Prospects for effective global nuclear non-proliferation policies improved in the early 1960s. There were four reasons for this change. First, as Lawrence Wittner has shown in his path-breaking work, Resisting the Bomb, grassroots antinuclear groups gained popularity throughout the world. The development of thermonuclear weapons, and the dangers associated with nuclear testing, brought emerging environmental groups together with peace advocates to demand governments ban the bomb. Nongovernmental organizations in the West, as well as political leaders from the Non-Aligned Movement, were especially important in advocating a nuclear test-ban treaty.575 This grassroots, global antinuclear movement was to expand and increase its influence in the decades to come.
Second, the tense confrontations between the Soviets and Americans between 1958 and 1962, initially over the status of Berlin and culminating in the Cuban missile crisis, brought the world close to the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945. Approaching the nuclear precipice - the US secretary of state, Dean Rusk, called it "the most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen," the only time when the nuclear superpowers came "eyeball to eyeball" - both the Soviets and the Americans recognized the need to reduce tensions, halt arms racing, and limit the chances of an accidental nuclear war.576 A world with fewer nuclear weapons and fewer atomic powers, it was thought, would be much safer. Both governments increasingly made bilateral and global nuclear-arms control a priority after the October 1962 missile crisis. This led to the third factor - the idea that if proliferation was not stopped, there could be a domino, snowball, or tipping point phenomenon resulting in dozens of new atomic powers. President John F. Kennedy told the world in 1963 that he "was haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty."577
The fourth and most important reason for the shift toward stronger non-proliferation polices was geopolitical. Until the early 1960s, it could be argued that the countries that had developed nuclear weapons - the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France - were status quo powers, unlikely to change postwar borders through force. Other potential proliferators - Sweden, India, Australia, even Israel - had understandable (if controversial) security motivations to acquire weapons for defensive and deterrent purposes. However, two other potential nuclear powers, the FRG and PRC, fell into a much different category. The possibility that either or both of these states would gain access to nuclear weapons threatened the stability of Europe and East Asia and challenged both American and Soviet interests.
The FRG was a divided land, only a generation removed from the Nazi legacy of terror and war, feared by its Eastern bloc neighbors, and mistrusted even by its closest European allies. The FRG demonstrated an interest throughout the 1950s in having access to the most modern weapons available.578 Policymakers in the United States worried about the political consequences of openly discriminating against West Germany, especially when Britain and France were atomic powers. The efforts to make the FRG feel it could participate in nuclear decisionmaking, without actually giving them the bomb, created much anxiety in both the East and the West. Even more alarming to the Soviets, as we have seen, was the attitude of President Eisenhower, who believed that a nuclear-armed FRG was inevitable.
The German question was at the heart of almost all discussions over what to do about nuclear proliferation. As the 1960s progressed, most everyone came to believe that the FRG could not be allowed to possess its own nuclear weapons. The Berlin crisis made it quite clear that the Soviets would simply not stand for a nuclearized Bundeswehr. In the words of a US official, "German national nuclear capability is virtually a Soviet obsession, based upon a deep-seated emotional fear of resurgent German militarism."579 Could the United States, however, tell the FRG it could never have the most modern weapons, while neighbors France, Britain, and the Soviet Union continued to build their stockpiles? How would the Germans react when smaller or less economically advanced countries like Israel and India attained nuclear status and the security and respect that came with it? US officials, like
Under Secretary of State George Ball, realized it was not “safe to isolate Germany or leave it with a permanent sense of grievance," which could result from “her forced exclusion from the nuclear club." Such policies, Ball noted, “would provide a fertile ground for demagogues."580 Ball and others proposed nuclear-sharing schemes such as the multilateral force (MLF) that they believed would satisfy West German needs.581 Others believed the MLF would only encourage the FRG’s nuclear ambitions. Resolving this dilemma - preventing a German national nuclear force without awakening dangerous resentments - created a great political struggle, both within the NATO alliance and between the United States and the Soviet Union.
