The dissolution of the Russian Orthodox Church was also nurtured by the national policies of the new independent states established on the western borderlands of the former Russian Empire after World War I. In order to prevent any Soviet influence, their governments bound up the legal recognition of the local Orthodox communities with requirements for their independence from the Russian mother church. This problem, however, had canonical aspects the solution of which was in the hands of the Moscow Patriarchate. As a result, tensions appeared between the legal and the ecclesiastical status of the Orthodox churches in the interwar so-called Near Abroad. These endangered the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church, which had to take measures to save intact its jurisdiction over the dioceses abroad.
The first step in this direction was made by the Great All-Russian Ecclesiastical Sobor (1917-1918). It guaranteed the canonical authority of the restored Moscow Patriarchate over the Orthodox communities that had fallen outside the interwar borders of Russia, thus preserving the territorial jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church fTom the imperial epoch. Following this policy, in 1918 Patriarch Tikhon protested against the subjection of the Diocese of Kishinev by the Romanian Orthodox Church. In his view, the political incorporation of Bessarabia and Moldova into Romania did not create sufficient canonical grounds for such an act.® 9 On October 13, 1921, the exclusive canonical rights of the Moscow Patriarch over the former Russian imperial territories were reaffirmed by A joint session of the Holy Synod and the Supreme Church Council, which declined the request of the Higher Church Administration, established by Russian emigres in Sremski Karlovci (Yugoslavia), to take care of the Orthodox churches in the Near Abroad.®0 At the same time, the Russian church leadership took into account the changed political situation and granted limited autonomy to its structures that had remained outside the Soviet borders.
The Finnish autonomy
Seized by the Russian Empire in 1809, Finland received the status of Grand Duchy. In 1892, its Orthodox population was organized into a separate diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, which numbered about 65,000 believers by
1917. World War I and the revolutions, however, destroyed the financial affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, which consequently failed to provide material support to the Finnish diocese. In this difficult moment, it was saved by the Finnish Senate, which voted special subsidies. These were justified by the autonomous status of the Finnish Orthodox diocese, proclaimed in January 1918. Under this status, the diocese remained canonically subjected to the Russian mother church but was obliged to observe the legal and economic provisions of the Finnish government.71
In August 1918, in the course of the Berlin negotiations with representatives of Bolshevik Russia, the Finns requested autocephaly for the Orthodox community in their country. This request was declined by the Soviet diplomats, who provided the argument that the national branches of the Catholic Church were also administrated by a center abroad.72 Therefore, the Finns tried to secure the independence of their Orthodox community by means of national law. On November 26,
1918, the Finnish Senate conferred the status of national minority church on the local Orthodox communitY.73 In this way, the state authorities received the right to set up new Orthodox dioceses and parishes, to open and close monasteries, and to approve the appointment of bishops. In addition, the management of the local Orthodox Church was entrusted to an ecclesiastical assembly consisting of clerics and laymen. Finally, the Finnish state limited the rights of Bishop Seraphim Luk”yanov of Vyborg and Finland, who was an appointee of a foreign religious organization.
In June 1919, the FinnisH Orthodox Ecclesiastical Assembly referred to Patriarch Tikhon with a request for autocephaly. It also suggested a unification of the Orthodox believers in Finland, Karelia, and Estonia in one ChurcH.74 The answer came on February 11, 1921, when Patriarch Tikhon issued Decree No. 139, which granted autonomy to the Finish Orthodox ChurcH.75 Its hierarchy Even received the right to prepare its own holy oil (myrrh) instead of getting it from the Russian mother church. Therefore, Tikhon defined this autonomy as extremelY broad and slightly different fTom an autocephalY.76 At the same time, he did not proclaim the Finnish Church an archbishopric, despite the elevation of Bishop Seraphim (Luk”yanov) to the rank of archbishoP.77
Autonomous status, however, did not stop the alienation of the Orthodox community in Finland fTom the Moscow Patriarchate. In March 1921, the Finnish Orthodox Church made the decision to adopt the Gregorian calendaR.78 This was approved by the government, but Patriarch Tikhon refused to bless iT.79 IN his turn, Archbishop Seraphim declared the new calendar uncanonical.80 As a result, his position as a state official was shaken and the Finnish government looked for a more loyal cleric to head the local Orthodox Church. Herman V. Aav, an Orthodox priest of Estonian origin, was chosen. He was not able to take the church leadership, however, without the blessing of the Russian mother church.
