On September 16, 1942, the Metropolitan of Kiev and Exarch of Ukraine, Nikolay (Yarushevich), together with another Russian bishop, visited the British embassy, then temporally transferred to Kuibyshev.110 They appeared at the embassy doors without preliminary notification. The diplomats had no choice but to welcome the two churchmen. Moreover, Metropolitan Nikolay brought several copies of The Truth about Religion in Russia as a gift. During the talks he surprised his hosts once more with a request to facilitate his visit to England, where he wished to meet with Anglican leaders. Nikolay (Yarushevich) assured the British diplomats that the Soviet government would facilitate his trip as well As an exchange visit of an Anglican church delegation. Two days later, he paid another visit to the British embassy to receive an answer to his proposal.111
The Church of England accepted the idea but carefully analyzed the motives behinD this Russian move. In the first place it examined “whether the general attitude of the Soviet government towards religion has undergone any radical change.”112 To answer this question, the Anglican leaders used the dispatches of the British embassy in the Soviet Union to the British foreign secretary in London. One of these, sent by Lacy Baggallay on September 30, concerned the visit of Metropolitan Nikolay to the embassy in Kuibyshev. According to the British diplomat, it was too early to assume that the Soviet government had made any fundamental change in its attitude to religion. He referred to an earlier dispatch of May 13, which had discussed the revival of religion after the outbreak of war and the change in the attitude of the Soviet state that had taken place “under the urge of expediency.” Lacy Baggallay stressed, “It must go a long way yet before religion plays in this country a part comparable with that which it played before or still plays in some other countries.” According to his analysis, the Soviet government took into consideration at least three reasons why the proposed exchange of visits would be of benefit:
1. It seems probable that the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that the Church can be a valuable ally, that religious feelings in the USSR at present cannot be ignored and must not be antagonised, and that every means must be used to bring popular support to the war effort.
2. The Soviet Government realises that the opinion about the USSR in the United Nations is considerably affected by the Soviet treatment of Christians in the USSR. The aim of a visit of this kind would be to set the minds of foreign Christians at rest on this point, and so remove a serious stumbling block in the way of future good relations.
3. One of the strongest cards of German propaganda in Europe is that they claim to be restoring Christianity to those peoples who have been deprived oF it by the Godless Bolsheviks. The proposed visit would be a demonstration that such propaganda is without foundation.113
Cooperation with the government was profitable for the Sergian Church as well. According to Baggallay, the church leaders would try to persuade the Kremlin of their loyalty by maintaining that the church “identifies itself with the government in its desire to repel the invader” and that “it is satisfied with the part which is able to play in the life of the nation.” What mattered here was not the sincerity of the Sergian administration, but its pragmatic approach addressed not to the past but to the future. Concerning the sincerity of the Sergian Church’s hierarchy, Baggallay concluded, “It is not for others to cavil if these leaders think that for the sake of the larger aim they must draw the veil over the sufferings of the past and put the best face possible on the difficulties of the present.”114 This pragmatic approach was admired by the Anglican Church.
The second issue in the report on the motives behind Metropolitan Nikolay’s proposal concerned the means by which the Soviet government intended to achieve its aims. The initiative of the Russian hierarch, combined with the publication of The Truth about Religion in Russia and the multiple articles on religion distributed by the Soviet Information Center, brought the Anglican observers to the conclusion that they should expect “a general propaganda offensive on the religious fTont.” All materials claimed that the Orthodox Church in the USSR had always been able to respond to the needs of every true Christian. They emphasized that the Sergian Church’s wartime support for the government had brought the Orthodox hierarchy closer to ordinary believers. If there was any persecution of religion, it was oriented against the reactionaries in the church.
The document also analyzed the impact of such an initiative on British-Soviet relations. It pointed to a survey in Great Britain that revealed that 72 percent of the interviewed pointed to the Soviet treatment of religion as the chief difficulty of the wartime collaboration with Stalin. From such a perspective, an exchange of church delegations was considered desirable from the point of view of the antiHitlerite alliance. Moreover, the two churches had not paid such visits to each
Other since the Bolshevik revolution. Therefore, the proposed exchange was also necessary for the establishment of closer relations between the Christians of the two countries. In this regard, equally important was the general effect of this enterprise on world opinion. According to the British analysts, these visits could provoke “a controversy about the treatment of religion in Russia.”115 Especially dangerous were the statements about the satisfactory position of the Russian Orthodox Church because they would undermine the confidence in the good will of the Soviet government. In this regard, the Church of England pointed to the negative public reaction to the speech about religious freedom in the USSR that the Russian ambassador to Great Britain, Ivan Mayski, delivered in 1941.
Soviet propaganda was not the only threat to the success of the planned visits. There was a real danger that Nazi Germany could benefit by presenting them as “merely a propaganda stunt.” The name of the Church of England could suffer equally in case of its association with the Bolsheviks. The Germans had already hinted at this when they learned of the correspondence between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Metropolitan Sergii of Moscow. Therefore, it was considered very important to minimize the impression that the visits were a propaganda campaign. Equally dangerous was their potential misuse. The British authorities were afraid that the Kremlin could announce “the visit round the world as proof that religion was in fine fettle in the Soviet Union, and that normal relations existed between the Russian and Anglican churches.” ' 16 Such a development would make things worse than before.
The final issue in the document related to the order of the visits. On the basis of the report fTom the British embassy, it concluded that the Soviet side insisted that the visit of the Russian church delegation had to precede that of the British onE.117 In such a case, there was a danger of Soviet propaganda speculations. Had the Russian visit come first, the Anglican Church was afraid that it would be impossible to return the visit. Such a development would give arguments to German propaganda. In order to escape the negative effects of such a perspective, the Church of England had to settle certain conditions in advance. They were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
If possible, an attempt should be made to induce the Soviet Government to adoPt a reticent attitude.
The visits should be a semi-private affair between the two Churches. There should be no public interviews by any of the delegates. Only agreed statements should be issued, the agreement being made between the representatives of both Churches. (Here one may remark that the invitation from the Russian side should come from the Metropolitan Sergei of Moscow, who is the locum tenens of the Patriarchal Throne.) The visit of an English delegation to Russia should precede a Russian visit to England.
The British delegation in the USSR should have every opportunity to move about fTeely (subject to military conditions), and the contacts of the delegation should not be confined to official conferences.118
The document concludes that despite the possibility for misrepresentation, the visits offered opportunities that should not be missed, and eventual disadvantages could be prevented with cooperation and care. This vision was in harmony with the policy of the British Foreign Office.119 On January 23, 1943, the Religions Division aT the Ministry of Information informed Archbishop Temple that the Archbishop of York, Garbett, was ready to join the Anglican delegation to Moscow.120 He was also informed that at the moment the details concerning the visit were being negotiated with the Metropolitan Nikolay of Kiev via the Soviet embassy in London. The plan for an Anglican visit that would precede the Russian one was put into operation.
World History
