The early craft societies were typically transitory, the longest-maintained union being the Philadelphia Cordwainers (1794-1806). Cyclical economic downturns routinely dissolved worker collective actions, and wage reductions, though resisted, were common during downturns in the economy. Another deterrent to unionization came from court actions. Conservative judges, in their instructions to juries, contended that union action per se was illegal. Societies of workers were considered conspiracies under English common law, a conspiracy being defined as “a confederacy of two or more, by indirect means to injure an individual or to do any act, which is unlawful or prejudicial to the community.” (Commons, 1910, p. 82) A doctrine developed in England during the late Middle Ages was thus applied some 500 years later to restrict the unionization of
Craftspeople. In the famous case of the Pittsburgh Cordwainers in 1815, the judge contended that both the master shoemakers and the journeymen were coerced:
No shoemaker dare receive one who worked under price, or who was not a member of the society. No master workman must give him any employment, under the penalty of losing all his workmen. Moreover, a conspiracy to prevent a man from freely exercising his trade, or particular profession, in a particular place, is endictable. Also, it is an end-ictable offense, to conspire to compel men to become members of a particular association, or to contribute towards it. (quoted in Commons 1910, 82-83.)
The jury in this case agreed that the master shoemakers, the journeymen, and the public were endangered by the association of journeymen and returned a verdict of guilty of conspiracy, although the court fined the defendants only $1 each, plus prosecution costs.
Later judgments sustained this legal perspective until the famous case of Commonwealth v. Hunt. In the fall of 1840, Hunt and other members of the Boston Bootmakers’ Society were hauled into municipal court for attempting to enforce a closed shop. Again, after a strict charge from a judge who felt that such union activities could lead only to a “frightful despotism,” the accused were convicted. The case was appealed to the supreme court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and in 1842, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw handed down a monumental decision that set a precedent on one point and opened the way to more liberal decisions on another. First, he held that a combination of union members was not criminal unless the object of the combination was criminal; the mere fact of organization implied no illegal conspiracy. Second, he asserted the doctrine that union members were within their rights in pressing for a closed shop and in striking to maintain union security. Justice Shaw was not a radical, nor was he particularly sympathetic with labor’s cause, but he was well aware of the economic realities that were pressing labor to act collectively. This decision did not mean that trade unions were free from further court confrontations, but no more serious efforts were made to make the mere fact of organization a criminal offense, and henceforth there would be some reticence about presuming that the use of any and all weapons of the trade unions were socially harmful.
World History