This problem was solved in July 1923 when a Finnish delegation visited the Patriarch of Constantinople to submit the Finnish Orthodox Church under his jurisdiction. It is worth mentioning that this enterprise was realized with the assistance of Swedish diplomats who persuaded the Turkish government to postpone the exile of Patriarch Meletios IV (Metaxakis) in order to release the Finnish Orthodox Church from its dependence on Patriarch TikhoN.81 ON July 8, Meletios IV also consecrated Rev. Aav as bishop, although the latter did not meet the canonical requirements for becoming a bishop because he had more than one marriage.
After his release from prison, Patriarch Tikhon needed several months to familiarize himself with the Finnish case. On November 27, 1923, he issued Ordinance [postanovlenie] No. 132, which stated that the reasons that had justified the transfer of the Finnish Orthodox Church under Constantinople’s jurisdiction had ceased to apply, and reclaimed his authority over the Orthodox flock in Finland.82 In Finland, however, this act was supported only by a small group of Russian clerics led by Archbishop Seraphim (Luk”yanov). Meanwhile, the Finnish government took advantage of the situation and replaced the troublemaker Seraphim with the loyal Herman (Aav). On December 29, 1923, the Russian archbishop was removed from his position by a decree of the Finnish president and sent to Konevsky Monastery on Lake Ladoga.83
26 Dissolution of the Russian Orthodox Church The Estonian autonomy
In December 1917, the Russian Orthodox Church allowed the consecration of Plato (Kulbush), the first bishop of Estonian origin. His tenure was short, however. In January 1919, Plato was murdered by the retreating Red Army. Therefore, at the end of March, representatives of the Estonian Orthodox parishes gathered to discuss the situation and decided:
A) ecclesiastical life in Estonia should be organized and develop according to the principles reflecting the new socio-political reality, i. e. the existence of an independent church within a sovereign Estonian state, and
B) all efforts should be made in order to elect a new primate of the Estonian Orthodox Church after the death of Bishop PlatO.84
In the beginning of 1920, Estonian delegates visited Moscow to negotiate a new status for their Orthodox Church. On May 10, Patriarch Tikhon, together with his Holy Synod and Supreme Ecclesiastical Council, issued Decree No. 183, which granted “autonomy to the Orthodox Church in Estonia in all ecclesio-economic, ecclesio-administrative, educational and ecclesio-civil affairs.” In October 1920, Rev. Alexander Paulus was appointed as administrator of the newly formed diocese of Revel (Tallinn) and Estonia. On December 5, he was consecrated as bishop, and then Patriarch Tikhon elevated him to the rank of archbishop of the autonomous Orthodox Church in Estonia.
