SUMMIT JET CHARTER: c/o Summit Aviation Corporation, 7144 Republic Airport, Farmingdale, New York 11735, United States; Phone (516) 756-2545; Fax (516) 756-0809; Http://www. summitjet. com; Year Founded 1980. Specializing in corporate and executive travel worldwide, the aircraft of Summit Jet are based at Republic Airport in 1980. Summit Aviation Corporation headquarters, however, are in Ridgefield, Connecticut.
From initial fixed-wing flights to U. S. destinations, the concern branches out over the next 18 years to operate to points around the world. It also acquires helicopters with which to provide flight-seeing and airport transfers.
Mike Brazill is charter manager in 2000 and he schedules Summits 6 pilots, who fly 2 Learjet 55 Longhorns and 1 each Canadair 600 Challenger and British Aerospace BAe (HS) 125-700A Hawker. Two Aerospatiale AS-350B Ecureuils are also flown.
SUN AIR (1): United States (1969-1978). Sun Air is set up at St. Petersburg, Florida, in 1969 to provide scheduled air taxi service to intrastate destinations. Employing the first of several Cessna 402s, the company duly inaugurates daily revenue frequencies linking its Lakeland base with West Palm Beach, Miami, Gainesville, and Jacksonville. This route network is supported for a decade.
SUN AIR (2): United States (1981). The second Sun Air is set up by A.
Wayne Lackey at Fort Lauderdale during February 1981 on the purchased assets of a failed charter operation. Plans are made to establish a scheduled route network connecting the company’s base with eight Florida cities. Employing one of several available Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirantes, Lackey’s new entrant inaugurates daily roundtrips to Miami on March 17.
Only one revenue flight is completed as Lackey, saddled with a $1 million in acquired debt, is forced to file for Chapter XI bankruptcy protection on March 24. Liquidation occurs later in the year.
SUN AIR (PTY.), LTD.: South Africa (1994-1999). In April 1994, Bop Air (Pty.), Ltd., the carrier of the former South African homeland of Bophuthatswana, is renamed Sun Air. Dirk E. Ackerman is chairman, with Johan L. Borstlap is managing director. They oversees a workforce of 132 and a fleet that includes 1 British Aerospace BAe (HS) 748-B2, 1 Cessna Citation II, and 2 each Embraer EMB-120 Brasilias and EMB-110P-1 Bandeirantes, plus 2 Douglas DC-9-32 jetliners. From bases at Mmabatho and Sun City, scheduled passenger and cargo services are operated to Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Thaba’Nehu.
Operating between the “golden triangle” cities of Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town in 1995, Managing Director Borstlap’s fleet is increased by the addition of two DC-9-31s and a Boeing 727-230A, the latter leased from Safair (Pty.), Ltd. The Bandeirantes are sold.
The B-727-230A is sold to Inter Air (Pty.), Ltd. in February 1996. In September, Sun Air enters into a marketing agreement with Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. On October 2, the two carriers link their frequent flyer programs and share codes on Sun Air flights between Durban, Cape Town, and Johannesburg. The schedules of these flights are arranged to connect with the new VAA thrice-weekly roundtrips between London and Johannesburg. A third “Baby Boeing” is delivered in November.
Plans are made to privatize the company early in the new year and Virgin Chairman Richard Branson enters into discussions with the South African government concerning the possibility of his acquiring a majority stake. Several groups bid on the carrier and begin to study its five-year business plan; these include consortia led by Virgin, Malaysia Airlines Bhd., Air France, and Comair (Pty.), Ltd. Sun Air is valued in the prospectus at between R60 million and R90 million ($13.4 to $20.1 million).
In a public poll, the company at year’s end is voted the best domestic airline in South Africa for 1996. An R2.6-million profit is reported for the year.
In February 1997, an arrangement similar to that with VAA is joined with KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines, N. V.); dual-designators of the Netherlands flag carrier are also carried on Sun Air flights from Johannesburg to Cape Town and Durban. In April, the carrier leases five McDonnell Douglas MD-81s aircraft from Safair (Pty.), Ltd. to replace its aging Boeing and Douglas fleet. In May, Investec, which owns the 4 DC-9s via an installment agreement with Sun Air Trust, gives Safair a 12-month window to sell the 4 planes should Sun Air default on its lease payments. When the first of the Safair planes arrives in July, one DC-931 is passed to the new Zimbabwe Express Airlines, Ltd.
