The Politburo faced an uphill public relations battle after the invasion. Its official story was full of holes. Its troops and special forces had somehow been invited to assist the Afghanistan revolution by puppet leaders appointed only after the coup. Amin was supposedly condemned to death by a fictitious Afghanistan Revolutionary Council. Radio announcements of these events had originated from within the Soviet Union, not from Kabul.
The Soviet propaganda machine sprang into full gear. The major talking points were distributed to forty-six "communist and workers parties of non-socialist parties” in a memo entitled "About the propa-gandistic coverage of our actions in relation to Afghanistan.” These friendly communist and socialist parties were given six points:
1. The Soviet Union sent troops at the request of the Afghanistan leadership.
2. The Afghanistan government requested Soviet assistance only for their battle against foreign aggression.
3. Foreign aggression threatens the Afghan revolution and its sovereignty and independence.
4. The request for assistance came from a sovereign Afghan government to another sovereign Soviet government.
5. The naming of the new leadership of Afghanistan was an internal matter decided by its own Revolutionary Council.
6. The Soviet Union had nothing to do with the change in government, which was exclusively an internal matter.
Although some of these points defied credibility, they were nevertheless supplied for the public discourse.
An even more urgent need was to coach the new Afghan government on how to conduct diplomacy. Already on January 4, 1980, the wily Andrei Gromyko, long the face of Soviet diplomacy, instructed the new Afghan foreign minister (Dost) on how to present the case to the Security Council of the United Nations. The "Memo of the basic points of a conversation of Gromyko with foreign minister Dost. January 4, 1980” comprises a monolog by Gromyko, rather than a "conversation” between him and Dost.
Gromyko: I want to share with you, Comrade Minister, some thoughts about the U. N. Security Council and your forthcoming remarks. Of course, these ideas are not final, but they reflect the views of our country about the events in Afghanistan and its vicinity. First. Western powers, particularly the United States, have launched hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union and against revolutionary Afghanistan. Imperialism has decided to "blow off steam.” Second. With respect to the tone of your presentation at the Security Council, you should not act as the accused but as the accuser. I think there are enough facts for this position. Therefore it is extremely important not to defend but to attack. Third. It is essential to emphasize that the introduction of the limited military contingent in Afghanistan was done by the Soviet Union in response to numerous requests of the government of Afghanistan. These requests were made earlier by Taraki when he was in Moscow and by Amin. Carter wants to create the impression that the Soviet Union received this request only from the new government of Afghanistan, but you can decisively refute this notion using exact dates and details. Fourth. You must clearly emphasize that the limited Soviet contingent was introduced to Afghanistan only to assist against unceasingly aggressive forces, particularly from Pakistan, where refugee camps have been converted by the forces of the United States, other Western countries, and China into staging areas for foreign fighters. Fifth. The change of leadership in Afghanistan is a purely internal matter. No one has the right to tell Afghanistan what to do or how to act.
Dost's role in this conversation was to listen and then to thank Gromyko for his time and remarks.
World History
