[ ... ]
—Late at night, at 12:30, Poskrebyshev210 called. He reported that instructions for the Chinese comrades could be issued in the spirit of my proposals, which St[alin] considers correct.
[ ... ]
—At the party conference.211 In the morning, closing of the debate on Voznesensky’s212 report. Resolution adopted.
—Evening session—closed. (Only delegates with deciding votes or with a voice but no vote participate.)
—A number of members and members-elect of the CC and Audit Commission were withdrawn and replaced with new people. (Withdrawn: Litvinov, Merkulov (former people’s [commissar of] ferrous metallurgy), Zhemchuzhina,213 and others).
—What happened to Zhemchuzhina was especially striking. (She made a good speech. “The party rewarded me, gave me encouragement for good work. But I let things get out of hand; my deputy (as people’s commissar of the fishing industry) turned out to be a spy, so did a woman friend. I failed to demonstrate element[ary] vigilance. I drew a lesson from all that. I declare that I will work to the end of my days honestly, like a Bolshevik...”
During voting, one member abstained (Molotov). Perhaps because he is her husband; even so, that was hardly correct. . .
—A number of members and members-elect were admitted to the CC, mainly military comrades.
—They (the military) were proposed by Stalin himself. He characterized them as modern military personnel, with an understanding of the nature of modern warfare, not old-fashioned, and so forth.
—Stalin: “It is a shame we failed to single out such people before. We did not know our cadres well!”
—He said of Golikov that as an intelligence agent, he is inexperienced, naive. An intelligence agent ought to be like a devil: believing no one, not even himself.
—Kuusinen, too, was admitted into the CC. Molotov recommended him: “There is no need to speak at length about Com[rade] Kuusi-nen. Suffice it to say that he is among the most senior members of the Comintern Executive Committee. And has always worked for the bolshevization of the fraternal Com[munist] parties. Now he is doing Soviet work—chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Kar[elian]-Fin[nish] Republic. There is ample justification for admitting him into the CC.” —Also elected to the CC was Maisky214 (Soviet ambassador to London). Molotov emphasized that Maisky works well as an envoy plenipotentiary in difficult conditions, and it had to be demonstrated that the party values diplomats who carry out the party’s will. That also served to counterbalance the expulsion of Litvinov from the CC.
—A motion passed to put M. M. Kaganovich and other people’s commissars and CC members on notice that if they fail to correct their errors they will be dismissed as people’s commissars and withdrawn from the CC.
—With that, the conference was closed.
[ ... ]
[ ... ]
—Golikov from the Intelligence Directorate: on Chinese affairs. Chiang Kai-shek proposes sending a Soviet adviser to the Eighth Route Army as well.
[ ... ]
[ ... ]
—In the CC secretariat (Zhdanov, Andreev, Malenkov). Discussion of our proposal for ECCI schools. In principal, all agreed. Confirm the schools individually (after working up their programs, choice of instructors, composition of student bodies, and so forth). Principal aim: to train for the most part cadres from the Slavic countries (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia). In the curriculum: the emphasis is to be on the study of one’s own country, one’s own party, their problems, how to fight the enemy on one’s home territory.
—Zh[danov]: “We got off track on the national question. Failed to pay sufficient attention to national aspects.” A combination of pro-let[arian] internationalism and the healthy national feelings of the given people. Our “internationalists” have to be trained.
[ ... ]
—D. Z. [Manuilsky] and I discussed the draft theses on the Second International.
(I offered him my observations: our intention is not evident in the theses; there is no clear orientation toward our goal: the final ousting of social democracy from the workers’ movement, the establishment of a united command for the workers’ movement in the person of the Com[munist] Party; not to allow social democracy to rise again and reprise the counterrevolutionary role that it played at the end of the first imperialist war, etc.)
[ ... ]
[ ... ]
—It could be said, for the first time on International Women’s Day I was not elected to the honor presidium. That, of course, is no accident. Apart from foreign policy considerations, this has to be taken as a signal of some kind of behind-the-scenes “shenanigans.”
[ ... ]
—Zhdanov gave me his comments on the theses on social democracy over the telephone:
—Considers the theses unsatisfactory:
1. The center of gravity in them is set on historical analysis (the past) rather than on the present moment in social democracy;
2. Social democracy is examined on the international scale, instead of differentiating the various individual major countries—the victors and the vanquished, the combatants, and the “neutrals,” and so forth.
