In which ways have the insurgents succeeded? Have U. S. forces adapted quickly enough?
THE BATTLE FOR THE “GREEN ZONE”
(Source Courtesy o< Sorman info & Media. ilusVBt)on by Wottgang Bartsch. from SoktF: Sckieien i teft, O 2001 Forsvarsrrakten, Stockbolm, p. 293)
Appearances Can Be Deceiving in Southwest Asia Too
While ostensibly crude, the Muslim militant’s method has never been defeated. Through multiple deception and continual mutation, it has so far bested Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, Israel in Southern Lebanon and Gaza, and the United States in Beirut and Mogadishu. To finally defeat that method, every deployed (or about-to-be-deployed) GI must become thoroughly familiar with its latest configuration. That will take a good, hard look at all that has happened over the last year.
In Iraq, U. S. forces have won every firefight and killed thousands of Islamic fighters. (See Map 1.1.) Unfortunately, wars are not won by occupying nonstrategic ground or killing opposition soldiers. They are won by destroying the enem/s “strategic assets.” Eastern insurgents don’t have many strategic assets. Whatever they need, they can generally take from a well-supplied adversary. To make matters worse, they have the edge in a 4th-generation-
Map 1.1: Iraqi Provinces
(Sourc« Courtesy of General Ubranee Unfversrty of Texas at Austin, from ttieir website for map designator ’iraq pof99 pdT)
Warfare (4GW) environment—one in which combat/tactics, religion/ psychology, politics/media, and economics/infrastructure all come into play. In a densely populated area, they are virtually immune to electronic surveillance and precision bombardment. Every time their pursuer overreacts, he damages local infrastructure and loses popular support. As such. Eastern insurgents develop a full portfolio of battlefield feints.
What has, or has not, occurred in Iraq deserves a closer look from this perspective. Marco Polo did, after all, warn of the diabolical mysteries of Upper Persia. Could U. S. forces have “won” every firefight in Iraq and still be losing the war? They were equally lethal and never driven from the field in Vietnam.
Within the context of Eastern intrigue, Iraq’s future looks far less certain than one might think. The U. S. military has had trouble countering its new foe’s propensity for chaos and deception. To do so now, it must identify, analyze, and compare every one of his strategic initiatives between September 2004 to September 2005. For many, there was a hidden objective, subtle diversion, and secret maneuver.
World History
