Immediately after the Poznan uprising, events moved swiftly in Poland. Social ferment grew, and people began calling openly for reform and change. With patriotic fervor and nationalist sensibilities soaring, there was a genuine danger that the existing leadership of the party, distracted by internal factionalism, might fail to diffuse the situation. In mid-October 1956, to coopt public sentiment, the leadership of the Polish United Workers’ Party decided to elect the once-discredited Gomulka as first secretary and to exclude the most discredited Stalinist officials from the top levels of the party. These radical personnel changes were approved by the Eighth Plenum of the party’s Central
Committee (CC) that began on October 19. Since Gomulka’s election evoked enthusiasm across the country, these decisions meant that the reformist forces within the party had achieved a real victory, offering the possibility that they could ease social discontent and pacify the country.
However, Soviet leaders were not consulted about this fundamental change, an unprecedented occurrence in the Soviet camp. They feared that it might be a prelude to the collapse of the entire Communist system. Khrushchev and a top-level Kremlin delegation quickly made a surprise visit to Warsaw on October 19 and confronted Polish authorities. They also prepared to authorize the Red Army to intervene, if necessary. Soviet troops, already stationed in Poland, began to move toward Warsaw. Khrushchev wanted to demonstrate power, but his actions threatened to initiate armed conflict between the Soviet Union and its biggest East European ally.
Eventually, in a dramatic faceoff between the two men, Gomulka convinced Khrushchev to accept the leadership changes in Poland in return for assurances that the political reforms would threaten neither local Communist rule nor the unity of the Soviet bloc.473 This agreement made a peaceful solution of the crisis possible, thereby avoiding a social explosion and a military clash.
Poles expressed their support for Gomulka in thousands of mass rallies and demonstrations all over the country. The acclaim constituted a notable achievement for the party because the majority ofpeople shared an anti-Soviet and basically anti-Communist attitude. Nonetheless, Poles believed that Gomulka was protecting the "Polish path to socialism," and inaugurating a bold anti-Soviet move.474
At the same time, Gomulka cleverly played a nationalist card of a different sort. Although Poles had taken to the streets calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops (as many Hungarians would also do, several days later), Gomulka convinced the people that "Polish state interests" required the Red Army to guarantee the country’s western borders. At the end of World War II, Poland had acquired German territory in the west as compensation for territory lost to the Soviet Union in the east. However, no peace treaty guaranteeing Poland’s territorial integrity had been concluded. Thus, just a decade later, fear ofWest German revanchism was widespread in Poland, and Gomulka sought to allay these apprehensions and placate the Kremlin at the same time.
In Hungary, the situation had been extremely tense since the summer of 1956 because party leaders were reluctant to make significant concessions even after Rakosi’s replacement. In early October, at the reburial ceremony of Laszlo Rajk and his companions, who had been executed after a show trial, more than a hundred thousand people silently demonstrated against an inhumane system. On October 16, at a mass rally, university students in Szeged established an independent student organization, and on October 22, at another rally, their fellow students in Budapest listed their demands in sixteen points. In addition to wanting the appointment of Nagy as prime minister and the convocation of an extraordinary party congress - desires shared by the party’s internal opposition - the students’ sixteen points included more radical demands, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and fair multiparty elections.
In Budapest, on October 23, these university students began a peaceful proreform demonstration to declare their solidarity with reformers in Poland. The demonstration escalated into an armed revolt by evening. To repress the uprising, the leadership requested the intervention of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary. After much hesitation, the CPSU presidium agreed. But the decision produced unintended results: instead of rapidly pacifying the situation, sporadic armed incidents evolved into a widespread anti-Soviet battle for liberation.
While the use of local forces, as Mikoian had suggested in the meeting of the CPSU presidium, might have offered a slim chance of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the Soviet intervention radicalized the Hungarian population and exacerbated the situation. In a few days the revolution spread across the country, a general strike took place, and all over Hungary workers’ councils and revolutionary committees snatched power from local authorities.
