The principal tasks of intelligence, however, are the gathering, processing, and analysis of intelligence information and the production of intelligence materials that meet policymaker needs. This suggests an intelligence process comprised of several steps, normally referred to as the “intelligence cycle”: a cycle of identifying needs; collecting information based on those needs; subjecting the information to analysis; producing finished intelligence based on such analysis; and disseminating the analysis to political leaders, who may then identify additional needs that start the cycle all over again.
The first stage-setting the requirements and priorities and providing direction—is the point where decision makers express their “needs” and relay the “tasking” to the intelligence agencies. This presumes that decision makers know what it is they need and can communicate their requirements effectively, both of which are faulty assumptions. Intelligence professionals frequently find themselves in the position of having to identify gaps in intelligence for political leaders and relate that information to decision makers, a very sensitive issue given that intelligence officers work for politicians and are reluctant, like their bosses, to admit a lack of knowledge.
Indeed, the awkward relationship between policymakers and intelligence officials raises questions about politicization of intelligence. Intelligence professionals in the United States like to portray themselves as objective arbiters of information and as disinterested participants in the policy process. Yet, organizational arrangements, even informal ones like the policy-intelligence relationship, surely exert pressure on intelligence analysts to toe the political line in ways that may jeopardize their policy neutrality.
Collecting and processing intelligence information—the second step in the cycle—is no easy task. Collecting intelligence is subject to several intangible factors, such as whether the information exists in identifiable form in the first place and whether it can be accessed in a reasonably cost-effective way. Gathering intelligence spans a variety of collection disciplines — such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and human intelligence — and is subject to institutional and budgetary considerations. Acquisition of intelligence is also highly sensitive to political and technological constraints. Even if the information is collected, it may not be the right information and therefore may not directly address the issues formulated in the requirements process. Technological and human constraints may even thwart the gathering of information on a particular issue altogether. Worse still, there may be policy questions, which have no answers. Former director of central intelligence (DCI) Robert M. Gates once claimed that there are secrets and there are mysteries; secrets can be acquired by using intelligence methods, but mysteries simply defy collection, analysis, and explanation.
The third stage of the cycle—analysis—is the point at which the gathered and processed information goes through rigorous evaluation and analysis. Without analysis, raw intelligence stands on its own, outside its context, and with little relevance. Information that has not been analyzed may also be misinterpreted and misused. Some policymakers prefer to do their own analysis. Undoubtedly, policymakers possess substantial analytic capabilities, but there is a critical difference—policymakers perform analysis within the context of their political world and their policy preferences, which may skew and bias their evaluations. Intelligence analysts are better placed objectively to evaluate raw intelligence. Analysts themselves often are subject to political pressures — after all, the intelligence analyst operates in a political world—but good analysts are able to extricate themselves sufficiently from policy concerns and conduct their analyses in a politically neutral environment.
Intelligence analysis leads to the next step in the intelligence cycle— production—where intelligence information finds its way into “finished” intelligence products. Because policymakers have their own preferences about how they absorb information, intelligence analysts study the consumption patterns of their consumers as well as the intelligence questions they pose. Intelligence analysts also have the obligation to ensure that their intelligence products—whether in manuscript form, oral briefings, or video teleconferencing—are engaging enough to draw the attention of policymakers. Above all, intelligence products must be timely, accurate, and relevant. Policymakers may otherwise not understand or deliberately ignore intelligence information, or even turn to other sources of information, all of which defeat the purposes of intelligence.
Factors such as cost, time, and the availability of information certainly affect whether intelligence serves the policy consumer well. Finished intelligence is relayed to the consumer on a “need to know” basis—that is, it is disseminated, the last stage in the cycle—to answer the policymakers’ questions as completely and accurately as possible in a timely manner. While finished intelligence usually seeks to be thorough, it may only answer questions partially or not at all. It may also raise new questions. The theory of the intelligence cycle suggests that these new questions then serve as new requirements, along with new foreign policy crises, national security threats, and other policy concerns.
World History
