Being part of the British Empire, and in accord with English laws and institutions, colonial governments were patterned after England’s governmental organization. Although originally there were corporate colonies (Connecticut and Rhode Island) and proprietary colonies (Pennsylvania and Maryland), most eventually became Crown colonies, and all had similar governing organizations. For example, after 1625, Virginia was a characteristic Crown colony, and both its governor and council (the upper house) were appointed by the Crown. But only the lower house could initiate fiscal legislation, and this body was elected by the propertied adult males within the colony.
Although the governor and the Crown could veto all laws, power gradually shifted to the lower houses as colonial legislative bodies increasingly tended to imitate the House of Commons in England. The colonists controlled the lower houses—and, therefore, the purse strings—thereby generating a climate of political freedom and independence in the colonies. Governors, who were generally expected to represent the will of the Empire and to veto legislation contrary to British interests, were often not only sympathetic to the colonists but also dependent on the legislatures for their salaries (which were frequently in arrears). Consequently, the actual control of civil affairs generally rested with the colonists themselves, through their representatives.
Of course, the power that permitted this state of affairs to exist rested in England, and the extent of local autonomy was officially limited. After the shift in power in England from the Crown to Parliament in 1690, the Privy Council reviewed all laws passed in the colonies as a matter of common procedure. According to official procedure, colonial laws were not in effect until the Privy Council granted its approval, and sometimes the council vetoed legislation passed in the colonies. Time, distance, and bureaucratic apathy, however, often permitted colonial laws and actions to become effective before they were
Even reviewed in England; and if the colonists highly desired a vetoed piece of legislation, it could be reworded and resubmitted.
In short, British directives influenced day-to-day events in the colonies only modestly. Indeed, government activity—whether British or colonial—was a relatively minor aspect of colonial affairs. The burdens of defense, for example, fell on the shoulders of those in Britain, not on those in the colonies, and colonists were among the most lightly taxed people in the world. Furthermore, the colonists themselves held the power to resolve issues of a local nature. They had no central or unifying government,1 but the colonial governments had organized themselves to the point in the early eighteenth century where they appointed officials, granted western lands, negotiated with the Indians, raised taxes, provided relief for the poor, and the like. In this way, British subjects in the New World enjoyed extensive freedom of self-determination throughout most of the colonial period (Economic Reasoning Proposition 1, scarcity forces us to make choices).
The main provisions of the early Navigation Acts, which imposed the most important restrictions on colonial economic freedom, formed the basis of the old colonial policy. Recall that these laws epitomized British mercantilism and that their aim was threefold: (1) to protect and encourage English and colonial shipping; (2) to ensure that major colonial imports from Europe were shipped from British ports; and (3) to ensure that the bulk of desired colonial products—the enumerated articles—were shipped to England.
The first Acts of Trade and Navigation (in 1651, 1660, and 1663) introduced these concepts concerning the colonies’ relationship with the Empire. Colonial settlers and investors always had been aware of the restrictions on their economic activities. Rules were changed gradually and, until 1763, in such a way that American colonists voiced no serious complaints. Articles were added to the enumerated list over a long period of time. At first, the list consisted entirely of southern continental and West Indian products, most importantly tobacco, sugar, cotton, dyewood, and indigo. Rice and molasses were not added until 1704, naval stores until 1705 and 1729, and furs and skins until 1721. Whenever enumeration resulted in obvious and unreasonable hardship, relief might be granted. For example, the requirement that rice be sent to England added so much to shipping and handling costs that the American product, despite its superior quality, was priced out of southern European markets. Consequently, laws passed in the 1730s allowed rice to be shipped directly to ports south of Cape Finisterre, a promontory in northwestern Spain.