3. The bankruptcy of social democracy is examined without any indication of the shameful predicament in which the working class finds itself in the face of current events.
4. In criticizing social democracy, formul[ations] are used that are no longer current (it has rejected social[ist] slogans).
5) No indication that the bourgeoisie and the fascists are adopting the social[ist] slogans of the working class in order to strengthen their own position and to destroy the workers’ movement.
6. No concrete and effective citations and statements of Social Democratic leaders about their current positions.
The fundamental question now:
—Will the working class allow the bourgeoisie to reinforce its power for a period of several more decades? (The Soviet Union—
Here—is doing its part; but where is the working class of the capitalist countries?)
[ ... ]
[ ... ]
—Received a telegram from the CC of the Yugoslav party on its position in connection with the developments in Yugoslavia.2"71
1. The party is organizing nationwide resistance to a German-Italian invasion of Yugoslavia and of attempts by England to draw Yugoslavia into the war on its side.
2. Nationwide pressure on the new government, demanding annulment of the Vienna pact and the conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact with the USSR.
3. To adopt a guarded attitude toward the new government.
[ ... ]
—Spent the evening with Viacheslav Mikhailovich [Molotov] (at the Kremlin).
—We talked about Yugoslavia.
—It would be counterproductive to organize street demonstrations. The English would take advantage of them. So would the internal reaction. Cadres of the Communist movement would be beaten. At present the thing to do is to gather strength and prepare. Not raise a stink, not shout, but firmly carry out your position. The Yugoslav comrades ought to be advised to do this.
—V. M. [Molotov] has his doubts about the campaign in connection with Thalmann’s fifty-fifth. If there is a conspicuous campaign 215 abroad, while here we do not do a thing, that would be awkward. But having any kind of observance could hardly be politically expedient, since we are maintaining a nonhostile policy as regards the Germans. We shall have to consult with the CC, but it would be best not to intensify that campaign.
—Regarding Turkey: The Germans are trying to set the Turks against us, intimidating them with the notion that we will attack them in the rear if they resist Germany. That is why we issued that statement. The Turks can now rest assured as far as we are concerned, and act more boldly. The Turks, of course, would have liked to get more from us.
—This Yugoslav business is a slap in the face for the Germans. Ma-tsuoka216 got the same cold shower. . . (The discussion was extremely friendly.) —I wrote up [the following telegram] to send to Yugoslavia (to the Communist Party CC):
We urgently advise confining yourselves at this stage to an energetic and skillful explanation of the position you have adopted among the masses, but without organizing any street demonstrations, and taking all pains to avoid armed clashes between the masses and the authorities. Do not give way to momentary inclinations. Do not let yourselves be carried away with sensational and outwardly effective actions, but instead concentrate all your attention on explaining our principles and slogans, our Communist policies—on the strengthening of the party; on rallying and organizing the forces of the working class, of the peasant masses and the toiling urban strata, and on the thorough preparation of those forces; on strengthening the influence of the party with the army and young people. Do not get ahead of yourselves. Do not give in to provocations by the enemy. Do not expose the people’s vanguard to attack and cast it too early into the fire. The time is not yet ripe for decisive engagements with the class enemy. Tireless explanatory efforts and the thorough preparation of oneself and the masses—those are the party’s present tasks. Take this into consideration and [put it] into action. Confirm receipt. Report to us regularly.
[ ... ]
• 2 April 1941 •
[ ... ]
—The CC in Sofia has been sent a warning in connection with the antiSerbian demonstrations: “ ... The involvement of Bulgaria in the war against Yugoslavia is not only an act of base treachery as regards a neighboring fraternal people; it will also mean turning the Bulgarian people itself into warriors for German imperialism, shedding its own blood for foreign interests and condemning its own country to terrible ruin and destruction. Develop a campaign along these lines, without giving in to enemy provocations.”
[ ... ]
• 6 April 1941 •
—Sunday.
—Agreement with Yugoslavia published with a photo of the Yugoslav delegation and Molotov, Stalin, and others.