The normal functioning of the new church, however, was impeded by the antireligious policy in Bolshevik Russia. By 1922, the Russian Holy Synod and the Supreme Church Council ceased to exist as a result of the mass arrests of Orthodox dignitaries. The imprisonment of Patriarch Tikhon in May completely destroyed the central administration of the Russian Orthodox Church. Under these circumstances, the Orthodox community in Estonia turned to the ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople with a request for help. On July 7, 1923, Patriarch Meletios IV issued a tomos that placed them under his jurisdiction. He preserved the autonomous status of the Estonian Church under the name “Estonian Orthodox Metropolia” and proclaimed its archpastor “Metropolitan of Tallinn and all Estonia.”86
The Latvian autonomy
After the establishment of independent Latvia, its Orthodox clergy also turned to Patriarch Tikhon with a request for autonomy. On February 26, 1920, the First General Congress of the Orthodox Church in Latvia nominated Archbishop John (Janis Pommer) of Pemza for their ruling hierarch. In April 1921, he was appointed by Patriarch Tikhon as Archbishop of Riga and All Latvia. The implementation of this act was delayed by John’s imprisonment by the Bolshevik secret police. Finally, he was released and permitted to go to Riga. On July 19, the Latvian archbishop received Decree No. 1026 fTom Patriarch Tikhon,
Authorizing Archbishop John to arrange the administrative, educational, and financial matters of the Latvian Orthodox Church in accordance with his personal visioN.87 He was also fTee to decide alone on the calendar questioN.88
As in the Finnish and Estonian cases, the new status of the Latvian Orthodox Church was justified by political changes. According to the decree, because it was situated in a sovereign state, the Church deserved to be autonomous in its economic, administrative, educational, and public affairS.89 Still, the decree was explicit in asserting that the Orthodox community in Latvia shouLd remain under Moscow’s jurisdictioN.90 In its turn, the Latvian government, like those in Finland and Estonia, did not trust its Orthodox citizens and exerted pressure over ArchbishoP John to leave the Moscow Patriarchate.91 In 1926, the Latvian state passed an act declaring that the local Orthodox parishes had ceased to belong to the jurisdiction of a foreign state famous for its atheism and hostility to religion.92 According to some researchers, Archbishop John delayed the full implementation oF this law in order to preserve canonical relations with the Russian mother churcH.93 MEanwhile, between 1918 and 1925, the Latvian Orthodox Church lost 20 percent of its properties, which were transferred to local Lutheran and Catholic churches.94
The situation worsened in September 1927, when Metropolitan Sergii (Starogorodskii) asked the Latvian archbishop to submit a declaration of loyalty to the Soviet government. To persuade his Latvian colleague, the Moscow deputy locum tenens paid special attention to the benefits thaT his own declaration (July 29, 1927) brought to the Russian ChurcH.95 IN October, John (Pommer) responded that he appreciated the legal recognition of the Moscow Patriarchate’s new leadership as an important condition for its canonical activities but refused to submit any declaration. In his view, it was unthinkable for the Orthodox believers under his jurisdiction, who were Latvian citizens, to pledge loyalty to a foreign government. In this regard, the Latvian archbishop stressed that the state border that had divided his flock fTom the Russian mother church in the terms of citizenship was also a church border. He concluded that the submission of such a declaration would be not only an intervention in the civil affairs of the Latvian state but also a violation of canonS.96 THe archbishop also recalled that all newly established republics in the western borderlands of the former Russian Empire had pursued the independence of their local Orthodox churches from the very beginning. At the same time, Archbishop John distinguisheD his Church from those in Estonia, Finland, and Poland, which had moved under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. He stressed his faithfulness to Tikhon’s decree of 1921, which laid down the canonical grounds of the Latvian Orthodox Church, and pointed out that its institutional independence was guaranteed by Latvian civil laW.97
Dissatisfied, the Moscow deputy locum tenens turned for assistance to Metropolitan Elevtherii (Bogoyavlenskii), the archpastor of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church. The latter tried to change the position of his Latvian colleague.98 On November 1, Archbishop John wrote him, arguing that Sergii’s declaration had only local meaning, and thus it was necessary to secure the legal recognition of the ruling organs of the Russian Orthodox Church in the
Soviet Union. On these grounds, the Latvian hierarch argued that in terms of civil law, Metropolitan Sergii’s declaration was mandatory for all adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate. Therefore, those branches of the Russian Orthodox Church that did not fulfill the demands for loyalty to the Soviet government had no other option but to leave the mother church. Under these circumstances, the Latvian Orthodox Church had two possible courses of action: to move under Constantinople’s jurisdiction or to ask Metropolitan Sergii (Starogorodskii) to withdraw his requirement for loyalty to the Soviet government.