Commodities were enumerated if they were especially important to English manufacturers or were expected to yield substantial customs revenue. However, the requirements of shipping listed items to English ports were less onerous than we might initially suppose. First, because the Americans and the English shared general ties of blood and language (and, more specifically, because their credit contacts were more easily established), the colonists would have dealt primarily with English merchants anyway. Second, duties charged on commodities that were largely re-exported, such as tobacco, were remitted entirely or in large part to the colonies. Third, bounties were paid on some of the enumerated articles. Fourth, it was permissible to ship certain items on the list directly from one colony to another to furnish essential supplies. Finally, the laws could be evaded through smuggling; with the exception of molasses, such evasion was probably neither more nor less common in the colonies than it was in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
With respect to colonial imports, the effect of the Navigation Acts was to distort somewhat—but not to influence materially—the flows of trade. The fact that goods had 27
To be funneled through England added to costs and restricted trade to the colonists. Again, however, traditional ties would have made Americans the best customers of British merchants anyway. Furthermore, hardship cases were relieved by providing direct shipment of commodities such as salt and wine to America from ports south of Cape Finisterre.
If English manufacturers were to be granted special advantages over other European manufacturers in British American markets, should restrictions also be placed on competing colonial manufacturers? Many British manufacturers felt that such “duplicate production” should be prohibited and tried to convince Parliament that colonial manufacturing was not in the best interest of the Empire. In 1699, a law made it illegal to export colonial wool, wool yarn, and finished wool products to any foreign country or even to other colonies. Later, Americans (many of Dutch origin) were forbidden to export hats made of beaver fur. Toward mid-century, a controversy arose in England over the regulation of iron manufactures; after 1750, pig and bar iron were admitted into England duty free, but the colonial manufacture of finished iron products was expressly forbidden. The fact that these were the only prohibitive laws directed at colonial manufacturing indicates Britain’s lack of fear of American competition.
After all, England enjoyed a distinct comparative advantage in manufacturing, and the colonies’ comparative advantage in production lay overwhelmingly in agriculture and other resource-intensive products from the seas and forests. Note that the important shipbuilding industry in the colonies was not curtailed by British legislation; indeed, it was supported by Parliament. Therefore, any piecemeal actions to prevent colonial manufacturing activities appear to have been taken largely to protect particular vested interests in England, especially those with influence and effective lobbying practices.
The laws prohibiting colonial manufactures were loosely enforced; they were restrictive and annoying, but they did not seriously affect the course of early American industrial development or the colonial quest for independence. Also, the economic controls that England imposed on the colonies were less strict than the colonial controls other European countries imposed, and these controls were less harsh for America than for Ireland and other colonies within the Empire. We should not, however, misapprehend the trend of enforcement of the old colonial policy. Regulation of external colonial trade was progressively strengthened. Beginning in 1675, governors were supplied with staffs of officials to help enforce trade regulations; after the general reorganization of 1696, the powers of these officials were sufficient to provide considerable surveillance and commercial regulation.
The only trade law flaunted with impunity was the Molasses Act of 1733—an act that, if enforced, would have disrupted one of the major colonial trades and resulted in serious repercussions, especially in New England. Before 1700, New England had traded primarily with the British possessions in the West Indies. In time, however, British planters failed to provide a sufficient market for northern colonial goods, and sugar and molasses from the increasingly productive French islands became cheaper than the English staples. During the same period, British planters in the sugar islands were hurt by the requirement that cane products be shipped to England before being re-exported. In an effort to protect British West Indian holdings, Parliament imposed high duties on foreign (predominantly French) sugar, molasses, and rum imported to the English colonies. The strict levying of these duties and the prevention of smuggling would have suppressed the market of northern staples in the West Indies and would have seriously curtailed all trade involving rum. New Englanders felt they had no feasible alternative because they had to sell their fish, provisions, lumber, and rum to pay for their imports. Rather than accept such hardships, the New Englanders continued to trade as usual; instead of facing the issue resolutely, English officials, many of whom were routinely bribed (10 percent
Being the custom for “looking the other way”), made no serious attempts to enforce trade regulations (Economic Reasoning Proposition 4, laws and rules matter). Some 30 years later, after the matter had been raised time after time, the Sugar Act of 1764 ruled against the American colonists in favor of the British West Indian planters. This decision to impose and collect the tax was a key factor in bringing on the first crisis leading to revolution.
World History