In October, state-owned Sun Air is sold to a consortium that includes Comair (Pty.), Ltd. (25%), the Black empowerment consortium Retha-bile and Coordinated Network Investments (55%), National Empowerment Fund (15%), and company employees (5%). The purchase price is R 50 million ($10.6 million), with the new owners agreeing to take over $46 million in debt. Managing Director Borstlap remains CEO.
Given their alliances with rivals British Airways, Ltd. (2) and Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., Comair and Sun Air will continue to compete with one another over established trunk routes. There will be no changes in branding or management. The two will, however, seek to jointly purchase equipment, coordinate schedules, and refrain, at least immediately, from launching routes in opposition to one another.
Flights continue in 1998. When SA Express Airways (Pty.), Ltd. sparks a price war with Comair (Pty.), Ltd. on October 5 in which both lower their domestic fares by 15%, Sun Air refuses to join in. At the same time, Managing Director Borstlap indicates that planning is underway for a listing of the company on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange sometime in the year 2000.
Sun Air joins with Nationwide Air Charter (Pty.), Ltd. and Comair (Pty.), Ltd. during January 1999 in lodging a complaint with the South African Competition Board. The three allege that South African Airways (Pty.), Ltd. has so reduced prices and increased capacity on a number of domestic routes as to be engaged in predatory pricing violations. Some SAA fares on the routes between Johannesburg and Durban are less expensive than motor buses. The board indicates that it will undertake an investigation over the next few months. When made aware of the Competition Board complaint, officials from SAA indicate that they will contest the claims.
South African Airways (Pty.), Ltd (SAA) and its affiliates continue their fare war with Comair (Pty.), Ltd., backed by British Airways, Ltd. (2), Nationwide Air Charter (Pty.), Ltd., supported by Sabena Belgian World Airlines, S. A., and Sun Air. By midsummer, the independents have still not heard from the SACB.
On August 1, SA Airlink (Pty.), Ltd. CEO Rodger Foster, who is also serving as chairman of the Airlines Association of South Africa, warns that the market is hopelessly overtraded and suggests that one or more of the smaller players will soon fail. Within days, SAA completes a deal with the Sun Air board of directors, led by Executive Director Sheiks Makhado; it is offered financial assistance in exchange for the carrier’s grounding. It is anticipated that the government will write off it’s the final R20 million ($3.3 million) that is owed to it by the airline. The arrangement, it will later be revealed, is good until mid-September, after which SAA is free to walk away without paying a thing.
Having received neither government or shareholder permission for the deal, loss-making Sun Air is sold to SAA on August 13 and shut down 72 hours later. Its staff is dismissed and on the specific order of SAA, all aircraft are returned to Safair (Pty.), Ltd. at Johannesburg International Airport. In announcing the closure, SAA CEO Coleman Andrews indicates that it should not take the independents more than two weeks to absorb Sun Air’s 10% market share and that its removal from the playing field should help the survivors become more viable and compete more robustly with each other.
With support from British Airways, Ltd. (2), Comair (Pty.), Ltd.,
Which grants its approval and writes off its 25% stake, immediately steps in to arrange accommodation for stranded Sun passengers.
Shortly thereafter, South Africa’s Public Enterprise Minister Jeffrey Radebe informs the National Assembly that the government had not approved SAA’s takeover of the defunct Sun Air and that a special investigation into the circumstances of the Sun Air demise would be conducted. In explaining his decision, Radebe confirms government disapproval of the sale of Sun Air by its current shareholders, believing that it would not receive its final R20 million ($3.3 million) privatization payment in 2000 due from the shareholders.
With the government unwilling to write off its outstanding payment, the consortium that had purchased Sun Air now has no airline, no buyer, and responsibility for Sun Air’s debts. Meanwhile, to make matters worse, Safair (Pty.), Ltd. proposes to file a R800-million lawsuit against Sun Air for breaking its aircraft leasing and maintenance contract. The move forces the government to place Sun Air into provisional liquidation and suspend its license, which will not be revoked until a final liquidation order is made. Lawyers for the black empowerment consortium Rethabile are instructed to seek enforcement of the SAA agreement.