At least the FRG was a liberal democracy. China was in many ways the original rogue state. Veering between the ironclad rule of Mao Zedong and the anarchy of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, China’s successful program to develop its own atomic weapons worried its neighbors and both Cold War superpowers. China, with a population of more than 700 million by the early 1960s, had already fought the United States in Korea, attacked India, and threatened Taiwan, Indochina, and Indonesia. The PRC’s emerging nuclear status threatened the US position in East Asia and could affect the escalating conflict in Vietnam. President Kennedy had considered a nuclear-armed China a grave threat that would “so upset the world political scene [that] it would be intolerable."582 In November 1962, US national security adviser McGeorge Bundy said that Chinese nuclear weapons would be “the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years."583 Mao’s internal policies had led to the death of millions of his own citizens, and he had already declared that he did not fear nuclear war with the United States: “If the worse came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist."584 From the US perspective, a nuclear-armed PRC could become even more aggressive and harder to deter. According to one analyst, the Chinese appeared "determined to eject the United States from Asia" and were sure to "exploit their nuclear weapons for this end." By 1970, China would have "thermonuclear weapons," and by 1980, "it [would] be necessary to think in terms of a possible 100 million U. S. deaths whenever a serious conflict with China threatens."585 China’s attitude toward the Soviet Union was hardly better, as the bitter rhetoric between these ideological and geopolitical competitors threatened to spill over into conflict throughout the 1960s. Tensions grew so heated between these former allies that by 1969, the Soviet Union contemplated a "pre-emptive strike" against China’s nuclear forces.586
Concerns about West Germany and China motivated the Soviet Union and the United States to seek a common stance in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The Kennedy administration began distancing itself from Eisenhower’s willingness to share nuclear weapons within NATO. Secretary of State Rusk told Khrushchev, "the Germans should not have a national nuclear capability."587 Kremlin leaders, of course, concurred. An FRG with nuclear weapons was a grave threat to their interests in Europe. Moreover, they shared a long and often disputed border with China. As relations with the PRC deteriorated, they faced the possibility of nuclear-armed adversaries on two fronts. Furthermore, most prospective proliferators were in the Soviet Union’s near abroad, in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The superpowers had compelling reasons to cooperate on nuclear non-proliferation.
They also increasingly recognized that uncontrolled nuclear proliferation offered challenges that went beyond traditional geopolitical concerns such as China and Germany. By the mid-1960s, nuclear experts sensed that major powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, understood the responsibilities of nuclear ownership and recognized the deadly logic of mutual vulnerability and deterrence, but they wondered whether the same would hold for smaller, less developed countries, or even non-state actors. In 1965, analyst Fred Ikle warned that if proliferation went beyond the "middle powers," it could lead to "owners of nuclear weapons who cannot be deterred because they feel they have nothing to lose." These might include a group "fanatically dedicated to some revolutionary cause which may have no concern for the survival of their country _ To carry out such 'nuclear anarchism’ or acts of personal revenge, modern delivery systems would not be needed; it would suffice if the weapons could be sneaked close enough to a target clandestinely."588 A study led by Thomas Schelling in 1963 argued that the future would hold complex or unforeseen nuclear threats. "(N)uclear weapons will become increasingly economical for smaller countries to produce" and may become available by "theft, commercial purchase, or diplomatic trading." These new nuclear powers would not need sophisticated strategic forces or ballistic missiles. "A fishing boat or a cheap airplane might have been an adequate means of delivery for, say, the Algerian Nationalists against Marseilles, or Castro’s Cuba against Baltimore or Miami."589
The Soviet Union and the United States had to overcome significant barriers before they could negotiate a nuclear non-proliferation policy, and they moved slowly at first, building upon earlier international efforts. In 1961, Ireland proposed a UN resolution, the Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons, which banned the spread of nuclear technology to additional states and prohibited all countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1962, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was formed to encourage the Soviet Union and the United States to adopt arms-control measures. A year before, President Kennedy created a new agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) headed by William Foster, and the same year named John McCloy as his special adviser on disarmament. McCloy negotiated a set of arms-control principles with his Soviet counterpart, Valerian Zorin, in September 1961. The McCloy-Zorin principles, as they were called, built upon the efforts of others such as British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, to pave the way for serious negotiations to ban nuclear testing.