In this regard, the Latvian archpastor considered his Church to be in a more advantageous situation than the Finnish and Estonian ones, because Tikhon’s decree did not grant it autonomy or autocephaly (neither of these terms was used in the decree), but only special rights awarded personally to him. As a result, Archbishop John was able independently to settle the ecclesio-administrative and economic affairs of his Church, as well as its relations with the Latvian government within the new state borders on the grounds of Canon XVII of the Fourth Ecumenical Council and Canon XXXVIII of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. According to John (Pommer), Tikhon’s decree prevented any possibility of Bolshevik intervention in the life of the Latvian Orthodox communitY. He even claimed that in case of his death, Orthodox Latvians would be able to elect his successor without external assistance. In fact, he succeeded in keeping this limbo status of his Church until his death in 1934.99
This event, however, shook the canonical foundations of the Latvian Orthodox Church. It revealed that the 1921 decree did not guarantee an automatic transfer of the rights of the assassinated hierarch to his successor. After John’s death, the church administration was temporarily entrusted to the widower-priest Augustins Petersons, who governed with the assistance of a synod of priests and laymen. Meanwhile, the lack of a bishop blocked the ordination of new priests in the Latvian Orthodox Church. It also impeded the performance of sacraments and liturgy.100
To find a solution, the Latvian Synod decided to convoke a local church assembly in order to change the Church’s canonical status and to elect a new archpastor. At the same time, the Latvian state appointed its own representative to the synod, Who supervised the preparations and drafted all documents and decisions for the forthcoming church assembly. Everything, from the date of the church assembly to the nominees for the position of church head, was under the government’s control. The most popular nominee, Rev. John Yanson, was not the favorite of the state. Therefore, the government changed the staff of the synod and appointed people sympathetic to the government’s protege. Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchate tried to secure his jurisdiction over Latvia. On May 27, 1935, it appointed Metropolitan Elevtherii of Lithuania as temporary administrator of the widowed Latvian Church. The latter, however, rejected this appointment. In August, the Latvian Synod requested the help of the ecumenical patriarchate.101
By the end of the year, Patriarch Photios of Constantinople was ready to grant autonomy to the Latvian Orthodox Church, but his death postponed this act. In February 1936, his successor issued a tomos “placing the Latvian Orthodox
Church under the protection and within the jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarchate.”102 It became the first document signed by His Holiness Benjamin “in his capacity as Patriarch of Constantinople and New Rome.” He pointed to the difficulties that the Latvian Orthodox Church had experienced since the death of Archbishop John and emphasized that the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople had a canonical right and duty to take care of “the churches and communities outside the borders of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church.” He also noted that the initiative for this act belonged to the Latvian Orthodox Church, whose leadership, with the consent of the civil authorities, had expressed the desire “to have the canonical protection of the Holy Ecumenical Patriarchal See.” On these grounds, the Synod of Metropolitans at the ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople had decided to take the Latvian Orthodox Church under its jurisdiction, thus helping it to arrange a safe and prosperous religious life. In this regard, Benjamin emphasized that the Orthodox Christians in Latvia formed one autonomous Church, which enjoyed independence in its internal affairs. Correspondingly, the tomos defined the rights and duties of this church. It also changed the name of its head to “Metropolitan of Riga and All Latvia.” According to the document,
The Metropolitan will be elected by the General Ecclesiastical Assembly guided by an Exarch, a Metropolitan of the Oecumenical See, specifically delegated for this purpose: the Chairman will make a list of his candidates. Once the names of three candidates, who have received most of the voices, have emerged, these names will be presented to the Oecumenical Patriarch, and the Metropolitans of the Patriarchal Synod of Constantinople through Canonical VotinG will elect fTom the three candidates the one who will be the Metropolitan.103