Meanwhile, one option remains. A proposal is made by the Sun Air Staff Action Committee, a consortium of foreign and local companies, (including marketing partner Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.) led by Glenn Watson, with backing from organized labor and former Sun Air employees, to purchase the Sun Air assets and restart the airline. SAA CEO Andrews scoffs and is quoted in an October Airline Business report as indicating that “only a total fool would invest the R300 million that would be required to restart Sun Air.”
When the government does not step forward to offer assistance in the form of greater protection for a reborn entity, Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., which has just received authority for direct London (LHR) to Cape Town flights, withdraws on October 4 from any further discussions on revitalizing Sun Air. Its local spokesman informs the Africa News Service on October 6 that the home office also has not, in its due diligence, been able to get a handle on potential liabilities facing Sun Air. That being the case, no profit could be expected.
The results of an investigation into Sun Air’s grounding conducted by official liquidator Kenneth Moses are released on December 27 and create headlines in every major newspaper in the country. Details are based on court papers and reveal a secret compact between South African Airways (Pty.), Ltd. and Safair (Pty.), Ltd. made without the knowledge of anyone at Sun Air or Investec, the bank that had financed part of its fleet. The pact made it impossible for the airline to restart or to sell its leased aircraft.
Under the alleged arrangement, SAA agrees to pay Safair R50 million for the Sun Air leases once it has purchased the airline. Meanwhile, the former Sun Air aircraft may only be sold or chartered by Safair to airlines operating outside southern Africa, a move that will clearly frustrate any group attempting to revive the carrier. It is now understood that the secret arrangement had been one of the “liabilities” that caused Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. to halt its talks with Sun Air’s former employees concerning a possible revival.
Also on December 27, it is reported that Sun Air Trust, which had owned Sun Air’s two DC-9-32s and DC-9-31s, was, itself, liquidated by the Johannesburg High Court on December 20. That closure frees the creditors of SAT to sell the four DC-9s, valued at R60 million, which had been unavailable for sale under the SAA-Safair deal. The trust continues to owe Investec R70 million, while SAA itself stands to forfeit the R50 million it had paid to Safair as part of the May 1997 arrangement.
On December 29, South African Public Enterprises Minister Radebe informs reporters that no one in the South African government knew about the secret SAA-Safair arrangement. An official government inquiry will commence, he promises, once the liquidators have finished their work.
The Sun Air court liquidation hearings get underway in mid-January 2000. Comair (Pty.), Ltd. Managing Director Pieter van Hoven testifies on January 20 that the government itself had persuaded him to buy a stake in the failed carrier when it was privatized in 1997 because there were no other serious bidders. More importantly, he reveals that South African Airways (Pty.), Ltd. had come up with a plan in 1999, never implemented, for “horizontal capacity collusion” as a way to end the 1998 domestic price war. Under this proposal, the local airline market would simply be carved up between all the active players. The idea went nowhere when Comair refused to drop its complaint, then pending before the South African Competition Board. Thereafter, the next move was to be the elimination of one of the independents.
During the first week of February, the Sun Air liquidators file suit against South African Airways (Pty.), Ltd. seeking R7.2 million to cover the salaries SAA had promised to pay the smaller carrier’s employees, as well as ticket liabilities. SAA had claimed R6 million from the Sun Air estate for wages. Various inquiries into the Sun Air closure drag on during the remainder of 2000, with principals in the case blaming or defending as the matter continues. Eventually, most of the arguments escape news coverage. In the end, Sun Air is completely liquidated and is not reborn. Safair leases the last two repossessed Sun Air-operated MD-81s to Spirit Airlines on August 16.
SUN AIR LINES: United States (1967-1969). Equipped with Beech 18s, Sun is organized by George Caleshu at St. Louis in early 1967. It begins intrastate service in Missouri on April 3 and by the end of 1968, has stretched routes from Kansas City to Miami with intermediate stops at St. Louis, Memphis, Nashville, Birmingham, New Orleans, and Jacksonville.
