The Main Directorate for Special Programs (GUSP)

GUSP is a small and highly secret state agency formed on the basis of a KGB Directorate. Its chief official function is the security of strategic installations, most specifically the bunkers built to shield the Soviet leadership in the event of nuclear war. It also has a coordination and mobilization function in the event of major war. Some reports also suggest it has “operational-analytical” functions. Given the nature of its tasks and the secrecy that surrounds it, GUSP will not be discussed further.93

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)

The MVD was in some ways the neglected stepchild of the Soviet power ministries. In the early decades of Soviet power, it was sometimes institutionally joined to the KGB’s predecessors, such as the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), but ultimately it developed as an autonomous institution in the post-Stalin era. The MVD suffered in comparison to the KGB and the military in terms of status, power, and resources. But the police (formally the “militia,” but I generally use “police” throughout) were the face of Soviet

, Pro et Contra, 7, 4 Putin’s Militocracy,”

Power with which ordinary citizens were most likely to interact, and evidence of pervasive corruption in the MVD in the 1970s and 1980s was an important indicator that Soviet control over coercive force was weakening. Moreover, the MVD, despite its relatively marginal status, did control key bodies from the point of view of domestic security, including the Internal Troops.31

Compared to the KGB, the MVD has endured relatively little organizational change since the Soviet collapse. Although internally it has experienced some reorganization, it was not split up into its constituent parts like the KGB. The one significant loss of coercive power and responsibility was the transfer in 1998 of the prison service from the MVD to the Ministry of Justice. The MVD controls not only the ordinary police (militia), but also many other subunits with responsibility for various aspects of internal security and law enforcement. These include, for example, the Road Police, Special Designation Police Detachments (OMON and OMSN), and multiple directorates with specific designations, such as the Department for Countering Extremism, which replaced the Department for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. The MVD also controls the 200,000-strong Internal Troops (VV), which has played a major role in the war in Chechnya.32 After the Yeltsin-era holdover, Vladimir Rushaylo, was removed as minister in 2001, the MVD under Putin was led by someone from his two main sources of officials, either St. Petersburg or the KGB. Boris Gryzlov, who went on to become Speaker of the Duma and head of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, led the MVD from 2001 to 2004. His successor, Rashid Nurgaliyev, was a KGB veteran who was moved to the MVD as First Deputy in 2002 before being elevated to the top spot.

The MVD employs more than 1.2 million personnel, plus physical plant employees and guards. A 2005 presidential decree listed the size of the MVD financed by the federal budget as 821,268 personnel. Of this number, 661,275 are law enforcement personnel and the remaining 159,993 are civilian employees.33 However, there are also MVD personnel financed by local and

For background on the Soviet period, see: Louise I. Shelley, Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control (London: Routledge, 1996); V. F. Nekrasov et. al., Organy i Voyska MVD Rossii: Kratkiy istoricheskiy ocherk (Moskva: MVD Rossii, 1996); Dennis Desmond, “The Structure and Organization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs under Mikhail Gorbachev,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 3, 2 (Autumn 1994), pp. 217-258; William C. Fuller, Jr., The Internal Troops of the MVD SSSR, College Station Papers No. 6 (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A & M University, 1983).

For basic introductions to the MVD, see: L. K. Savyuk, Pravokhranitel’nye organy (Moskva: Yurist, 2001), pp. 283-316; Mark Galeotti, “Policing Russia: Problems and Prospects in Turbulent Times,” JIR, Special Report No. 15, September 1997; Gordon Bennett, The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK (March 2000).

“Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob ustanovlenii predel’noy shtatnoy chislennosti organov vnutrennikh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” No. 1246, October 31, 2005. See also the figures provided by the official state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which gives data not only on the total number of personnel, but also those in the Internal Troops and in MVD special forces: Mikhail Falaleyev, “Chist’ mundiry,” RG, November 10, 2006.