Following the tomos, the Latvian Synod convoked an assembly for the election of the new archpastor. On March 29, 1936, Augustins, the favorite of the government, was consecrated as bishop in the morning and elevated to the rank of Metropolitan of the Latvian Church in the evening. The event was attended by the Latvian president and government, the Department of Churches and Religious Affairs, and many ambassadors, among others. The ecumenical patriarchate was presented by its exarch, Metropolitan Germanos of Thyateria, as well as by other hierarchs and clerics, including the head of the Estonian Orthodox Church, Alexander (Paulus). In the evening, Augustins was enthroned in the Orthodox cathedral in Riga. During the ceremony,
Metropolitan Germanos and Bishop Augustins took their places on either side of the chair, the other hierarchs lining up beside them. Metropolitan Germanos then handed the Crozier to Bishop Augustins, placed the white Klobuk on his head and put him on the throne. Then Metropolitan Thoma of the Prince Isles read out the Patriarchal Message, which stated that the Head of the Latvian Orthodox Church was now elevated to be “Metropolitan of All Latvia.”104
In the same message, the ecumenical patriarch gave his paternal blessing to Augustins and instructed him to perform “the necessary duties toward Church and State.” Meanwhile, the representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople who attended the event stressed its role as “the Mother Church of all Orthodox Churches.”105
The arrangement of the canonical status of the Latvian Orthodox Church was followed by an improvement of its legal status. On September 7, its Ecclesiastical General Synod adopted new statutes, which were registered without delay with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As a result, the state began to pay in cash or Compensate the Orthodox Church in kind “for the property which had been seized when the state became independent.”106 In addition, the Orthodox Theological Department was established at the Faculty of Lutheran Theology in the Latvian university in Riga. By the end of 1936, a second Latvian bishop was consecrated by Metropolitan Alexander of Estonia and Archbishop Herman of Finland. In the following years, the friendly relations of the Latvian Orthodox Church with the Estonian and Finnish churches led to the organization of joint annual Episcopal Synods.107
The Polish case: from autonomy to autocephaly
The establishment of the independent Polish state also brought about transformations in the local Orthodox community. This process was influenced by the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921), during which up to 500 Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches in the Ukrainian territories under Polish control were transferred to the Roman Catholic Church.108 WHen the eastern borders of interwar Poland were finally fixed, the area included an Orthodox population of about four million inhabiting Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and Southern Lithuania.109
While the Orthodox churches in the Baltic States suffered ITom a shortage of clergy and underdeveloped eparchial structures, the Orthodox community in Poland impressed with its size, having five eparchies with bishopric sees in Volhynia, Polesye, Grodno, Vilnius, and Warsaw. Another peculiarity of this community was its ethnic heterogeneity. According to the sources, the proportion of Ukrainians varied between 40 and 75 percent of the entire Orthodox population. They were followed by a considerable number of Belarusians and Russians and small groups of Poles and LithuanianS. i 10 At the same time, these ethnic communities occupied different places in the Orthodox Church in Poland. Whereas the hierarchy was primarily Russian, the laity was dominated by Ukrainians and Belarusians. This situation ensured internal divisions and frictions. On the one hand, the Russians were inclined to support political reunification with Moscow after the defeat of the Bolshevik regime, whereas Ukrainians dreamed about their own state and opposed both the Russians and the Poles. On the other hand, the memory of the eighteenth-century partitions of Poland incited its political elite against Orthodoxy, which was considered dangerous for the national consolidation of the Polish state. Finally, the Orthodox citizens of Russian and Ukrainian origins considered their faith to be part of their national identity. All this made the status of the Orthodox Church in interwar Poland a highly complicated issue.
