Nasser did not plan the specific war which broke out in June 1967, but, from 1956 on, he expected another war with Israel at some point. His Fian-Arab diplomacy and his build up of the Egyptian army were based on the assumption that another major conflict with Israel was inevitable. He also believed that there were three key factors on his side:
• The USSR would back Egypt in any war with Israel.
• The USA would prevent Israel from attacking Egypt.
The Egyptian army would be ready for war with Israel.
He was to be proved wrong on all three counts. With a disregard for Cold War alignments and diplomatic conventions, Israel seized the initiative in June 1967. Asserting that an Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran (see Source K), Egyptian army manoeuvres in Sinai, and a recent military pact between Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan were evidence of an intended joint Arab attack, the Israelis claimed they had to strike preemptively. This was their justification for launching well prepared assaults on various Arab positions. Within three hours, Israeli aircraft had attacked Egyptian airfields and practically destroyed the whole of Nasser's air force while it was still on the ground. Syria and Jordan also suffered crippling Israeli ground and air attacks. Within six days the Israelis had achieved overwhelming success; the combined Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi and Syrian forces had been defeated. As in 1948-49, lack of effective liaison between the Arab commands, inferior equipment, and strategic naivety had made the task easier. Israel now had control of these vital areas:
• the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza strip, taken from Egypt
• East Jerusalem and the West Bank, taken from Jordan
• the Golan Heights, taken from Syria.
The humiliation for Nasser could not have been greater. It was a disaster from which he never fully recovered. Always contingent upon his being able to guide the Arabs to victory over Israel, his reputation as the great Fian-Arabist was now shredded. The respect and gratitude of the masses for what
What does Source K indicate about the scale of Israeli success in the Six-Day War?
SOURCE K
Map showing the aftermath of the Six-Day War.
He had previously done to raise Arab consciousness and self-esteem did not entirely evaporate, but his leadership was now compromised.
World History
