By acknowledging Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Sepah involvement in thejraqi insurgency, one sees why Fallujah was billed as an al-Zarqawi stronghold. The Muslim militant method is more psychological and political than it is martial. It depends on the
Western occupier using so strong a hand as to alienate the local population. As such, it encourages that occupier’s overreaction to ongoing events.
When the London Times published a press release from “insurgent commanders. . . inside Fallujah” on 8 November 2004, it unwittingly furthered the opposition’s agenda. That release casually mentioned that the insurgents had “118 car bombs. . . and 300 volunteer foreign suicide bombers lined up to take on the advancing American units.” Then—during the initial stages of the as
Sault—when Marines reported “entire buildings that were boobytrapped” at the city’s outskirts, the rumor quickly spread that many structures throughout the city had been rigged for demolition. Such reports and rumors might have prompted casualtyconscious American commanders to destroy any vehicle, person, or building suspected of harboring high explosives.
While most of the U. S. troops probably showed great courage and restraint during the assault, there was still evidence of a firepower-heavy format. As they moved through the city, they shot at many of the vehicles, people, and dogs they saw up side streets. “Expecting and finding countless explosive devices and boobytraps, American units took few chances as they moved methodically through the city. Every vehicle is treated as a potential car bomb; every person a possible enemy.” While probably not universally true, some units were “shooting anything that moves.” It was obvious from the televised coverage of the battle, that many buildings came under heavy bombardment from bomb-dropping fixed-wing aircraft, “Hellfire”-missile-firing helicopters, tanks, and antitank weapons.