Such an Orthodox community was considered dangerous for the sovereignty of Poland. The country’s politicians believed that the establishment of a state-controlled Orthodox Church would hold back Ukrainian nationalism and Russian separatism. To achieve this goal, the Polish authorities used the debate on church management to weaken relations between the different Orthodox groups. Whereas Russians insisted on a synodal form of government that gave predominance to their native episcopate, Ukrainians and Belarusians preferred a conciliar one, in which decisions would depend on the non-Russian laity. The interests of these ethnic groups also clashed on the question of the Polish Orthodox Church’s future relations with the mother church in Bolshevik Russia. Under pressure from the Polish state, some Orthodox hierarchs raised the autocephaly issue, asking for full independence fTom the Russian Orthodox Church. Most bishops, however, favored autonomy, which would keep the Orthodox community in Poland under the canonical jurisdiction of Patriarch Tikhon. Finally, both camps turned to him with a request for church independence. In its turn, the Polish embassy in Moscow solicited for autocephaly.
Patriarch Tikhon refused to grant autocephaly. He argued that canon law allowed this ecclesiastical status to be granted to individual peoples or nations, but not to such heterogenic ethnic conglomerates as those in Poland. Tikhon even mentioneD that he would have been ready to grant autocephaly to Poland had the Poles been an Orthodox natioN.111 Still, he agreed that the Polish citizenship of this part of his flock required some church independence. On September 28, 1921, together with his synod, Tikhon issued Decree No. 1424, which granted autonomy to the Orthodox Church in PolanD.112 THe Moscow church leadership also took into consideration the Polish government’s refusal to give an entry visa to Metropolitan Seraphim (Chichagov), originally appointed Metropolitan of Warsaw. Instead, on October 11, 1921, the Moscow Patriarchate appointed Archbishop Georgii (Yaroshevskii) as a provisional administrator of the Warsaw diocese and exarch of Patriarch Tikhon in Poland.113
Soon aFterward, the patriarchal administration elaborated “Statutes of the Government of the Orthodox Church in Poland” and sent them to the Polish government for approval in January 1922.114 They were followed by Patriarch Tikhon and his synod’s Decree No. 58, which elevated Archbishop Georgii to the position of permanent District Metropolitan (oblastnii mitropolit) of WarsaW.115 In this regard, some observers claim that Georgii (Yaroshevskii) received only limited canonical jurisdiction. Their thesis is built on Tikhon’s epistle of April 6, 1925, which stated that Georgii was appointed not as “Metropolitan of All Poland,” but only as diocesan hierarch of WarsaW.116 According to this epistle, the 1922 Statutes of the Orthodox Church in Poland foresaw granting Metropolitan Georgii canonical rights over all Orthodox dioceses in Poland, but the Polish state’s lack of approval left this document null and void.
This view of Georgii’s canonical jurisdiction, however, is quite problematic. On the one hand, the full text of Decree No. 58/1922 has not been published.
On the other hand, the available sources do not provide information about a dismissal of Metropolitan Georgii fTom his position as exarch of the Moscow Patriarch in Poland, which was granted to him on October 11, 1921. At the same time, it is strange that the issue of the canonical jurisdiction of Metropolitan Georgii appeared two years after his death. Moreover, Tikhon raised this question on April 6, 1925, a day before his own death.
