From early on, U. S. studios created a worldwide popular culture that people of many societies enjoyed. During the 1990s and 2000s, the sheer pervasiveness of American cinema became even more evident. Films from the seven major distributors—Warner Bros., Universal, Paramount, Columbia, 20th Century Fox, MGM/UA, and Disney (Buena Vista)—reached nearly every coun-
How did Hollywood cinema strengthen its hold on world culture? We have already seen that many film industries declined in the 1970s and 1980s, often because of competition from television and other leisure activities. Hollywood films, particularly megapictures, offered stiff competition to the local product. U. S. companies had often stayed out of markets where admission prices were very low, since they could not recoup much of their investment there. As living standards rose in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in Asia, moviegoers could afford higher ticket prices and the U. S. firms moved in.
The U. S. studios also benefited from the vast power of the conglomerates to which they now belonged. The entertainment conglomerates that had acquired most of the Hollywood firms in the 1980s and 1990s were among the world’s top-ten media companies. In 2001, the combined revenue of the six giants came to $130 billion. Each conglomerate, linked to international funding and audiences, could act globally. Viacom, parent to Paramount, owned MTV, which broadcast in eight languages throughout the world, and the company programmed over 2,600 movies and series per year for international television. Viacom also owned the Blockbuster video rental chain. Similarly, News Corporation owned not only 20th Century Fox but also newspapers, book publishers, and the rights to broadcast major sports events, such as NFL football and Manchester United rugby. News Corporation’s television holdings, particularly its satellite outlets BskyB and Asian Star TV, reached three-quarters of the world’s population.
By owning more media outlets in many countries, a conglomerate gained access to new markets, competing with smaller-scale local companies. The conglomerate could also reap economies of scale. The modern media empire, dependent on “content providers,” sought synergy (p. 682) between a novel, a movie, or a television series and other divisions, such as record companies.
The Disney Empire For many companies, the model was the Walt Disney Company. Its revenues placed it in the top tier of global entertainment companies, second only to AOL Time Warner. In the 1980s Disney wisely diversified its filmmaking, entering the adult market with its Touchstone and Hollywood labels. Later it bought Miramax, so that films as varied as Pulp Fiction (1994), Shakespeare in Love (1998), and Scary Movie (2000) contributed their share to the Magic Kingdom. Apart from theatrical filmmaking, Disney held a commanding place in the U. S. market through publishing, cable television (The Disney Channel, ESPN), network television (Capital Cities/ABC), theme parks, and merchandising (highlighted by a chain of Disney Stores).
On all these fronts and more, Disney expanded into the world. It established cruise lines, launched Disneyland parks in Japan and France, and placed its stores in major European and Asian capitals. Disney employed people from eighty-five different countries at its parks and retail outlets as well as in its filmmaking divisions.
It outsourced much of its animation work to Asia, where inkers and colorists worked for low wages.
Disney invested in cable and satellite television companies, licensed merchandising to an estimated 3,000 firms worldwide, and dubbed its entire film and television library into thirty-five languages. At the end of the 1990s, nine of the world’s ten top-selling home videos were Disney animated features. By buying Capital Cities/ ABC in 1995, Disney could bundle its cartoon and live-action programs along with the immensely popular sports programs exported on ESPN. In 1999, revenues from overseas came to nearly $5 billion, or 20 percent of the company’s total income.
The key to the Kingdom was branded content. The Disney name, like famous brands of soap or automobiles, guaranteed quality and consistency. Trademarked characters Mickey Mouse and Simba the Lion could be poured into many media molds—a film, a TV show, a comic book, a song, a Broadway play, or merchandise. The Disney company understood synergy long before the term became fashionable. Although it floundered in the 1960s and 1970s (chiefly through failing to exploit its assets), the firm took off again in the early 1980s, particularly after Michael Eisner became president in 1984. Eisner started his job by seeking “to formalize the role of synergy and brand management.” 1
The Disney company taught Hollywood to keep the world market in mind at all times. Directors brought from abroad, such as Hong Kong’s John Woo and Germany’s Roland Emmerich, supposedly knew how to please foreign audiences. Stars had to tour the world with their movies. Above all, producers sought a “global film.” Batman (1989), The Lion King (1994), Independence Day (1996), Men in Black (1997), Titanic (1997), The Lord of the Rings (2001-2003)—these were megaevents that aimed to attract every viewer, everywhere. Jurassic Park (1993) is a particularly compelling model of the global film (see box).
It was not only home-grown movies that allowed Hollywood to penetrate other countries. For decades the Majors had invested in the overseas film trade, a process that began to intensify in the 1980s. The studios sank money into cable and satellite television, theater chains, and theme parks. Because of the power of the Majors’ distribution network, many local films were marketed, either nationally or internationally, by a Hollywood company.
World History