—Germany has declared war on Yugoslavia and Greece.217
[ ... ]
• 9 April 1941 •
—Talked with Zhdanov about the CI’s May Day appeal. We both consider it inexpedient in the current situation to come out with a Comintern appeal for May Day. (To make a thorough analysis would mean showing one’s cards to a certain degree, giving the enemy an opportunity he could use against us, and so forth.)
The events in the Balkans do not alter the overall stance we have
Taken as regards the imperialist war and both of the combatant capitalist alignments. We do not approve of German expansion in the Balkans. But that does not mean that we are deviating from the pact with Germany and veering toward England.
Those among us who think it does are underestimating the independent role and power of the Sov[iet] Union. It seems to them that we have to orient ourselves toward either one imperialist alignment or the other, but that is profoundly mistaken. . .
[ ... ]
—Called up Zhdanov about our directive on the observance of May Day. [He] related Joseph Vissarionovich’s [Stalin’s] comments on the necessity of differentiating between countries (combatant, noncombatant, occupied, and so forth). Regarding the fundamental positions (“The imperialist war is the business of the imperialists; the people’s peace is the business of the working class and peoples.” “The war of the Greek and Yugoslav people against imper[ialist] aggression is a just war,” etc.) there are no reservations.
[ ... ]
—Was at the Bolshoi Theater. Final evening of “Tadzhik Days.” Present (in the PB box): Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Andreev, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Shvernik, Shcherbakov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Dim[itrov].
—After the performance we lingered until 2:00.
—J. V. [Stalin] was telling us about his talk with Matsuoka.
“We, too, have communism—moral communism,” Matsuoka was telling J. Vissarionovich. Whereupon the latter made a joke about “Japanese communism” . . .
—We drank to my health as well. In this connection J. V. [Stalin] said: “D[imitrov] has parties leaving the Comintern (alluding to the Amer[ican] party). And there is nothing wrong with that. On the contrary, the Com[munist] parties ought to be made independent, instead of sections of the CI. They should turn into national Com[munist] parties with various names—the Workers’ Party, the Marxist Party, etc. The name does not matter. What matters is that they put down roots in their own peoples and concentrate on their own proper tasks. They ought to have a Com[munist] program; they should proceed on a Marxist analysis, but without looking over their shoulders at Moscow; they should resolve the concrete problems they face in the given country independently. And the situation and problems in different countries are altogether different. In England there are certain ones, in Germany there are different ones, and so forth. Once the Com[munist] parties have become stronger in this way, then reestablish their international organization.”
The International was formed in Marx’s time in the expectation of an imminent international revolution. The Comintern, too, was formed in such a period in Lenin’s time. Today the national tasks of the various countries stand in the forefront. But the position of the Com[munist] parties as sections of an international organization, subordinated to the Executive Committee of the CI, is an obstacle. . .
Do not cling to what was the rule yesterday. Take strict account of the new conditions that have arisen. . .
From the point of view of the parochial interests (of the CI), that may be unpleasant, but it is not those interests which are decisive!
The membership of the Com[munist] parties within the Comintern in current conditions facilitates bourgeois persecution of them and the bourgeois plan to isolate them from the masses of their own countries, while it prevents the Communist parties from developing independently and resolving their own problems as national parties. . .
—The question has been formulated sharply and clearly of the further existence of the CI for the immediate future and of new forms of international connections and international work under the conditions of world war.
—Raised for discussion with Ercoli [Togliatti] and Maurice [Thorez] the issue of discontinuing the activities of the ECCI as a leadership body for Com[munist] parties for the immediate future, granting full independence to the individual Com[munist] parties, converting them into authentic national parties of Communists in their respective countries, guided by a Communist program, but resolving their own concrete problems in their own manner, in accordance with the conditions in their countries, and themselves bearing responsibility for their decisions and actions. Instead of the ECCI, having an organ of informational and ideological and political assistance for Com[munist] parties.
Both found that formulation of the question basically correct and entirely appropriate to the current situation of the international workers’ movement.
• 22 April 1941 •
—Meeting of the American commission. Developed the aim of independent development and action by Com[munist] parties, their performance and struggle as national Communist parties of their respective countries, and the ramifications this entails for America.
—In the evening a reception at the Kremlin for participants in the days of Tadzhik art. Remarkable evening.