The Soviet Union, United States, and Britain negotiated a Limited Test-Ban Treaty that was opened for signature on August 5, 1963. The treaty was not perfect. The Soviets and Americans disagreed about the number and types of inspections that would be allowed, and underground tests were not banned. Nothing was done about China’s emerging nuclear program. More ambitious arms-control measures, such as a comprehensive test ban or limitations on the growth of strategic weapons, were beyond the reach of the superpowers for the time being.
The Limited Test-Ban Treaty, however, was a good start toward the goal of a global non-proliferation regime, and its timing was propitious. By the mid-1960s, several developed and developing states were considering or actually constructing active nuclear weapons programs. In Europe, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, and even Romania were seen as candidates for the bomb. It was speculated that Brazil, Argentina, and perhaps Mexico were motivated to develop atomic weapons as well. Regional arms races in the Middle East and South Asia were feared if Israel and India successfully tested a weapon. China’s capabilities and the conflict in Vietnam made East Asia fertile soil for new nuclear powers, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and even Australia.590 There was great concern that China’s test - which took place in October 1964 - could initiate a nuclear domino effect if vigorous action were not taken.591 Not only might this destabilize key regions of the globe by initiating local arms races; the increased number of smaller states acquiring nuclear weapons could put pressure on West Germany to follow suit.
President Lyndon B. Johnson signaled a renewed US commitment to nonproliferation on January 21, 1964, in a message to the ENDC calling for a worldwide treaty based on the Irish resolution. Real movement on the policy front, however, did not come until exactly one year later, when the blue ribbon Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, or Gilpatric committee, delivered its findings to the White House. This committee of influential officials had been put together to construct a new US non-proliferation policy in the wake of the PRC’s atomic test in October 1964. The group explored a broad menu of alternatives. On the one hand, it considered the consequences of accepting or even aiding nuclear proliferation. At the other end of the spectrum, the group weighed the implications of a far tougher nonproliferation policy. The committee examined a wide range of policies, including appeasement, sanctions against emerging nuclear powers, preemption against the PRC, and even sabotaging French nuclear-testing sites.592
There were divergent views within the US government, including skepticism in some quarters about whether nuclear non-proliferation was even desirable. State Department official George McGhee suggested in 1961 that it would be advantageous "if a friendly Asian power beat Communist China to the punch" by testing a nuclear device first, and there was "no likelier candidate than India."593 Dean Rusk argued that it "was easy for the U. S. to speak out against proliferation, but the Prime Minister of India or Japan must look on the question quite differently." For the secretary of state, "nonproliferation [was] not the overriding element in U. S. relations with the rest of the world."594 A briefing paper for the Gilpatric committee wondered if it was in "the U. S. interest in all cases" to prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, "or might it be in the U. S. interest for particular nations to acquire such capability?"595
The committee, however, concluded, "preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest, despite the difficult decisions that will be required." The report "as a matter of great urgency" recommended the administration "substantially increase the scope and intensity" of its non-proliferation efforts. "The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons." A program that included formalizing multilateral agreements, applying pressure on individual states considering nuclear acquisition, and making changes to the United States’ own policies was recommended.596
In order to implement the committee’s recommendations, controversial policies would have to be adopted. The Soviet Union would have to be accepted as the key partner in a global effort to stem the spread of atomic weapons. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and regional nuclear-free zones would have to be supported. Nonnuclear powers would have to be given something in return for their pledge to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Neutrals like India would have to be offered some form of guarantee against nuclear attack. Japan would have to be reassured. Israel’s and Egypt’s nuclear ambitions would need to be confronted. Carrots and sticks would have to be employed both to appease and deter potential proliferators. On the most controversial question of all, the status of the MLF and its relationship to West Germany’s nuclear ambitions, the committee was divided. Most ofits members understood, however, that the MLF would have to be sacrificed to obtain the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the Soviet Union.
