Alliance and confrontation

The event that truly determined China’s foreign relations in 1947 and 1948 was the CCP’s decisive victory in the civil war. In the face of this radical change, the responses of both the United States and the Soviet Union were gradual and passive. As the revolutionary movement developed, US influence in China steadily declined, until it finally disappeared completely. In contrast, Soviet political influence grew to the point that the USSR and the new Communist-dominated state, the PRC, came together in a formal alliance. After the CCP-led People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seized Shenyang in November 1948, CCP leaders started to formulate the foreign policy of their new government. The CCP’s cognitive framework, based on revolutionary theory, and the leadership’s fundamental attitude to the growth in international tensions at that time largely influenced this change in CCP policy. Mao and his colleagues were Communist revolutionaries; they were deeply convinced that the Chinese revolutionary movement was a part of a worldwide Communist revolutionary movement. Regardless of the Cold War, this approach roughly determined the CCP leaders’ attitude toward the United States and the USSR. Mao’s concept of "leaning to one side" vividly revealed the basic tendency and choice of the CCP’s leaders.

Nevertheless, one must note that the lean-to-one-side policy was really more like a broad statement of principle. Since it expressed only the CCP’s general principle of managing foreign relations within the framework of US-Soviet confrontation, it obviously gave rise to few specific policies for managing foreign relations. In reality, the choices - of what kind of alliance with the

17. The Chinese Civil War left behind a devastated economy. Here people in Shanghai line up to exchange depreciated paper money for gold in 1948 - ten people were crushed to death in the melee that followed.

Soviet Union or which confrontations with the United States there were to be - were both the results of more complex decisionmaking processes.

At the end of 1947, when CCP leaders formed their strategy of overthrowing the GMD regime by force as soon as possible, Mao thought that relations with the Soviet Union would be the key to the new Chinese state’s foreign policy and would serve as a model for its domestic development. He wanted to visit Stalin in Moscow to discuss these matters. Even ifthis proposition was never realized during the civil war, it did underscore the Chinese leadership’s urgent wish to bolster relations with the USSR.

The CCP’s gestures were not unrequited. In fact, beginning in the spring of 1948, Soviet aid to the CCP notably increased. After the PLA took over Manchuria in early November, Stalin deemed it necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the CCP’s internal situation and its policies in various areas. He again assumed personal responsibility for the USSR’s China policies. However, some ofStalin’s policies met with staunch resistance from the CCP leadership. On January 10, 1949, Stalin telegraphed to the CCP Central Committee his suggestions for peace talks between the CCP and the GMD. Even if that was not his intention, Stalin’s suggestions could have led to a division of China and, consequently, Mao categorically refused to follow his advice. Stalin had to backtrack.333 This incident demonstrated to Soviet leaders that they needed to study more intently the implications of the CCP’s victory, as well as its domestic and foreign policies.

From early 1949 to the summer of that year, a number of top-level secret exchange visits occurred between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CCP. On January 31, 1949, Anastas Mikoian visited the CCP Central Committee’s headquarters at Xibaipo, and for three days held extensive talks with Mao and other CCP leaders. As a result of these talks, the two sides reached broad agreement on the CCP’s domestic and foreign policies. Disagreements regarding future bilateral relations were left for later discussion. Mikoian’s visit had a very positive impact on CCP-USSR relations. Mao praised Soviet aid to the CCP at its Central Committee meeting in March 1949, where he also essentially dictated the lean-to-one-side policy for the new regime.334 This event marked the establishment of the CCP’s policy of a formal alliance with the Soviet Union for the new Chinese state.

In late June, Liu Shaoqi led a senior delegation to visit Moscow, where it concluded agreements with Stalin on the substance ofthe CCP’s domestic and foreign policies following the founding of its regime. This visit completed the CCP’s preparations for an alliance with the Soviet Union; the only outstanding issues were how to deal with the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945, and whether a new treaty ought to take its place.

CCP leaders saw the 1945 treaty as problematic. When they were young, they had all gone through a process of committing themselves first to the patriotic cause before becoming self-avowed revolutionaries and being drawn to Communism. In their mind, “following the path of the Russians" signified not only the elimination of an exploitative social structure, but also the creation of a new international order wherein the first item on the agenda was to abolish all of the unequal treaties China had previously signed. In this light, the CCP leaders were dissatisfied with the August 1945 treaty and, during Mikoian’s visit to Xibaipo, they explicitly questioned some of its basic features. Subsequently, when Liu Shaoqi visited Moscow, he proposed to Stalin three alternative solutions: first, that they preserve the treaty, which would be recognized by the new China; second, that they abolish the treaty and create a new one; or, third, through an exchange of notes, that the two countries agree to keep the status quo temporarily while preparing themselves for a new treaty. Stalin prevaricated on the issue, and this meant that the question of the treaty was left to become the focus of the Stalin-Mao conversations after the founding of the PRC.