At the end, J. V. [Stalin] proposed a toast to Lenin: “I thank you for your salutations and the sympathy you have shown me... People are in the habit of praising their living leaders until those leaders collapse. Then, once they are dead, they forget all about them. Such customs are unseemly; however, they are universal. We Bolsheviks, however, are in the habit of swimming against the current. And we reject those customs. We ought never to forget about the great man to whom we owe everything we have and everything we have achieved. We ought never to forget about Lenin. Lenin gave birth to us all, forged us, organized us, armed us, aimed us. He created the party of the Bolsheviks, which knows no fear before difficulties, which knows no fear in a struggle. He created a new ideology of humanity, an ideology of friendship and love among peoples, equality among races. An ideology that holds one race above others and calls for other races to be subordinated to that race is a moribund ideology, it cannot last for long. . . I propose a toast to Lenin, our teacher, our educator, our father!
—The Tadzhik people is a distinctive one, with an old, rich culture. It stands higher than the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs. We saw this especially clearly in the Tadzhik Days festival. We wish it [the Tadzhik people] to continue flourishing, and Muscovites to do their utmost to help!”
• 23 April 1941 •
—Discussion with lecturers on the international situation (sixty-five persons).
—Gave explanations:
1. Of the Soviet-Japanese pact
2. Of the situation in the Balkans and the prospect of war in the Mediterranean basin
3. Of relations between the Soviet Union and China following conclusion of the pact with Japan
—General conclusions:
A) Events in the Balkans are not hastening the end of the war; on the contrary, they are prolonging and intensifying it. World war is long and drawn out.
B) The flames of war are coming ever closer to the borders of the Soviet Union, which should do its utmost to prepare for any “unforeseen contingency.”
C) The Soviet Union is being given an ever freer hand as regards the West.
—Again discussed the directive for the CP of France with Maurice [Thorez], Marty, and Ercoli [Togliatti].
[ ... ]
• 4 May 1941 •
[ ... ]
—A telegram from Sofia (via the NKID [People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs]).
—Todor Pavlov relates that the [Communist] Workers’ Party urgently requests advice on the party’s position as regards the “liberation” of Macedonia and Thrace.
• 5 May 1941 •
—Text of the telegram from Sofia:
Todor Pavlov reported that the latest events have put the Workers’ Party in a difficult position. The Workers’ Party is unable to formulate independently its attitude to the occupation of Thrace and Macedonia by Bulgarian troops. Given the atmosphere of chauvinist intoxication that has partially affected the working masses as well, primarily the petty bourgeois, if the Workers’ Party were to come out against the “liberation” of Thrace and Macedonia and the western outlying districts, it could find itself isolated from certain strata of the population. Moreover, opposition to the “liberation” of these regions ought to be accompanied by some sort of concrete demands. Agitating for maintaining Thrace and Macedonia in their former state borders after the actual rout of Greece and Yugoslavia would be futile.
Neither could the Workers’ Party approve of the “liberation” of Thrace and especially Macedonia, considering the Soviet government’s statement to the Bulgarian government of 3 March 1941, and the friendship agreement concluded between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The Workers’ Party leadership cannot produce cogent responses to left-wing political figures and cannot provide instructions for its members who for various reasons are traveling to Thrace and Macedonia. Communications with the appropriate authority are very slow and irregular. The Workers’ Party urgently awaits instruc-tions.—i May 1941.
—Discussion with Kolarov, Pieck, Marek [Stanke Dimitrov], Belov [Damianov] and Vladimirov [Chervenkov] on decisions and actions of the Bulgarian Com[munist] Party on the basis of the materials received.
—And also on the telegram from Sofia. There is some suspicion that Com[rade] Pavlov is not expressing the view of the CC, but has instead sent an inquiry on his own initiative.
—It was decided to send advice to the CC on the recent developments in the country.
—In the evening a ceremonial assembly in the Kremlin for graduates of the military academy, and reception afterwards.
At the ceremonial assembly J. V. [Stalin] made a speech:
—The Red Army has substantially reorganized and rearmed itself on the basis of the experience of modern warfare. But our schools are lagging behind that process in the army. They are not conducting training on the basis of the latest models of weaponry. We have to reckon with the enormous advances taking place in military science and with the experience of the current world war.
