Conclusion

All these factors point in the direction of, if not harmonious, then at least conflict-free bilateral relations. At the same time, one should see that the relative importance of Russia in the German public discourse has been declining, already for some time. This reflects the post-cold war situation, and the less conflict-ridden transformation of Russia since 1998.

In terms of policy recommendations, I would list the following. Stability remains an important aim of Western policy. In combination with ongoing institutional reforms, especially in the economic realm, this is the best that can be expected. The ‘rule of law’ will gradually become more relevant, but it cannot be imposed from abroad. Still, economic and political players should never hesitate to point out that, and why, arbitrary decisions - as apparently in the Yukos case - are detrimental for blooming external relations.

Germans and others must learn, and accept, that Germany does not have a special role in and for Russia and Eastern Europe. Germany’s participation is required, but as part of European unity. There is no special relationship. Also, democracy cannot be imported like Swiss cheese. Not because Russians are unable to practice it, but because internal conditions have to be ripe for Western-type forms of representation. The same is true for social capital and for civil society development.

Western policy-makers and societies, and especially the media, should also be prepared for shifting at least some of their attention away from the state-to-state level of interaction toward the transnational, and toward more societal interactions. Finally, we have to accept - and not only for Russia - that politics are increasingly inconsistent. The degree to which decisions can be implemented in a directed and organized way must be permanently reassessed.