During the year, the fleet is enhanced by the addition of several de Havilland DH-114 Herons and de Havilland Canada DHC-6-100 Twin Otters. The use of a Learjet allows the carrier to claim that it is the first commuter to employ a jetliner.
Sun Air Lines in 1969 is the largest regional airline in America, but is so significantly overextended, that it cannot fiscally support its business and so must close its doors in July.
SUN AIR OF SCANDINAVIA, A. S.: Lufthavnsvej 33, P. O. Box 40, Billund, DK-7190, Denmark; Phone 45 76 50 01 00; Fax 45 75 33 86 18; Http://www. sunair. dk; Code EZ; Year Founded 1977. Entrepreneur, pilot, and former school building salesman Niels Christian Sund-berg, an employee of Business Jet Flight Centre at Billund, purchases the flight portion of that company when it goes bankrupt in 1977. Early in 1978, Sundberg registers his prize at Billund as Sun Air of Scandinavia as an aircraft sales, maintenance, and charter company. Over the next decade, Sun-Air undertakes nonscheduled domestic services plus air taxi, air ambulance, and contract flights with Piper and Cessna lightplanes.
By the middle 1980s, the fleet of Sundberg’s carrier provides many single-plane examples, including 1 each Beech Bonanza, Cessna 172, Cessna 237, Cessna 207, Gulfstream Commander 690B, Piper PA-31310 Navajo, Piper PA-34 Seneca, and Piper PA-23 Aztec.
When the European Commission relaxes certain air transport requirements in 1987-1989, Sundberg, who is increasingly unable to make ends meet in the charter business, elects to launch a scheduled operation. He applies for a number of scheduled routes and but several years will elapse before these are awarded. An interline agreement is signed with Deutsche Lufthansa, A. G. and an Embraer EMB-110P1 is purchased with which to initiate flights from Billund to Cologne and Bonn during the spring of the latter year.
In 1990, the fleet comprises 2 Cessna Citation Is, 1 Cessna 402, 1 Cessna 441, 1 EMB-110P1, 1 SAAB 340A, and 1 Shorts SC-7 Skyvan. During the summer, the German major shuts down its Cologne hub and the contract with Sun Air ends. As a result of financial and political difficulties, bookings fall to 2,000.
A British Aerospace Jetstream 31 and two Mitsubishi Mu-2Bs are acquired in 1991. When Maersk Air, A. S. withdraws from its Billund to U. K. (Southend Airport) service in favor of a new route to London (LGW), Sun Air steps in to take over the previous service. Unhappily, load factors dictate that it be suspended within three months of its start. During the spring, the Danish government decrees that Aarhus Airport, 40 miles outside Copenhagen, will be the nation’s second airport.
When SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System) is unable to make a profit flying larger aircraft into the airport, owner Sundberg approaches them with a strategic agreement. Sun Air will take over the low-density service to Norway and SAS will provide airside handling, ticketing, check-in, and other airport services for the regional.
The new Jetstream begins scheduled flights from Aarhus to Oslo in August. Enplanements by year’s end total 8,000.
Five more Jetstream 31s arrive in 1992, as orders are placed for three Jetstream 41s and the Bandeirante is withdrawn. Enplanements surge to 50,000. In 1993, President Sundberg oversees a workforce of 70. The first Jetstream 41 is placed into service as a new service is inaugurated from Karup to Aarhus and Stockholm’s Bromma Airport.
Airline employment is increased to 85 in 1994 and the fleet now includes three Cessna 500 Citation Is, seven Jetstream 31s, two Jetstream 41s, two Mitsubishi Mu-2s, and a Partenavia PN.68 Observer. Brussels, Copenhagen, Goteborg, Odense, and Thisted join the route network.
Recognizing the need to find a commercial partner in 1995, Chairman Sundberg approaches Iberia Spanish Airlines (2) (Lineas Aereas de Espana, S. A.), Air France, Alitalia, S. p.A., and kLm (Royal Dutch Airlines, N. V.). An appropriate fit cannot be found with any of them. The fleet is, meanwhile, increased by the addition of 5 Jetstream 41s and enplanements total 120,000.
