Real wages rose during the war, at least when official price indexes are used to deflate wages, but the rise was not uniform. The gaps between the wages earned by managers and workers and between the wages earned by skilled and unskilled workers narrowed.
The “Great Compression” in wage differences, moreover, persisted for some years into the postwar era (Goldin and Margo 1992), although it eventually disappeared. Wartime wage controls, which were tougher at the high end of the wage distribution, and the strong demand for unskilled labor seem to be the main factors behind this important, albeit temporary, increase in wage equality.
The war put relations between labor and management on hold. The Roosevelt administration had supported labor’s efforts to organize, bargain collectively, and strike; now labor was expected to cooperate with the effort to maximize production. Labor took a no-strike pledge, paralleling a no-lockout pledge by management. For the most part, labor kept its pledge. The major exception was the United Mine Workers, under their charismatic leader John L. Lewis. As the result of public indignation over strikes in the coalfields, Congress passed the Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act in 1943, which provided for government takeover of mines and factories in essential war industries that were hampered by strikes. Despite this case, however, the conflict between labor and management was generally kept in check during the war by labor’s patriotism and by the government’s extraordinary powers.
The real crunch came at the end of the war. As workers’ overtime disappeared and real earnings were eroded by rising prices, labor leaders were under pressure to secure wage increases, and they were not forthcoming without a struggle, but the widespread work stoppages of 1945 and 1946, alienated large segments of the electorate.
During this period, employers complained that they were being caught in the jurisdictional disputes of rival unions and that labor itself was guilty of unfair practices. A belief was growing that union power was being used to infringe on the rights of individual workers. In fact, employers often used strikes to pressure the OPA to grant a price increase. Labor, of course, realized that this avenue was open to employers, and this entered into their strike calculations. The OPA, in many cases, claimed that higher wages could be paid without granting higher prices, but the path of least resistance, typically, was to grant a round of wage and price increases in an industry experiencing a strike.
After the Republicans won control of Congress in 1946, they lost no time in drawing up a long, technical bill that significantly amended the Wagner Act. The new law, passed in 1947 over President Truman’s veto, was officially called the Labor Management Relations Act but became known familiarly as the Taft-Hartley Act. The Taft-Hartley Act, unlike the Wagner Act, assumed that the interests of the union and individuals in the union were not identical, taking the view that many union members were “captives” of the labor bosses—a position offensive to a great part of organized labor. The closed-shop agreement, under which the employer hires only union members, was outlawed. Union shop agreements, which permit nonunion members to be employed but require them to join the union within a certain time period after starting to work, were permitted. More important, the law permitted individual states to outlaw all forms of union security, including the union shop.
The most important features of the Taft-Hartley Act were those purporting to regulate unions in the “public” interest. A union seeking certification or requesting an investigation of unfair labor practices had to submit to a scrutiny of its internal affairs by filing statements with the government, and its officers were required to sign affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party. The right to strike was modified by provision of a cooling-off period after notice of termination of contract, and the president of the United States was given authority to postpone strikes for 80 days by injunction. More significant was the outlawing of certain unfair union practices. After 1947, it was unfair for a union to do the following:
1. Restrain or coerce employees regarding their right to join or refrain from joining a labor organization, or restrain or coerce employers in the selection of employer representatives for purposes of collective bargaining or adjustment of grievances.
2. Cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee.
3. Charge, under a valid union shop agreement, an excessive initiation fee.
4. Refuse to bargain collectively with an employer when the union involved is the certified bargaining agent.
5. “Featherbed” the job—that is, force an employer to pay for services that are not performed.
6. Engage in, or encourage employees to engage in, a strike where the object is to force one employer to cease doing business with another employer (the secondary boycott).
After 12 years of almost complete freedom, labor found the Taft-Hartley Act harshly restrictive. Dire warnings were voiced about the coming decline of trade unionism in America. Labor’s leadership was incensed at the offensive language and punitive spirit of the act. Many of the provisions looked worse in print, however, than they proved in practice. The injunction clause, for example, stirred memories of the days when the courts granted injunctions at the request of private parties; however, in the hands of a president of the United States, acting in an emergency, the injunction was no longer a destructive weapon.
World History