On December i6, 1949, having just arrived in Moscow, Mao held talks with Stalin on the treaty question. Stalin at first claimed that the time was not right for changing the old treaty. He suggested instead that a statement on the issue of Port Arthur would suffice. Only after Mao insisted on the complete termination of the old treaty did Stalin agree to make major revisions to it, though only after two years.335 Clearly, Stalin was not ready to renounce the benefits that the Soviet Union itself had reaped from the old international order.

After Mao stood fast for another couple of weeks, and after several meetings between Stalin and his closest advisers, the Soviet leader’s view began to change. During his talk with Molotov and Mikoian on January 2, 1950, Mao proposed three options: to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty; alternatively, to have the official news agencies of the two countries issue a succinct communique announcing that agreements had been reached on the important questions; or, lastly, to issue a joint statement on the major points of bilateral relations. Molotov thought that the first option was the best. Mao immediately telegraphed Zhou to ask him to get ready for negotiations and to visit Moscow.336

Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow on January 20. On January 22, Mao and Zhou talked with Stalin and determined the basic contents of the new treaty. After that, negotiations passed to the specifics, where the two sides took up key issues such as the use of the ports of Port Arthur and Dalian. In the end, the Soviets mostly agreed with the suggestions from the Chinese side but, citing the issue of military aid, Stalin insisted on a "supplementary agreement" that prohibited other countries from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed on February 14,1950, and marked the formal birth of the Sino-Soviet alliance. From that point on, the Soviet Union began to supply economic, financial, and military assistance to the PRC on a grand scale.

The story of CCP-US relations mirrors that of its relations with the USSR. As was the case with the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, the fundamental ideological attitudes of CCP leaders prompted them to opt for confrontation with the United States. The Communist leadership also believed that the United States had become the major external threat to their final victory. During the last stage of the civil war and the founding of the PRC, the CCP lived in constant dread of various forms of US intervention, including a direct military intervention, schemes to sow division in the Chinese revolutionary camp, an embargo against the new China, or the obstruction of the final reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.337

Concerning the domestic environment, after more than two years ofpolitical mobilization, the CCP had cleansed both party and army of "US-fearing" or "US-admiring" thinking. Two events - the takeover of the US consulate after the seizure of Shenyang in November 1948 and the searching of US ambassador John Leighton Stuart’s residence after seizing Nanjing in April 1949 - highlighted the prevailing anti-American sentiment among lower-rank PLA cadres and soldiers. The Central Committee had to take forceful measures to prevent overly zealous actions that might have triggered major international conflicts.

On the other hand, the CCP was also under considerable pressure from the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders distrusted the CCP’s relations with the United States. Because the CCP leaders treated their relationship with the USSR as their top priority from the very beginning, it followed naturally that they would do everything required to dispel the doubts of their Soviet counterparts, even at the cost of any chance of developing relations with the United States. Although Stalin had said, before the PLA crossed the Yangtze River, that the CCP could establish relations with the United States and other Western countries, particularly trade relations, the Chinese Communist leadership doubted that such relations would do them any good.338 It is likely that the CCP leaders did not want to take any chances when they were at a sensitive stage in the formation of their alliance with the Soviet Union.

The CCP’s interactions with the United States during the period from late 1948 to the summer of 1949 came to have a significant influence on its US policy. These events included the arrest of US consulate staff in Shenyang in the winter of 1948 and the CCP representatives’ covert contacts with US ambassador Stuart after the PLA took over Nanjing in April 1949. While the CCP arrest of US consul Angus Ward and his staff produced intense resentment in Washington, the talks between Ambassador Stuart and Huang Hua, the CCP representative in Nanjing who was Stuart's former student, had no positive results. It could even be said that the interactions with Stuart disabused the top CCP leaders of any notion of developing normal relations with the United States, if they indeed had one at that time. On June 30, Mao Zedong published "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in which he publicly announced that the new government would "lean to one side" in favor of the Soviet camp. Significantly, on the same day, the Central Committee telegraphed the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee to say that "we entertain no illusions that the US imperialists will change their policies [toward the Chinese revolution]."339 When, during the summer of 1949, the United States withdrew all of its diplomats fTom China, Mao wrote in response:

The war to turn China into a US colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the US imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War II. The US policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia, and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, US imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking Europe. US imperialism considers its front in the Americas relatively secure. These are the smug overall calculations of the US aggressors.340

The CCP's victory overturned the existing postwar international order in East Asia, which was based on the Yalta agreement and the ensuing 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. The new state of affairs was based on the new Sino-Soviet treaty signed in February 1950. Through its alliance with the USSR, the PRC now staked its initial position in the Cold War on standing alongside Moscow in confrontation with the United States.

