The year 1968, however, was to be a watershed for Gaullist France as well as a turning point in East-West relations. The students’ revolt and the social unrest which paralyzed the country in May signaled a serious internal crisis. Although the situation was rapidly brought under control, the regime was deeply weakened, as de Gaulle’s resignation would illustrate in less than a year’s time. Moreover, the events provoked a financial crisis and weakened the French franc, thereby eroding the power base of Gaullist diplomacy. In brief, the limits of "grandeur" were now clearly visible. Perhaps even more importantly, international developments did not conform to de Gaulle’s vision. As Wladyslaw Gomulka had warned in no uncertain terms a year earlier during de Gaulle’s visit to Poland, the time was not ripe for Soviet satellites to fTee themselves from Moscow’s control.249 The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia at the end of the summer came as a dramatic confirmation. Although the crushing of the Prague Spring was only a temporary blow to the amelioration of East-West relations, and detente was back on track in a matter of months, the detente that began to emerge was very different from the one envisioned by de Gaulle. As evidenced by the multiplication of calls on both sides, it was a detente in which the superpowers and their respective alliances played a major role, that is, the very kind of detente "between blocs” that de Gaulle had persistently rejected because it sustained the East-West status quo. This was what the Harmel Report of December 1967 called for. Named after Belgian foreign minister, Pierre Harmel, who had taken the initiative, the report was adopted by the NATO allies in spite of French reservations. Focused on the "future tasks" of the alliance, the report made the case for an increased role for the Atlantic alliance in East-West relations, in effect making the argument - much to the dismay of Gaullists - that the conduct of detente should become a NATO policy.
The adoption of the Harmel Report illustrated the limits of de Gaulle’s revisionist design on the Western alliance. Far fTom triggering the "disintegration" of the Western bloc, France’s withdrawal from the allied integrated bodies actually led to a reaffirmation of US leadership and a consolidation of the Atlantic alliance. This was made clear by the adoption, in 1967, of the new strategy of flexible response that Paris had obstructed for years, thus ending a divisive intra-alliance debate. By the time of his resignation in April 1969, de Gaulle’s all-out revisionism, in short, had failed to shatter the status quo, both in East-West relations and within both blocs.
The balance sheet of de Gaulle’s policies must be nuanced in terms of both their impact on the Cold War system and their effects on France’s international standing. In spite of the failure - at least for the time being - of his revisionist design, de Gaulle had succeeded in shaping a vision of East-West relations that represented a valid alternative to the bipolar model. To be sure, the prevailing model was compatible with a measure of East-West change, as illustrated by the intensification of detente in Europe in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakia crisis. In fact, the crisis arguably made detente easier to accept both in the East and in the West, as Soviet worries that the satellites would leave the Warsaw Pact and declare their neutrality were allayed and US fears of a dilution of the Atlantic alliance were also put to rest. Yet the American version of detente seemed more likely to preserve the division of the continent and of Germany for the foreseeable future than to create a dynamic which would bring about structural change. The Gaullist model thus remained an enduring alternative in the debate about the future of the European system in the decades to come.
As for France’s international standing, it was, from then on, premised on the self-proclaimed validity of the Gaullist vision in the long term. France’s international reputation stemmed fTom its support of an international system freed of the logic of blocs. This vision underscored France’s unique approach to East-West as well as to North-South relations and illuminated its commitment to national self-determination as well as to European autonomy. In this way, the
Gaullist ambition to overcome the Cold War status quo justified the country’s independent profile and its assertive foreign policy. This was perhaps de Gaulle’s most significant achievement: by restoring France’s sense of a distinctive international role and status, he reconciled the French to their international environment. There was a paradox here: by making the overcoming of Cold War realities the raison d'etre of France’s international policies, de Gaulle somehow turned his country into a satisfied power - and this at a time when events seemed to be freezing those very realities.
World History