During the spring of 1996, partnership negotiations are undertaken with British Airways, Ltd. (2). On August 1, the carrier becomes a franchise partner of BA, the first recruited from outside of the U. K.; the British major does not take equity, preferring to leave the Danish carrier an independent airline. It does, however, provide computerized reservations and other airport services, and allows its passengers to participate in its frequent flyer program.
The fleet now includes 9 J-31s and 7 J-41s painted in “British Airways Express” livery. The two share designators on Sun-Air’s Continental routes.
In January 1997, “British Airways Express” service is inaugurated from Billund to Manchester. Four Jetstream 31s will be removed. In July, the carrier purchases two BAe ATPs and another Jetstream 41 from BAe Asset Management Turboprop.
Two aircraft are delivered in early December. The ATP replaces a Jetstream 41 on the Billund to Manchester route while the J-41 succeeds a J-31 on the run from Billund to Oslo.
Following its arrival in January 1998, the second ATP is dedicated to ad hoc and charter work, including the transport of ski enthusiasts to Norway.
The last BAe ATP to be manufactured, serial no. 2062, is acquired in early December.
It is announced on February 25, 2000, that the company will soon inaugurate a new twice-daily Jetstream 41 return service from Billund to Berlin’s Tegel Airport. The flights, employing both J-41s and ATPs, commence on March 27 and complement the airline’s extensive network of flights from Billund to Manchester, Stavanger, Haugesund, Torp, Oslo, and Goteborg.
SUN AIRE: United States (1981-1985). Stephen Milden forms Sunaire at St. Croix, U. S. Virgin Islands, as a division of the privately owned, Hamilton-based FBO Aviation Associates on April 1, 1981. After a year of revenue charter work, capitalization is raised to purchase a de Havilland Canada DHC-6-300 Twin Otter that is employed to inaugurate scheduled seven-times-per-day roundtrip services to St. Thomas on July 5, 1982. During the remainder of the year, a total of 17,621 passengers are flown.
A second Twin Otter arrives in 1983, along with a Piper PA-34 Seneca and a PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain. Enplanements climb 51% to 50,980.
Airline employment in 1984 is 35. Significant competition arrives in April when Virgin Island Seaplanes Shuttle launches 14-times-per-day services between the 3 U. S. Virgin Islands.
Bookings total 58,190, a 14% boost, while cargo accelerates 53.5% to
36,000 pounds.
The St. Croix-based carrier is purchased by Metro Airlines in October 1985 and merged, becoming an Eastern Metro Express division on November 15, dedicated to providing feed to Eastern Air Lines’ San Juan hub. Prior to the takeover, the year’s passenger boardings are 69,135. Afterwards, traffic and other details are reported with those of the Metro Airlines parent, as are those of its Aviation Associates division.
SUN AIRE EXPRESS: United States (1991-1994). San Juan, Puerto Rico-based Aviation Associates, an Eastern Metro Express commuter partner of Eastern Air Lines prior to that major’s January 18, 1991 shutdown, is purchased by Metro Airlines Chairman Edmond Henderson and President Jay Seaborn in February and renamed. With a “United Express” code-sharing alliance in hand, the 216-employee company’s 9 de Havilland Canada DHC-6-300 Twin Otters and 3 DHC-6-200s continue operations from a base at St. Croix as before and transport a total of 348,336 passengers, down 18.9% from the previous year.
Enplanements decline a further 5.1% in 1992 to 330,592 as the carrier’s parent is reformed and renamed Aeroflight Holdings.
An effort is made throughout 1993 to sell the airline but no buyers are found. As a result, the airline, in financial trouble, is forced into Chapter XI bankruptcy in December.
Prior to its bankruptcy, the airline’s customer bookings rise 5.7% to 349,451. Revenues for the year total $14 million.
In May 1994, Sun Aire is purchased by the Texas-based megaregional Mesa Airlines. Under terms of the agreement, Mesa pledges to invest between $600,000 and $750,000 in its new acquisition as part of the required Chapter XI reorganization, which is designed to allow Sun Aire, in the future, to pay back its $2.3-million debt. In addition, the Virgin Island-based company will receive a cash infusion of $750,000, bringing Mesa’s total investment in cash and debt to $3.1 million.
The takeover does not occur, new financing is not obtained, and the company is forced to shut its doors at year’s end, after flying 69,072 passengers.
World History