Crossing the Yalu River

The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. Previously, Chinese leaders had concentrated their attention on domestic matters, and the major tasks of the PLA had been to accelerate its entry into Tibet and to prepare for the takeover of Taiwan. Chinese leaders already regarded the United States as a major menace, but they did not believe that any American military threat was

I8. The chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong.

Impending. At this time, both the Korean peninsula and Indochina were regions of tension. Of the two, China clearly saw the latter as more important. On the Korean peninsula, China hoped it would not have to intervene. From July 1949 to March-April 1950, three divisions of the Korean army (or more than 30,000 soldiers) that had fought in the Chinese Civil War were allowed to return, armed, to North Korea. Chinese leaders made this decision in part because they were concerned that North Korea might be attacked by South Korea, with possible Japanese assistance. On the other hand, these troops no longer had important duties in China. Allowing them to return to Korea was a logical component of disarmament at a time when the Chinese army was already being demobilized on a large scale.

In May i949 - even as China made the decision to provide aid to North Korea - Mao explicitly told North Korean leaders that he did not approve ofan attack on South Korea, and he continued to hold this position for some time.341

Probably because he knew Mao’s attitude, Stalin did not ask Kim II Sung to consult Mao on North Korea’s military plans until shortly before Stalin finally approved North Korea’s attack in April 1950. On May 13, when Mao learned from Kim of the joint proposal by the USSR and North Korea, he first verified it with the Soviets, and then decided not to oppose Kim’s planned offensive in South Korea, as he knew that China was in no position to challenge Stalin’s decision.342 Nevertheless, Chinese leaders did not really focus on the situation on the Korean peninsula during the early stages of the war, immediately after June 25,1950, because they saw it as a Soviet responsibility.

In addition to the basic solidarity that existed between Chinese and Korean Communists, the main reason behind the Chinese leaders’ decision to enter the Korean War in the fall of 1950 was their reevaluation of the overall situation in East Asia after the success of the American military intervention. The military deployments undertaken by the Truman administration were extensive; the United States not only used force on the Korean peninsula, but also strengthened its military presence in the Taiwan Strait and in Southeast Asia. These actions led Chinese leaders to think that the United States was about to engage in a strategic expansion against China. At a Politburo meeting on August 4, Mao said that "if the US imperialists were to succeed, they would be complacent, and would threaten us."343 Zhou’s talk in the August 26 meeting on national defense highlighted the Chinese leadership’s concern with a possible "domino effect" caused by US intervention.344

In terms ofthe specific decisionmaking process, two events made a Chinese entry into the Korean War highly likely. First, when the United States dispatched troops to Korea, it also imposed a blockade of the Taiwan Strait. Essentially, the civil war in China had been a war for the reunification of the country, and the US presence in the Taiwan Strait therefore directly contradicted the final goals ofthe CCP. To Chinese leaders, the blockade constituted intolerable aggression. In fact, the American blockade of the strait forced the PRC to abandon a campaign to take over Taiwan and, in doing so, facilitated the redeployment ofseveral PLA army corps to the Korean border where they would confront the United States. On July 7, the Central Military Commission

Decided to form an army for border defense in the northeast. Marshal Su Yu, who had been the intended commander for the invasion of Taiwan, was now appointed commander-in-chief and political commissar of the border defense army. The Ninth Corps, previously assigned to the attack on Taiwan, and the Nineteenth Corps, previously scheduled for demobilization, were instead concentrated along the Long Hai and Jin Pu railways in order to be transferred quickly to the northeast.

Second, the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by US troops finally prompted Chinese leaders to enter the Korean War. When the war took a dramatic turn after the Inchon landing on September 15, Chinese leaders began sending warning signals to Washington that US troops should not cross the thirty-eighth parallel. On October 3, Zhou Enlai sent an ultimatum via the Indian ambassador to China, saying that if the American troops crossed the parallel "we would not just be by-standers; we would intervene."345 The US leadership never took Zhou’s warning seriously, and on October 7 their troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. From that point on, in fact, it was inevitable that Chinese troops would, in some form, cross the Yalu River.

