The second of the defining factors is Germany’s external relations. Several aspects are relevant here. First, Germany’s postwar development was decisively on the side of strengthening and expanding civilian elements of modernization. Most of the investment and energy from state and from private sources focused on technology, and on economic and social improvement. Military aspects were, if not quite neglected, never the centre of attention. This was, of course, partly due to constraints imposed by the Allies after the Second World War. But it was also because there was a fairly broad domestic consensus for this pattern of development. Later, the term Zivilmacht was coined for this.
Second, there was a specific policy style developed by economic, social and political actors for doing politics: corporatism. Compared to other European countries, Germany’s post-war development was remarkably consensual, despite the fact that there were serious economic and social adaptations to be implemented. The coal, steel and ship industries declined. Despite substantial state subsidies to assist these industries to adapt to changing technologies and market opportunities, they eventually crumbled. Even so, there were few mass protests and little social unrest directed at these changes. The reason for this was corporatism. In tripartite negotiations, the government, trade unions and industrialists’ associations finally arrived at mutually acceptable solutions - and carried them out. This was the core of the so-called Modell Deutschland (German model), providing the formula for successful post-war development.
Third, there was a high degree of dependency on imported energy resources, which has been a constant factor. The competitiveness of the German coal industry decreased in the 1960s and 1970s. The first serious move of OPEC in the early 1970s made it clear to everyone how dependent Germany was on importing oil - and gas. For the first time, the country of the Autobahnen had empty highways, because of the ‘energy crisis’.
Currently, Germany has to import 78 per cent of its energy resources, a significant amount: 98 per cent of all mineral oil resources are imported, 82 per cent of natural gas, and 55 per cent of coal (see Figure 1).
Fourthly, Germany distinguishes itself through the significant role of societal actors. This is especially true regarding the role of the German regions, the Bundeslaender. All of them have their own representation in Brussels, many of them in other countries too, as far as away Asia. Also, the role of all kinds of NGOs in generating and maintaining transnational activities and links is important.
Figure 1. Germany’s energy resources, 78% of which are imported. Source: Verbundnetz Gas AG, 2003
The fifth and final factor is the role of history. For decades, historical legacies connected to the inter-war years and the Second World War constituted significant constraints - formal and informal
- on Germany’s sovereignty and on actual foreign protocol. This limitation was lifted only by the ‘4 plus 2’ treaty in 1990.
But in the period before, and especially after, reunification, these limits have been gradually disappearing. Germany is politically sovereign - though of course economically shaped by globalization as are all other global actors. The consequences of German reunification, feared by many, could almost be disregarded. No new assertiveness has developed. While the country is still deeply embroiled in domestic problems, partly related to reunification, but also to demographic developments and to embedded social brakes hampering adjustment to changing conditions, the actual foreign policy turned out to be surprisingly pragmatic. This is a case where the notorious word normalization really makes sense.
These five factors and conditions produce a foreign policy which is bound to be integrationist and institutionalist. Zivilmacht
- corporatism - the logic of being a trading state, the relevance of non-state players and the consequences of reunification all point in the same direction: it is real, and legitimate, to have particular German interests. But they will be pursued primarily by working in and through European and other institutions. In this regard, it is not easy to identify Germany’s specific concerns. Germany’s foreign policies are pretty much European.
Nevertheless, it is possible to attempt to list the relevant German interests. First, and by far the most important, are European issues: institutional reforms, enlargement embedded in a new institutional setting, the stability pact - although, even now, Germany is violating it for the third year in a row. And managing and regulating migration, as an important all-European issue.
Second, and due to more or less common demographic trends and to globalization, social systems - health, pensions, and taxes
- have to be reformed and adapted efficiently, preferably in a European context, to avoid intra-European competition (the race to the bottom).
Third, the undeniable global role of the US has to be set into a web of global institutions. This is not directed against US interests per se. It is the result of Germany’s positive experiences with rules and institutions. And it is also a strategy of safeguarding against the unilateral execution of dubious policies resting on unfounded and unconfirmed assumptions.
World History