Although Nagy was appointed prime minister on October 24 in the hope that he would be able to calm the crowds, there was little chance he could do so under prevailing conditions. Nagy realized that the fate of the revolution was entirely in the hands of the Soviet Union. From the very outset of negotiations with a high-ranking Soviet delegation led by Mikoian and Mikhail Suslov, he endeavored to convince them that with adequate support he could stabilize the situation. 475 But, rather than suppressing the armed resistance, he argued that the most effective way to bring it under control
27. Hungary 1956: a man burning a picture of a statue of Lenin.
Was to place the party at the head of the mass social movement that undergirded the revolution.
Events during the following days seemed to vindicate Nagy’s policy. Pledging to stabilize the situation in Hungary, he sought to extract further concessions from the Soviets. On October 28, Moscow agreed to the new government’s program, calling events in Hungary a "broad national movement," instead of a "counterrevolution," promising to dissolve the secret police, legalize the revolutionary organizations, and withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest. On October 29, Red Army units began to pull back from the capital. The next day, the Soviet government issued a declaration with an explicit promise to lay a new foundation for relations between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries based on mutual equality and
Noninterference in domestic affairs. In addition, the declaration promised to consider the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary entirely, a core demand of the revolutionary groups since the beginning of the revolt.
The Soviet leadership was serious about all this: on October 30, the presidium - under pressure from a Chinese delegation that had been sent to Moscow - unanimously decided that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary.476 But the possibility of such a withdrawal did not mean the Kremlin was willing to "give up" Hungary. It was in fact the maximum political concession that Soviet leaders were willing to make in order to avoid a recourse to military intervention, an action they knew was the worst possible solution. In fact, had Nagy’s government been able to consolidate the situation, without jeopardizing the Communist regime and the integrity of the Soviet bloc, the Kremlin would not have intervened militarily.
The Malin notes of the discussions at meetings of the presidium make clear that the withdrawal would have been considered only if the Hungarians had satisfied Moscow’s two conditions. Foreign Minister Shepilov explained: "With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time."477 478 Even Mikoian, who consistently represented the most liberal viewpoint among Soviet leaders, said at a session of the presidium on November 1: "We simply cannot let Hungary be removed fTom our camp." Meanwhile, however, he did try to convince the others that a political solution was still possible and that they should wait another ten to fifteen days before invading.
While considering the withdrawal of troops, Soviet leaders never intended to allow the restoration of the capitalist system. Instead, they hoped to restore a situation akin to that in Poland. They were prepared to accept a reformed Communist system, displaying more independence internally, but remaining loyal to Moscow and within the confines of the Soviet bloc.
Yet, on October 31, one day after taking the decision to pull out their troops, the Kremlin abruptly reversed its position. Soviet leaders canceled their previous order and decided to mount an even more massive military operation. Alarming news from Hungary explains this radical aboutface, news that
Suggested a general disintegration of the regime: the installation of a multiparty system, the dissolution of the secret police, the collapse of the party leadership, the passivity of the armed forces, the freedom of the press, and violent acts against Communist officials. The Kremlin realized that Communist power in Hungary was on the verge of collapse, and this assessment led Soviet leaders to conclude that the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the crisis had been exhausted.
Inside Hungary, signs of Moscow’s prospective intervention multiplied at an alarming rate: on October 31 came the first reports that fresh Soviet troops were entering the country and occupying all the important strategic locations. It was at this point, when it became clear that a Soviet invasion was imminent, that the Cabinet decided to make a heroic last-ditch effort to preserve the revolution. On November 1, it announced Hungary’s withdrawal fTom the Warsaw Pact and declared the country’s neutrality. At the same time, Nagy sent an appeal to the secretary-general of the United Nations requesting that the four great powers assist in the defense ofHungary’s neutrality and that the matter be urgently placed on the agenda of the upcoming General Assembly.
On November 4, the Soviets launched a massive invasion and crushed the revolution in a few days. A countergovernment led by Janos Kadar was installed, while Nagy and his associates temporarily took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. After this second Soviet intervention, some 200,000 people fled the country to the West. During the revolution, 2,700 people were killed. Communist reprisals and terror led to the detention of 13,000 people, the imprisonment of over 20,000, and the execution of 230 - including Prime Minister Nagy and several of his closest associates.
World History