Although hostility to the United States played the key role in China’s decision to enter the Korean War, the decisionmaking process was complicated by considerations of how to handle Sino-Soviet relations. After the North Korean reverses, Stalin asked for China’s assistance in Korea, and leaders in Beijing found it difficult to say no because of China’s subordinate role in the alliance. Proponents of a massive Chinese intervention - first and foremost Mao Zedong himself - could not have persuaded their comrades to intervene if it had not been for Stalin’s willingness to meet Mao’s minimum preconditions in terms of Soviet aid, including a guarantee that the Soviets would prevent the war from being expanded into China.

On October 1, after being asked to do so both by the Soviets and the North Koreans, Mao made the decision to enter the war. Yet because he did not have majority support, he did not send the telegram that he had drafted to that effect. He explained to the Soviet ambassador on October 3 that some policymakers did not support China’s entry into the Korean War out of concern that direct Sino-American confrontation would set back China’s plans for peaceful reconstruction. They were also worried, he said, that disaffection might arise within China.346

At the beginning of the war, Stalin had kept China in the position of a limited participant. But at the decisive juncture of North Korea’s failure to repulse US troops, he urged China to send troops, and tried to sway the Chinese leaders as best he could. In an October 5 telegram to Mao, Stalin cited the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty. He said that the United States had not made adequate preparations for a large-scale war and that, if the Americans were to carry the war into China itself, the USSR would assist in repelling them. He also noted that China’s entry into the war would force the United States to make concessions, and that Washington would "have to abandon Taiwan." If China did not send troops, in contrast, then it would not "even get Taiwan back."347 At about the same time that Stalin sent this telegram, the CCP Central Committee took the final decision to send troops to Korea. It is unclear whether Mao had yet received Stalin’s telegram at that point, but Stalin’s reaffirmation of the promises in the Sino-Soviet treaty certainly played a role by encouraging Chinese leaders to overcome their fears that war might spread into their own country.

Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao left Beijing for Moscow on October 8. In discussions on October 11, Stalin agreed to provide any military aid necessary to China. Yet, on the issue of Soviet air cover for China’s troops as they entered the Korean peninsula, he stated explicitly that it would be impossible for the Soviet air force to enter the war immediately. What it could do, Stalin said, was to help bolster air cover for China itself.348 Stalin’s promise was very significant because it convinced the Chinese leaders that the PRC would not have to worry about US air assaults in China proper while its troops fought on the Korean peninsula.

However, Stalin’s reluctance to provide air cover for Chinese troops in Korea undoubtedly made some of the preparations extremely difficult for China. Mao telegraphed Zhou many times, instructing him to urge the USSR to make a resolute and explicit promise to provide military equipment and to enter the war itself within two months. At this time, some Chinese leaders also envisaged that their troops would be engaged primarily in a defensive strategy, and would not launch attacks on US forces.349

Around October 14, Chinese leaders essentially finalized their strategic plan and war objectives. They wanted to prevent the Korean War from expanding into China proper, to stop the United States from occupying the northern regions of Korea close to the Chinese border, and to help the North Korean regime survive. According to Mao’s instructions, once Chinese troops entered the Korean peninsula, they were to be deployed in suitable positions so they could set up defensive lines. They were not to undertake offensive operations for six months. As Mao said on October 14, he meant "to push the national defense line toward Deokcheon, Yeogwon as well as south of them - assuring this will be of great benefit [to us]."350 On October 18, based on Zhou Enlai’s reports from the negotiations with the USSR, Chinese leaders again reviewed their decision to send troops to Korea, and gave the go-ahead for troops to enter. The following day Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River.

After finding conditions on the ground in North Korea to be to their advantage, China’s army launched its first offensive campaign on October 25, 1950. From that time until July 27, 1953, China fought a large-scale regional war against the United States. This war - the PRC’s first - had major consequences for the new state’s international orientation.

The Korean conflict immediately brought the newly founded PRC to the forefront of the Cold War in East Asia. China’s alliance with the USSR was strengthened and broadened, creating a much closer relationship between the two parties than had ever existed in the past. Equally important, China’s antagonism toward the United States was deepened and made more permanent. The realities of war created perceptions among CCP leaders of a much more ominous world outside their region. The parameters of the Cold War in Asia, thus established, would remain unchanged for a long

Time to come. 351