Despite ample pride, talent, and faith in its cause, the South was woefully unprepared for a protracted war. Figure 14.1 provides a rough portrayal of the available human
FIGURE 14.1
Population of Males 10-49 Years of Age in 1860 (in thousands)
Northern Whites 6,056
Free Blacks 145
Southern Whites 1,712
Slaves 1,220
Border Whites 851
Source: Ransom 1989, Figure 6.2.
Resources that each side possessed for potential combat. The reality of the situation, moreover, was that the 1.2 million military-age slaves in the South could not be used for fighting on the front, and probably fewer than 30 percent of eligible whites in the Border states sided with the southern cause.
Indeed, the South had to use some of its precious manpower to repress its slave labor force. And, when circumstances permitted, slaves and free blacks joined the Union forces, further tipping the balance in favor of the North. By the end of the war, blacks in the Union army alone outnumbered the Confederate forces. Conventional military wisdom of the day calculated a ratio of two to one for an attacking army to overcome a defending army. Ultimately, those calculations proved valid: The North could outman the South three or more to one.
In industrial capacity, the comparisons are even more lopsided. Value added in manufacturing in the North, according to Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss (1981), totaled $1.6 billion in 1860. It totaled merely $193 million in the South, with half of it in Virginia. Richmond, Virginia, was also the site of the only cannon manufacturer in the South. (The original buildings are still there along the James River.) Initially, neither side had a significant advantage in arms production, and both depended heavily on imported arms. But the North was able to increase production quickly. The South was much less able to do this, and its lack of domestic manufacturing bore down heavily after the federal naval blockade during 1863 and 1864 shut off foreign supplies.
Particularly troubling to the South, especially after the North took control of the Mississippi River, was the lack of a transport network sufficient to move food and supplies to the troops. The South’s limited rail network was strained to capacity, but the primary shortage was of horses and mules. Because the fighting was largely on southern soil, the South’s animal stocks fell relative to the North’s as the war wore on.
These comparisons, however, do not mean that the South’s decision to fight was irrational. The South’s hope was that the North would eventually tire of the enormous human costs of the war and agree to let the South go its own way. The Revolutionary War had provided a forceful example of a nation winning independence from an economically and militarily more powerful foe. (For Robert E. Lee, that example was part of the family history: His father, “Light-Horse Harry” Lee, had been an outstanding cavalry commander in the Revolution.) In the summer of 1864, even after numerous southern defeats, it still seemed possible that war weariness might defeat Lincoln in his bid for reelection—indeed, Lincoln himself doubted that he would win—and that Lincoln’s successor might negotiate a peace that preserved slavery. However, General William Tecumseh Sherman’s capture of Atlanta in September rekindled Lincoln’s fortunes, and Lincoln’s reelection sealed the South’s fate.
World History
