The US-Soviet nuclear competition of the 1960s and early 1970s saw the end of US nuclear superiority and the emergence of the strategic parity that would characterize the remainder of the Cold War. Driven by fear, credibility concerns, and organizational interests, both sides made massive investments in weapons systems whose use would have horrible consequences. Preemption came to be understood by both sides as highly dangerous and highly difficult technically. Indeed, US defense officials, and possibly their Soviet counterparts, were not sure how tactical nuclear weapons could be used without inviting catastrophe. As the nuclear danger increased and as
Taboos against the use of nuclear weapons strengthened, US and Soviet leaders sought to avoid high-stakes nuclear "poker games." They moved toward military strategies that postponed nuclear weapons use (flexible response), but also engaged in strategic arms control.
Even while detente and SALT were unfolding during the early 1970s, Cold War concerns continued to shape strategic policy. Both sides prepared for the worst by developing high-tech warning systems and heading toward launch-on-warning capabilities. Also making deterrence hazardous and uncertain, both sides developed new weapons systems, cruise missiles on the one hand, and MIRVed missiles on the other, that raised apprehensions about vulnerabilities to attack. By the mid-1970s, the prospects for an end to the Cold War were hard to imagine as arms control faltered and arms builders on both sides continued to develop and deploy new strategic weapons. US and Soviet leaders knew that it was insane to use nuclear weapons, but they wanted to keep them because of their fears and pursuit of national advantage.
World History