The Gilpatric committee’s conclusions were controversial, especially among those in the US State Department who supported the MLF. Secretary of State Rusk argued the report was as "explosive as a nuclear weapon" and worked to keep it secret. President Johnson, however, strongly supported the group’s recommendations, and the thrust of the committee’s findings became official US non-proliferation policy when Johnson approved National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 335, "Preparation of Arms Control Program." The policy built upon the president’s speech celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations, where he had called upon other governments to join the United States to negotiate "an effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind." With NSAM 335, Johnson ordered a program to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. He assigned the task to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and gave it direct access to the White House, an arrangement that signaled Johnson’s keen interest and that prevented the State Department fTom sabotaging the effort.597
The United States submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty to the ENDC on August 17, 1965. The Soviet Union made its own proposal to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1965. The proposals were similar except for one key provision - how they viewed collective nuclear forces such as the MLF or the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). While the US proposal allowed for the MLF, the Soviet plan prohibited nonnuclear-weapon states from participating in "the ownership, control, or use of nuclear weapons." The Soviet draft even challenged the right of nonnuclear states in an alliance to participate in nuclear planning and targeting. Soviet and American negotiators wrestled over the precise language governing US-NATO nuclear arrangements for almost two years. The difficulty of these negotiations surpassed only the problem both superpowers had in convincing their alliance partners and neutrals to embrace the treaty.
A non-proliferation treaty faced great challenges, particularly within the Western Alliance. Japan expressed grave concerns about the PRC’s nuclear status and indicated it was interested in its own atomic weapons. Britain was adamant that there must be a treaty at any cost, even if it jeopardized the FRG’s interests. France’s position was most vexing. De Gaulle did not believe that states could be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if they really wanted them, and he did not support the treaty. On the other hand, France was adamantly opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons by the FRG. Furthermore, de Gaulle supported the Soviet position on the MLF and did whatever he could to undermine the scheme.
The West Germans were not pleased with the renewed focus on their intentions in the nuclear field. Hadn’t the FRG already promised, West German officials complained, not to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons in the Paris Accords of 1954? Why should the FRG, its leaders asked, sign an agreement without something tangible from the Soviets in return? The FRG was bitterly disappointed that none of her “allies” were making an effort to link non-proliferation to a European settlement beneficial to Germany. Furthermore, West Germany had an emerging civilian nuclear sector, and it did not want to see an NPT harm its economic interests in this area.
The pressure to terminate talks regarding the MLF and to accept the NPT, combined with clashes over military and international monetary policy, brought US-West German relations to a low point in the late 1960s. The new chancellor of the FRG, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, accused the United States of “complicity” for its overtures to the Soviets on the NPT.598 The former chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, publicly called the NPT proposals “the Morganthau Plan squared.” The FRG’s attitude toward the NPT threatened a crisis between the blocs and within NATO.
Though less well known, the Soviet Union had its own difficulties with socialist countries over the issue of nuclear proliferation, resulting in similar alliance tensions. On January 17, 1955, the Council of Ministers of the USSR authorized the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology with its allies. The Soviets offered nuclear technology and information, including research reactors, to Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and even Egypt. The most important beneficiary of this policy, however, was China. In exchange for Chinese exports of uranium, the Soviets provided more than 10,000 experts, technical drawings, and refined fuel. This aid is estimated to have expedited China’s weapons program by ten to fifteen years.
This program was abruptly ended in the late 1950s, as relations between Russia and China deteriorated.599 In addition, promises to improve Hungary’s and Czechoslovakia’s atomic energy programs were not fulfilled. Khrushchev’s concerns about China’s military prowess and aggressive intentions created another source of tension with his allies. As the historian Douglas Selvage has shown, in 1963 and 1964 the Soviet leader was willing to accommodate American desires for the MLF plan in order to achieve an NPT aimed at China. Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, were furious. They insisted that the NPT must guarantee the FRG’s nonnuclear status. The Soviets heeded these concerns and once again made eliminating the MLF a key goal of an NPT.600
The MLF issue and the looming appearance of new nuclear powers gave the non-proliferation question a sense of urgency throughout 1966. The evidence indicated both India and Israel would expand their efforts to build nuclear weapons in the absence of a global regime. While it was clear that the Soviets wanted a nuclear NPT, it was just as clear they would not accept an arrangement that allowed for a meaningful MLF. In the fall, negotiations intensified, with Gromyko and Rusk struggling to find compromise language that prevented the transfer of nuclear weapons to individual states but allowed for individual European national programs to be folded into a single larger European scheme. The United States wanted to protect existing US-NATO nuclear arrangements and allow for the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).
