The Unions

Despite (or perhaps because of) the surge in the demand for industrial labor, the 1920s were not years of advance for organized labor. As Table 22.2 shows, the number of workers holding union membership fell from a peak of more than 12 percent of the civilian labor force in 1920 to less than 8 percent at the end of the decade. This fall is especially surprising in light of the rapid growth of manufacturing and the concentration of the population in urban areas. It is true that, throughout the 1920s, employers continued their effective use of the antiunion instruments developed before World War I. They discriminated in hiring and firing against employees who joined or organized unions. They used the hated “yellow-dog” contract, in which new employees promised not to join a union, to prevent union membership, and to serve as a basis of civil suits against unions that persuaded employees to violate the contracts. But the employers’ most useful weapon was the injunction, by which a court could forbid, at least

TABLE 22.2 UNION MEMBERSHIPS, 1919-1929  1

Source: Historical Statistics 1975, Series D4, D7, D8, and D940.

Temporarily, such practices as picketing, secondary boycotts, and the feeding of strikers by the union.

During the 1920s, government generally did not interfere with labor relations. The dreams of labor unions for legislation that would protect their right to organize, and provide ordinary workers with a safety net in the form of unemployment insurance and social security, would not be realized until the 1930s. There were, however, some glimmers of what was to come. The railroads had been nationalized during World War I. When they were returned to private ownership in 1920, Congress established the National Railway Labor Board to help resolve labor disputes. This law was modified in 1926 when a Board of Mediation, to focus on voluntary cooperation, replaced the Labor Board.

More important as a precursor to the New Deal were workers’ compensation laws as Price Fishback and Shawn Kantor demonstrate in A Prelude to the Welfare State (2000). These laws, most of which were passed by the states in the 1910s, showed their worth in the 1920s. Traditionally, if a worker was injured on the job and wanted compensation, the worker had to sue his or her employer. But to win, the worker then had to show that the employer had been negligent, and overcome a number of legal defenses, which was a daunting task. Under workers’ compensation, the worker could not sue, but the employer would buy insurance that compensated the worker and provided medical care in stated amounts for stated injuries. Both employers and employees saw potential benefits from the new system, making it relatively easy to pass the legislation. Employers did not have to worry about the rare but costly settlement; employees did not have to worry that they would suffer a debilitating injury and end up with no compensation. For the most part the new system worked well, and strengthened the case for a stronger federal safety net, although in some industries workers may have paid for the new benefit with lower wages.

Although such policies slowed organized labor’s progress, they cannot explain an absolute decline in union membership. It seems most likely that the upsurge in union membership associated with World War I had not been firmly established. The wartime increase in membership resulted in part from agreements by the unions to a nonstrike pledge in return for lessened opposition to union organization. The sharp recession of 1920-1921, and the resulting high unemployment, undermined support for unions. It is pertinent to note in Table 22.2 that most of the membership decline had occurred by 1923, after which time there was only minor attrition. In addition, beginning with the important strike against U. S. Steel in 1916, a host of strikes failed—except to anger employers. Company welfare programs designed to entice workers away from their own organizations also took their toll, but the inertia between 1924 and 1929 must be attributed primarily to two other causes. First, the increase in real wages left the greater part of the labor force generally satisfied. More important, the powerful American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions, whose members especially benefited from the building boom, took no interest in organizing the growing mass production industries. Added to this was a generally tired and unimaginative labor leadership.