Some key West German documents for this period are available in Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), Akten zur auswartigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989-). A useful introduction to the vast research on occupied Germany is Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1949/55: ein Handbuch (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1999). On the Allied Control Council, see Gunther Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat und Deutschland, 1945-1949: Alliierte Einheit, deutsche Teilung? (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995). The most thorough interpretation of the negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers is Hanns Jurgen Kusters, Der Integrationsfriede: Viermachteverhandlungen uber die Friedensregelung mit
Deutschland, 1945-1990 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000). The global background of the division of Germany within the framework of the Cold War is treated in Georges-Henri Soutou, La guerre des Cinquante Ans: les relations Est-Ouest 1943-1990 (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 9-225.
A dominant characteristic of the research on the division of Germany has always been the national perspective. See the account of British policies in Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). The controversial reparation issue is superbly dealt with by Sir Alec Cairncross, The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations, 1941-1949 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). The best monograph on Ernest Bevin is Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: Heinemann, 1983). For a German view of the relevant British policies, see Claus Scharf and Hans-Jurgen Schroder, Die Deutschlandpolitik GrojSbritanniens und die Britische Zone 1945-1949 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979).
There is an exhaustive literature on the American contribution to the division of Germany. Detlev Junker (ed.), The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1968: A Handbook, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), contains several succinct, up-to-date essays; see also Jeffrey Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Herman-Josef Rupieper (eds.), American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955 (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1993). Carolyn Wood Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), believes that Germany's partition was fundamentally an American decision. Of remarkable impartiality in this field replete with sometimes overblown controversies is John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Of the numerous studies of former officials, the most useful is Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1957). For an account of American economic policies with regard to Germany, see Wilfried Mausbach, Zwischen Morgenthau und Marshall: das wirt-schaftspolitische Deutschlandkonzept der USA 1944-1947 (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1996). General Clay's decisive role has been analyzed in several well-documented studies with partially controversial conclusions: Wolfgang Krieger, General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1949 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988); John H. Backer, Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York: Van Nostrand, 1983); and Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt, 1980). A critical assessement of George F. Kennan's changeable German policies is Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 141-77. There are two significant memoirs that still deserve critical reading: George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967), 415-28, and Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (London: William Heinemann, 1950). For the Berlin blockade, see Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), and for the influential role ofJohnJ. McCloy, see Thomas Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
The contribution of France to the partition of Germany is discussed in the context of its general foreign policy by William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). For an informative account by a leading expert on Germany, see Alfred
Grosser, Deutschlandbilanz: Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945 (Munich: Hanser, 1970), 9-119. Policies in the French zone are covered in Volker Koop, Besetzt: franzosische Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland (Berlin: be. bra-Verlag, 2005). Still useful are Claus Scharf and Hans-Jurgen Schroder (eds.), Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die franzosische Zone 1947-1949 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983); Roy F. Willis, The French in Germany, 1947-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962) and John W. Young, France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-war Europe (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990). The best collection of essays on the important influence of de Gaulle in early French policies toward German unity is Claire Andrieu, et al. (eds.), Dictionnaire de Gaulle (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2006).
Since the opening of the archives of the German Democratic Republic and the partial accessibility of Soviet archives, a relatively vast literature has appeared on Moscow's German policies. Indispensable collections of new sources are Jochen P. Laufer and Georgij P. Kynin, Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941-1948: Dokumente aus dem Archiv fur AujSenpolitik der Russischen Federation, 3 vols. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), and the Cold War International History Project Bulletin. The best account of policies in the Soviet zone is Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). A comprehensive monograph on the Soviet Military Administration in Deutschland is Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische Militdradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-1949 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999). In spite of the rich harvest of new sources, interpretation of Soviet policies is still controversial. There are those who think that Stalin was bent on a united, pro-Soviet Germany: see, for example, Gerhard Wettig, Bereitschaft zur Einheit in Freiheit? Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1949 (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1999). For an alternative view, see Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question, and the Founding of the GDR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), who believes that Stalin wanted to secure or restore "Germany's unity," and was ready to accept a neutral Germany and even a Western-style democracy. The thesis that Stalin had always secretly pursued the goal of "two Germanies" also finds a supporter: Jochen Laufer, "Stalins Friedensziele," in Jurgen Zarusky (ed.), Stalin und die Deutschen (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2006), 131-58.
Good introductions to the role of the Germans under Allied occupation can be found in Antony Nicholls, The Bonn Republic: West Germany 1945-1990 (London: Longman, 1997), 1-92, and Dennis L. Bark and D. R. Gress, From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 1-227. A standard account from a contemporary German scholar is Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 1945-1949 (Stuttgart and Wiesbaden: DVA and F. A. Brockhaus, 1983). Hans-Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der auJJenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945-1949 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980), is my own interpretation of the interplay of Allied and German policies that gave rise to the division of Germany.
World History