Why is it that France was routed and England is losing, while the Germans are winning? The major reason is that Germany, as a defeated country, sought and found new avenues and means of escaping the onerous position in which it found itself after the first war. It created an army and cadres, supplied itself abundantly with arms, especially artillery, as well as an air force. Meanwhile, France and England, following their victory, got dizzy with success, boasted of their might, and failed to carry out the necessary military preparations. Lenin turns out to have been correct when he said that parties and states perish from dizziness and success.
An army that thinks itself invincible and beyond the need for further improvements is doomed to defeat.
Is the German army invincible? No. It is not invincible. In the first place,
Germany began the war with the slogan of “liberation from Versailles.” And it had the sympathies of peoples suffering from the Versailles system. But now Germany is continuing the war under the banner of the conquest and subjection of other peoples, under the banner of hegemony. That is a great disadvantage for the German army. It not only is losing the former sympathy of a number of countries and peoples but, on the contrary, has opposed to itself the many countries it occupies. An army that must fight while contending with hostile territories and masses underfoot and in its rear is exposed to serious dangers. That is another disadvantage for the German army.
—Furthermore, the German leaders are already beginning to suffer from dizziness. It seems to them that there is nothing they could not do, that their army is strong enough and there is no point in improving it any further.
All of which goes to show that the German army is not invincible.
Napoleon, too, had great military success as long as he was fighting for liberation from serfdom, but as soon as he began a war for conquest, for the subjection of other peoples, his army began suffering defeats. . .
Our army must be constantly reinforcing and improving itself. And our military schools must march in step with the army, not lag behind.
At the reception J. V. [Stalin] proposed toasts several times. He was in an exceptionally good mood.
. . . The main thing is an infantry, a well-supplied infantry. But the major role is played by the artillery (cannons, tanks). To perform that role the artillery needs air power. Air power does not of itself decide the outcome of the battle, but in combination with the infantry and the artillery, it plays an exceptionally important role. It is not long-range air power that matters the most (it is needed for diversionary operations deep in the enemy’s interior), but short-range air power (bombers, dive bombers). Short-range air power covers the operations of artillery and other weaponry. The cavalry has not lost its significance in modern warfare. It is especially important when the enemy is beaten back from his positions, in order to give chase and not allow him to fortify new positions. Only the correct combination of all types of troops can ensure victory.
. . . Our policy of peace and security is at the same time a policy of preparation for war. There is no defense without offense. The army must be trained in the spirit of offensive action. We must prepare for war.
• 6 May 1941 •
[ ... ]
—Sobolev from the NKID [People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs] reported that Tsvetanova-Dragoicheva218 related to Lavrishchev219 that the telegram sent by T[odor] Pavlov has no bearing on reality. The Workers’ Party does have a position on the Macedonian and Thracian question and is issuing a special declaration-appeal.
—Sent Sobolev the following letter: “In the interests of avoiding such unpleasant misunderstandings as occurred with the tendentious message from Todor Pavlov, please inform Com[rade] Lavrishchev that Tsvetanova [Dragoicheva] is the person in our party leadership’s confidence in Bulgaria and she alone is entitled to communicate the opinions and inquiries of the party leadership.”
[ ... ]
• io May 1941 •
—Sent the following telegram to Sofia via Fitin:220
We are in solidarity with the appeal against the war and with the articles in Rabotnichesko delo no. 7. The chief task for the party at this stage is to explain to the people the danger of utter national enslavement and to rally the healthy forces of the nation to the struggle for national independence. An authentic national policy must be opposed to the traitorous policy of the bourgeoisie: the Bulgarian army must be the defender of national independence, and not a gendarme detachment for Germany; against involving Bulgaria in the war; defense of the state against foreign intervention and the withdrawal of German troops from the country; defense of the economic independence of the country and the future of its people as an independent and full-fledged nation; friendship with the Soviet Union.
Expose servility before the imperialist dictators, bolster the people’s faith in their own strength and in friendship with the USSR; bolster solidarity with the Balkan peoples in the struggle against the imperialists. There will be neither peace nor a definitive solution to the Macedonian and Thracian question as long as the imperialists are at work in the Balkans and their abettors rule.
Take account of the new difficulties—the fomenting of chauvinism, the opening of profitable services in the occupied regions, the seizure of Serbian and Greek peasants’ lands, as well as the intensified attack on the working class and party. Take measures to reinforce the party and to safeguard its cadres.
[ ... ]
World History