The normal functioning of the Orthodox Church in Poland, however, depended on not only its canonical but also its legal recognition. In this regard, its hierarchy had to come to a series of agreements with the Warsaw government. The Polish state did not accept the Moscow statutes but offered its own “Temporary Regulations on the Relationship of the Government to the Orthodox Church in Poland.” In February 1922, after their adoption by an Episcopal Assembly, the Polish Orthodox Church finally gained legal recognition. It also began to receive financial aid fTom the state budget.117
The Polish government’s next step was to acquire autocephalous status for the local Orthodox Church. During the Genoa Conference (April 10-May 19, 1922), its representative visited Patriarch Tikhon in Moscow to discuss this issue, but without success. He was warned that any attempt by the Orthodox Church in Poland to unilaterally proclaim autocephaly would be followed by a suspension of its autonomY.118 Soon afterward, Tikhon was arrested. To find a solution to this situation, the Polish Orthodox Church convoked an Episcopal Assembly in the Pochaevska Lavra to discuss how to manage its affairs until the restoration of the canonical leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate. It decided to act independently and to decline any orders from the Renovationist Supreme Church Government until Patriarch Tikhon’s release.119
On June 14, Metropolitan Georgii convoked another Episcopal Assembly in Warsaw. It concluded that the Moscow mother church was no longer able to take care of its branches abroad and adopted the principle of full independence of the Polish Orthodox Church. Three of the attending bishops—Elevtherii (Bogoyavlenskii) of Vilnius and Lithuania, Vladimir (Tikhonitskii) of Grodno, and Panteleymon (Rozhnovskii)—voted against this, however, and on return to their dioceses they convoked eparchial councils, which rejected the introduction of any autocephalous rule. ' 20 Soon afterward, the disobedient hierarchs were removed from their office. Archbishop Elevtherii (Bogoyavlenskii), who was in charge of over 200 Lithuanian parishes included in interwar Poland, was expelled. Therefore, he went to free Lithuania, where he continued to serve as hierarch of the Moscow Patriarchate. In a similar way, two other bishops, Sergii (Korolev) and Vladimir (Tikhonitskii), found asylum in Czechoslovakia.
Meanwhile, the Orthodox Church in Poland faced another problem. In February 1923, Metropolitan Georgii (Yaroshevskii) was murdered by an Orthodox archimandrite who was against the establishment of autocephaly. After the assassination, Archbishop Dionisii (Valedinskii) of Volhynia was elected Metropolitan of Poland. This act, however, had to be confirmed by the Russian mother church in order to be canonically valid. As Patriarch Tikhon was still in prison, the Polish Orthodox Church, with the consent of the government in
Warsaw, referred to the Patriarch of Constantinople with a request for help. On March 13, 1923, Patriarch Meletios IV sent a telegram approving the election of Metropolitan Dionisii (Valedinskii) as canonical. In a corresponding move, the Polish Synod issued a decree for his official enthronement on April 23.121
Taking his office at a moment when there was no guarantee of the survival of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Dionisii had to find way to secure the future of his Church. Meanwhile, the Polish government tried to consolidate its power in the eastern provinces inhabited mostly by Orthodox people. In July 1923, it began to press the Orthodox hierarchy to introduce the Gregorian calendar as a means of unifying the holiday systems in the country. The reform was also supported by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As a result, in April 1924, the Polish Orthodox Church adopted the new calendar. Facing strong resistance from its Ukrainian and Belarusian flock, however, the government reconsidered this decision and in August permitted some parishes to use the old calendar.
In November 1923, after Patriarch Tikhon’s release from prison, Metropolitan DionisIi informed him of the Polish developments during his imprisonment and asked for autocephalY.122 While waiting for Moscow’s answer, the Polish Synod decided to prepare myrrh during Lent in 1924. Perceived as a sign of autocephaly, this act provoked strong objections fTom Moscow. It is important to note that the reaction of the Bolshevik government preceded that of the Russian Orthodox Church, wHich on May 10, 1924, sent a note to the Polish government protesting its intervention in the affairs of its local Orthodox Church.123 On June 5, Patriarch Tikhon also refused to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox community in Poland. Under these circumstances, the Polish Synod again sought the assistance of the Great Church of Constantinople.