Regional budgets not included in this decree. According to a report by the MVD Financial-Economic Department, police units supported by local and regional budgets make up about one-third of the total number of MVD personnel.94 Thus, overall, the MVD employs around 1,230,000 people.95 For comparison, the Soviet MVD employed roughly 3.5 million personnel in 1988.96

Published figures also permit a rough estimate of the total number of police in Russia. Combining the 661,275 federal law enforcement personnel with the more than 400,000 police personnel supported by regional and local governments, minus the 200,000 internal troops, yields a total of 871,909 police in Russia.97 With a 2006 total population of 142,800,000, this means a ratio of 1 police officer for every 164 citizens, or 611 police for every 100,000 inhabitants.98 This estimate of the number of police in Russia is imprecise, but if it is at all close, it suggests that the number of Russian police is quite high compared to other post-communist countries or some other developed countries (see Table 2.2). For example, it is almost twice as many on a per capita basis as the United States, Germany, France, or Poland. To put it differently, any weaknesses in Russian state capacity in the law enforcement sphere are not due to a small number of police personnel. Indeed, as we will see when we discuss homicide rates in Chapter 3, Russia does not seem to be getting good value from such a large police force.

This discussion of personnel also points to a key difference between the MVD and other major power ministries, such as the armed forces and the FSB: the important element of regional and local control over the police. According to Article 72 of the Constitution, “the guaranteeing of legality, law and order, and public safety” and “personnel of judicial and law-enforcement bodies” are joint responsibilities of the center and subjects of the Federation.

State Building in Putin’s Russia TABLE 2.2. Police Personnel per 100,000 Inhabitants

Note: Post-communist countries are italicized.

Source: Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 1998-2000; author’s estimate.

Although somewhat decentralized in the context of Russia’s power ministries, in comparative context, Russian policing has historically been quite centralized for a federation. The federal element of state coercion, especially as it applies to the police, will be explored further in Chapter 4.

The police in general are relatively understudied in the statist literature. The Russian police are also generally understudied in the West. Given this relative neglect both in political science and in Russian studies, and the importance of the police for the post-Soviet Russian state, they receive extensive coverage in this book.

Other Power Ministries and Law Enforcement Agencies

The Military, the FSB, and the MVD, despite the greater fragmentation of the 1990s, remain the fundamental state coercive agencies in Russia. Other organizations, such as the SVR, the MChS, and the FSO, have managed to carve out relatively stable and successful bureaucratic niches for themselves. In addition to these core agencies, there are several other important organizations that play an important law enforcement role and that will feature at various places later in the book.

The Federal Service for the Control of the Narcotics Trade (FSKN)

The FSKN is a relatively new organization, formed in 2003 as part of a larger reorganization of the power ministries undertaken by Putin. The function of combating the drug trade was previously primarily a function of the MVD. Putin’s decision to create a separate agency dedicated to this task was motivated both by concern about the escalating drug problem in Russia and the previous inefficiency of the police in dealing with the problem.99 Like the FSO, it also has sufficient domestic surveillance and intelligence capabilities to serve as a counterweight to the FSB.

The FSKN was formed largely on the basis of the Federal Tax Police Service (FSNP), an organization created after the Soviet collapse to provide some muscle to the state in enforcing tax claims. The FSNP was staffed largely by personnel from the former KGB and became famous for its so-called “mask show” raids on businesses. The FSNP grew to about 53,000 personnel, and it did help the state raise revenue, but it was also widely seen as corrupt.100 When the FSNP was disbanded, its functions and some of its personnel were transferred to the MVD, while the bulk of the personnel (around 40,000) went to work for the FSKN; the size of the FSKN in 2007 was 33,677.101 Of course, there are doubts as to whether the same personnel who were accused of corruption in hunting down corporate tax evaders will be any cleaner in cracking down on the drug trade. The FSKN under Putin was headed by Viktor Cherkesov, a close acquaintance of Putin who shared a background in the KGB and who also hails from St. Petersburg. Cherkesov had a reputation as a hardliner, based partially on his persecution of dissidents in Leningrad well into the Gorbachev era.

The Ministry of Justice

The Ministry of Justice is not a traditional power ministry. Most of its functions, such as providing legal expertise on laws and decrees and maintaining official registers of property, political parties, and non-governmental organizations, do not involve state coercion in any direct sense. However, as noted earlier, the ministry does control the prison system, which was transferred from the MVD in 1998 at the request of the Council of Europe to make the Russian prison system more compatible with European standards. The Federal Penitentiary Service - literally the Federal Service for the Administration of Sentences (FSIN) - is responsible for the detention and prison system that holds more than 850,000 prisoners. Its personnel wear uniforms and have ranks, and are subject to MVD personnel regulations.102 The Ministry of Justice also controls the Bailiffs Service, which is responsible for the enforcement of judicial decisions and orders, including civil judgments involving the payment or seizure of money. Peter Kahn argued that Bailiffs’ activities are guided more by enriching themselves or the state than the private parties who are seeking compensation.103