods
than could be absorbed by the domestic market and thus
had to export their manufactures to make a profit.
As in the earlier phase of Western expansion, however,
the issue was not simply an economic one, since
economic concerns were inevitably tinged with political
ones and with questions of national grandeur and moral
purpose as well. In nineteenth-century Europe, economic
wealth, national status, and political power went hand
in hand with the possession of a colonial empire, at least
in the minds of observers at the time. To nineteenthcentury
global strategists, colonies brought tangible
benefits in the world of balance-of-power politics as well
as economic profits, and many nations became involved
in the pursuit of colonies as much to gain advantage over
their rivals as to acquire territory for its own sake.
The relationship between colonialism and national
survival was expressed directly in a speech by the French
politician Jules Ferry in 1885. A policy of “containment
or abstinence,” he warned, would set France on “the
broad road to decadence” and initiate its decline into a
“third- or fourth-rate power.” British imperialists agreed.
To Cecil Rhodes, the extraction of material wealth from
the colonies was only a secondary matter. “My ruling
purpose,” he remarked, “is the extension of the British
Empire.” 2 That British Empire, on which (as the saying
went) “the sun never set,” was the envy of its rivals
and was viewed as the primary source of British global
dominance during the latter half of the nineteenth
century.
With the change in European motives for colonization
came a corresponding shift in tactics. Earlier, when their
economic interests were more limited, European states
had generally been satisfied to deal with existing independent
states rather than attempt to establish direct
control over vast territories. There had been exceptions
where state power at the local level was on the point of
collapse (as in India), where European economic interests
were especially intense (as in Latin America and the
East Indies), or where there was no centralized authority
(as in North America and the Philippines). But for the
most part, the Western presence in Asia and Africa had
been limited to controlling the regional trade network
and establishing a few footholds where the foreigners
could carry on trade and missionary activity.
After 1800, the demands of industrialization in Europe
created a new set of dynamics. Maintaining access to industrial
raw materials, such as oil and rubber, and setting
up reliable markets for European manufactured products
required more extensive control over colonial territories.
As competition for colonies increased, the colonial powers
sought to solidify their hold over their territories to protect
them from attack by their rivals. During the last two
decades of the nineteenth century, the quest for colonies
became a scramble as all the major European states, now
joined by theUnited States and Japan, engaged in a global
land grab. In many cases, economic interests were secondary
to security concerns or national prestige. In Africa, for
example, the British engaged in a struggle with their rivals
to protect their interests in the Suez Canal and the Red
Sea. In Southeast Asia, the United States seized the Philippines
from Spain at least partly to keep them out of
the hands of the Japanese, and the French took over Indochina
for fear that it would otherwise be occupied by Germany,
Japan, or the United States.
By 1900, virtually all the societies of Africa and Asia
were either under full colonial rule or, as in the case of
China and the Ottoman Empire, on the point of virtual
collapse. Only a handful of states, such as Japan in East
Asia, Thailand in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Iran
in the Middle East, and mountainous Ethiopia in East Africa,
managed to escape internal disintegration or political
subjection to colonial rule. As the twentieth century
began, European hegemony over the ancient civilizations
of Asia and Africa seemed complete.