On November 13, 1924, Patriarch Gregory VII issued a tomos that granted autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church. This act was reaffirmed by his successor, Constantine VI.124 The Polish autocephaly was justified by Canon XVII of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, as well as by Canon XXXVIII of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which required the church life of rural parishes to be organized around a city center, thus corresponding to the administrative structure of the state. Neither of these rules, however, deals with autocephaly. In fact, their use in the concrete case presupposes a specific interpretation of canon law. Therefore, the ecumenical patriarch made reference to history. According to the tomos, the Patriarchate of Constantinople was the true mother church of the Orthodox people in Poland; in other words, it had the right to grant them autocephaly and they did not need Moscow’s blessing. In this regard, it emphasized that the Kievan Metropolia, as well as the Orthodox Metropolia of Lithuania and Poland, had originally been set up by the Great Church of Constantinople. Finally, the tomos recommended that “in matters concerning church order and in matters of a more general nature, which are beyond the jurisdiction limits of every Autocephalous Church acting individually,” the head of the Polish Orthodox Church should refer to the Holy See of Constantinople, through whose meditation it would receive competent advice and help from the other sister-churches. In addition, it obliged the autocephalous Polish Church to receive myrrh fTom Constantinople, which de facto limited its independence.
After the announcement of Polish autocephaly, Patriarch Tikhon accused the Patriarchate of Constantinople of intervening in the territorial jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. He justified his refusal to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox dioceses in Poland by reference to the 1918 Statutes, which required that such decisions be taken by an All-Russian Ecclesiastical Sobor. His protests were in vain. In December 1925, the Polish Synod changed the Church’s name to “Polish Autocephalous Holy Orthodox Church.”125 The granted autocephaly, however, did not bring sufficient improvement in this religious organization’s legal status. In December 1935, the Committee for Nationality Affairs at the Council of Ministers defined the official role of the local Orthodox Church as a primary instrument to expand Polish culture in the eastern regions. It also foresaw a Polonization of the local Orthodox Church in terms of its personnel and liturgical language. The legal position of the Polish Orthodox Church improved only in 1938, when new state regulations were adopted. According to the new rules, the Polish Orthodox Church
Was recognized as an integral member of the “Universal Eastern Orthodox Church” in terms of dogma and canon, but otherwise was completely independent of any external secular and ecclesiastical authorities. The Church became a legal corporate entity, with all rights according to that designation, and was assured of freedom to govern itself. Regarding its administration and governance, a General Sobor composed of representatives fTom the synod, clergy, and laity was the supreme governing body, although its executive body was the Episcopal Synod headed by the Metropolitan. The latter Would be elected by a special Electoral General Sobor of clergy and laity, while bishops were chosen by the synod from a list provided by an electoral assembly within each diocesE.126
The Lithuanian exception
The interwar development of the Orthodox Church in Lithuania differed from that of the other Orthodox churches in the interwar Near Abroad. One reason has roots in the peace treaty that cut off the southern area of Lithuania, together with the historical capital city of Vilnius, and joined it to Poland. As a result, the southern neighbor state presented a much more serious threat for Lithuanian sovereignty than did Soviet Russia. Lithuanians were also disappointed by the support of the Roman Holy See for Poland. Therefore, despite their traditional affiliation with Catholicism, they were less suspicious of the Moscow Patriarchate and did not subject its local branch to such restrictions as in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland.
The lack of church separatism in Lithuania was also connected with the personality of Metropolitan Elevtherii of Vilnius. In 1922, when a considerable part of his diocese was joined to Poland, Elevtherii was included in its Orthodox Church. Under these circumstances, he relied on the Moscow Patriarchate to preserve the unity of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church, which turned out to be divided between two states in the interwar period. Therefore, Elevtherii fervently defended the canonical authority of Patriarch Tikhon over the Orthodox community in Poland and opposed the promotion of autocephaly there. In 1923, he was arrested and then expelled from Poland. In the next years, he lived in Lithuania and became the most loYal hierarch of the Moscow Patriarchate outside the Soviet Union. In 1928, his loyalty was awarded. On November 28, Metropolitan Sergii (Starogorodskii) and his temporary patriarchal synod granted autonomy to the Orthodox Church in Lithuania.127 According to some contemporary observers, this act had no real signIficance: The Lithuanian Orthodox Church continued to consider itself an eparchy of the Moscow Patriarchate.128
World History