A rough understanding between the Soviets and the Americans on treaty language and interpretation emerged during the winter of 1966 / 67. That did not mean, however, that a working treaty agreeable to all major powers was in sight. The West Germans continued to object to an NPT on a number of grounds, and demanded revision of key articles. The so-called Gaullist wing ofthe new government, led by Finance Minister Franz-JosefStrauss, dismissed the treaty as a “Versailles of cosmic proportions."601 Disagreements over the inspection and safeguard regime, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the length of the treaty were sticking points for a number of countries. The non-aligned nations highlighted other problems with the treaty and demanded that the United States and the Soviets offer security guarantees, reduce their nuclear stockpiles, and direct the savings into economic aid for the underdeveloped world. These disagreements proved time-consuming and contentious. Negotiations dragged on throughout 1967 and the first half of 1968.
The superpowers were joined by sixty-two other states, giving preliminary approval to the NPT, when it was signed on July 1,1968. The Johnson administration hoped for rapid ratification, both domestically and internationally, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 undermined those hopes. The US Senate voted in October 1968 to delay ratification, and key countries such as Italy, Israel, and the FRG refused to sign the treaty. As Richard M. Nixon succeeded Johnson as US president, the fate of the NPT was uncertain.
The Nixon administration was ambivalent toward both the NPT and the issue of nuclear proliferation in general. A briefing paper for Nixon argued that there were cases where "independent nuclear weapons capability might be desirable."602 A National Security Council (NSC) memo pointed out that, regarding the NPT, the "problems with the FRG are understated."603 A Kissinger aide claimed that "Henry believed that it was good to spread nuclear weapons around the world" and argued Japan and Israel would be better off with atomic weapons. 604 The president himself argued "treaties don’t necessarily get us very much" and if countries wanted to "make their own weapons," they could "abrogate the treaty without sanction."605 In the end, while the United States would continue to support the treaty, Nixon made it clear that he would "not pressure other nations to follow suit, especially the FRG."606
Despite this ambivalence, the Nixon administration formally presented the NPT to the US Senate for advice and consent on February 5, 1969. After a vigorous internal debate and the victory of Willy Brandt’s Social Democratic
Party in national elections, West Germany signaled its intention to sign the treaty in November 1969. The last major hurdle was cleared for both the United States and the Soviet Union to sign, and both superpowers deposited the treaty on March 5,1970.
The simple act of negotiating and signing a treaty did not, in itself, end the threat of nuclear proliferation. There were immediate setbacks. The Nixon administration did not make non-proliferation a priority. Israel’s burgeoning weapons program was ignored, as were South Africa’s nascent efforts. US-French nuclear cooperation was resumed. Western European companies offered advanced nuclear technology to potential proliferators, including Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan. India detonated a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, triggering considerable protest but few sanctions.
In spite of these problems, nuclear proliferation began to slow. Many potential proliferators suspended their weapons programs, and Japan, Australia, Sweden, and Egypt, among others, did not go nuclear as had been feared. Significantly, the complex and difficult NPT discussions helped spur other important arms-control negotiations. The Johnson administration pursued the so-called Outer Space Treaty, banning the militarization of space.
28. In May 1974, India became the second Third World country, after China, to successfully test a nuclear weapon. Here Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi visits the testing sites in Rajasthan. She is flanked by the defense minister, Krishna Chandra Pant (left), and Homi Sethna, chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (right).
The first regional nuclear-free zone was established in Latin America through the Treaty of Tlatelolco in February 1967. Strategic arms-control talks were initiated between the Soviet Union and the United States during the summer of 1968, culminating in Nixon and Brezhnev signing treaties in Moscow on May 26,1972, limiting both strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. While challenges remained, there was no denying the extraordinary shift in policies and attitudes against the horizontal and vertical spread of nuclear weapons that had taken place in little over a decade.
World History
