Friendship, 1939 to 1941
With the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact in August 1939 and the subsequent division of Poland after the invasion of German, and somewhat later Soviet troops, Germany and the Soviet Union became neighbours. At the same time the new ‘friends’ agreed not to become involved in the domestic politics of the other country - in Germany the communist persecution continued, and the USSR carried on determining for itself its treatment of German emigrants. There was no special cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the interior ministries of both countries, aiming, for instance, for the extradition of German anti-fascists from the USSR. On the contrary, in Germany there was no desire for the return of active communists or Jewish emigrants; politics was entirely aimed at expelling such groups of people from Germany or isolating them from society. Nevertheless, the pact caused the German Ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich Werner Count von der Schulenburg, to concern himself anew with the release of citizens of the German Reich. In addition to the roughly 3,500 ‘returnees from Russia’, who were registered in Germany after arriving from the USSR from 1934 until the autumn of 1939, several hundred Germans were also sent back to Germany from Soviet prisons after February 1937.22
The forced expulsion of foreigners who had had their visas revoked took place from early 1937, predominantly in the border regions or areas with particular registration systems. The second directive of April 1937 contained instructions on this topic. The local NKVD administration were told by the central administration:
To carry out, over the course of half a year, operative and preventative measures, in order to remove from the USSR all German and other foreign citizens, who are suspected of whatever scale of espionage or counterrevolutionary activity. The German citizens who are to be removed from the USSR and, if necessary, to be forcefully imprisoned and deported, include all German citizens registered with the militia except political emigres, whose cases will be dealt with separately.23
After the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact there were still almost 500 German citizens on the list of prisoners which the German representation in Moscow had compiled. Schulenburg hoped the new circumstances would bring about an accelerated release of these people. An increasing number of Germans were deported in the first months of the pact period, who were now - since Poland no longer existed - delivered directly to the German authorities; among them were, as in previous years, anti-fascist emigrants, who were immediately taken into ‘protective custody’ in Germany. The German diplomatic service, although it had received instructions not to issue such people entry visas into Germany, did not want to hamper the overall process. Also, for some people, the embassy had no precise data and could not therefore produce an assessment in line with the Gestapo’s directives. From 1939 to 1941, besides approximately a thousand free returnees, about 350 people were deported from Soviet prisons to Germany.
In foreign affairs both countries also adapted themselves to the new circumstances, which for the USSR meant an end to its anti-fascist propaganda. The KPD leadership was involved in the decision-making processes as little as the Comintern - they were merely to execute what the Soviet party leadership demanded. It is clear that the new line, which led many doubtful leftists in Western Europe to break with the Soviet Union for good, threw the KPD into confusion over it legitimacy. It worked hard at its communiques, in order to save at least part of its anti-fascism, but it had to give in to the pressure passed on through the Comintern leadership. After month-long discussions the KPD managed to force itself to find a political platform which was to guide further political orientation.24 The objective of this document was to exploit the official friendship between both countries, in order to anchor the KPD in Germany. It shows the completely incorrect assessment of the situation in Germany by the exiled leadership of the KPD, which since the arrest of leading KPD functionaries in France in September 1939, and the start of the Second World War, had been controlled from Moscow. The KPD also hoped to re-strengthen its position within the Comintern, which had been declining continuously since 1933. Both objectives failed.
The only success the KPD had during this pact period was in carrying out political training sessions. Since the beginning of the Terror, an independent German party life could no longer exist. The fear was too great that the people one met would be arrested a short time later, or that gatherings could be interpreted as fascist espionage networks. Now, in 1940, the party leadership once again called together its emigrants living in Moscow and the surrounding area. These training courses were aimed at reinstating those Party members who had been dispersed and made insecure through the Terror. They were to be prepared for later tasks in Germany, even if the KPD thought a return to Germany was impossible at this point. Additionally, it appeared necessary to explain the Soviet policies of the period to the emigrants.
Naturally there was also great confusion among the simple KPD emigrants about the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Some thought it was a tactical manoeuvre of the Soviet Union in order to keep itself - at least at first - out of the world war. In this case, the pact seemed justified to them, in that it served to protect and strengthen the USSR. Others believed in an actual convergence of the two political systems. Those who were active as anti-fascists, be it as writers or as editors for newspapers, magazines or radio, had to tone down their comments - anti-fascist opinions were no longer popular. Instead, they wrote primarily about internal Soviet themes or produced translations. Some could adjust themselves well to the new situation; others fell into a creative crisis. But the demand for German teachers increased, since the contacts between both countries was quickly re-intensified after years of disagreement in all areas - economics, science and culture.
The new relationship had the effect that a few emigrants took up their connections to their families in Germany again, whether by means of the normal postal service or by transmitting a message via those travelling between the countries. In addition, contact to the German embassy in Moscow was no longer forbidden. The KPD did want to restrict such relationships, but it had no way of controlling them, let alone eliminating them. A few wives of arrested KPD members tried to return to Germany. But it was not only the German-Soviet relationship that played a role in this. A decree from late 1939 which was provoked by the Soviet-Finnish winter war was the key trigger. The Soviet Union had so far been able to stay out of the
Second World War, but the refusal of Finland to comply with Soviet demands after signing an assistance and trade agreement with the USSR, provoked the Red Army assault on Finland in November 1939, and as a result the war. In this context all those who did not possess Soviet citizenship were evacuated from Moscow (and other large cities). The Soviet authorities even presented some German emigrants with the decision either to participate in the evacuations or to return to Germany. Since the people had lived in the Soviet Union long enough to recognize that life in the province would be much more difficult for them than in Moscow, several opted for the second alternative.
The changes resulting from the new foreign policy situation certainly had significant effects on the life of the German emigrants, but even more so did the internal political situation, marked by an abatement of the Terror. Some historians speak of this time as the first ‘thaw’. In December 1938 Ezhov was relieved of his function as Commissar for Internal Affairs by Beriia. Shortly afterward it was conceded that mistakes had been discovered in the arrests. Among the thousands set free at this time were many Germans. The NKVD released imprisoned German emigrants mostly in the months from December 1938 to April 1939 and November 1939 to March 1940.25 Although individual people were still arrested during this time, the release of prisoners contributed to the feeling that the Terror was over, in spite of the fact that these people were required to remain silent regarding their imprisonment. Nevertheless, a whole set of details about the prison conditions and the unjustified recriminations began to emerge. Most of them applied directly to the KPD for renewed Party membership. After initial delays and insecurities, the KPD leadership re-established Party membership in most cases. Those who still had imprisoned relatives could continue to believe in an apparent mistake that would soon be cleared up. How could they return to Germany in this situation?
World History
