See CHURCH COMMITTEE.
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (SASC). Created by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the committee merged the Senate Military Affairs Committee and Naval Affairs Committee, both of which had been in existence since 1816. The new committee’s jurisdiction was based on the Constitution’s grant to Congress to provide for the general defense. The 13-member committee met for the first time on 13 January 1947.
The SASC quickly became an important conduit for national security legislation. It was heavily involved in the passage of the 1947 National Security Act and the amendments to it in 1949 that established the Department of Defense (DOD). It passed, among others, the Selective Service Act of 1948, the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1948, the Air Force Composition Act of 1948, the Uniform Code of Military Justice Act of 1950, the Universal Military Training Program Act of 1952, and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.
In its early years, the SASC lacked jurisdiction and professional staff and so largely reacted to, rather than initiated, legislation. The
Committee passed general authorization bills that provided little guidance for the annual funding decision of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, which doled out the money for authorized programs. However, the SASC gradually began accruing important powers, first, by assuming control over presidential nominations and, then, by asserting its oversight responsibilities over defense and intelligence matters. In 1959, for example, the committee started requiring authorization of missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels prior to appropriations, all in the face of opposition by the Dwight D. Eisenhower White House and the Department of Defense.
During the 1960s, the committee enhanced the authorization process by broadening its access to information. In 1969, the chairman established a system of regular quarterly Pentagon reports on major weapons programs, cost overruns, and performance tests. In 1973, the committee received for the first time the Pentagon’s five-year plan for procurement of major weapons systems. In the meantime, the committee continued to expand the items in the defense budget requiring authorization, such as weapons, manpower, and personnel issues.
In addition, the committee began asserting jurisdiction over arms control issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1969, for example, the committee held hearings on the military implications of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It also held hearings on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that led to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and an interim agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. In 1975, a subcommittee held hearings on Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreements.
In the late 1970s, the committee also played a significant role in the debate over ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. During July through October of 1979, the committee held hearings on the SALT II agreement and on 20 December 1979 recommended that the treaty not be ratified, claiming that it, as negotiated, “is not in the national security interests of the United States.”
During this time, the committee exercised limited oversight responsibilities over intelligence matters that, to some experts, were tantamount to no oversight at all. In May 1976, the committee lost some of its jurisdiction over intelligence when the Senate established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) with responsibility for oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Intelligence community (IC). The SASC, however, retained jurisdiction over tactical intelligence with military applications.
By the time Arizona senator Barry Goldwater became chairman of the committee in 1985, the committee’s work was well on its way to being sidelined by the momentous changes taking place in world politics. The Ronald Reagan defense buildup, for example, began to wane, and a long period of real decline in the defense budget began. However, Senator Goldwater was instrumental in putting together a bill to reorganize America’s defense establishment. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 over the opposition of the Pentagon and the secretary of defense. Today, the committee is an important arbiter of national security policy, especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. See also HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (SFRC). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was established in 1816 as one of the original 10 standing committees of the Senate. Throughout its history, the committee has been instrumental in developing and influencing United States foreign policy. The committee has considered, debated, and reported important treaties and legislation, ranging from the purchase of Alaska in 1867 to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. It also holds jurisdiction over all diplomatic nominations.
Through these powers, the committee has helped shape foreign policy of broad significance, such as in matters of war and peace and international relations. Members of the committee have assisted in the negotiation of treaties and at times have helped to defeat treaties they felt were not in the national interest. The SFRC was instrumental in the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and 1920, and in the passage of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948.
For much of the Cold War, the SFRC experienced a bipartisan spirit. However, the state of almost constant crisis spawned by the ideological conflict with the Soviet Union resulted in the vast expansion of presidential authority over foreign policy. Since the 1960s, the committee has sought to redress this imbalance of powers.
The SFRC has had only limited jurisdiction over intelligence matters. During the Cold War, the committee exercised intelligence jurisdiction only as it affected American foreign relations. The committee lost that role when the Senate established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in May 1976. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the SFRC has assumed a secondary role to that of the SSCI and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on matters pertaining to counterterrorism and intelligence. See also HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE.
SENATE RESOLUTION 400. A resolution of the U. S. Senate passed in May 1976 that established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to oversee the activities of U. S. intelligence agencies. The resolution empowered the SSCI to conduct studies of intelligence activities and programs of the U. S. government, submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation, and report to the Senate concerning intelligence activities and programs. See also CHURCH COMMITTEE; RULE X; SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI).
The SSCI was established in 1976 by Senate Resolution 400 to provide congressional oversight of the programs and activities of U. S. intelligence agencies. The SSCI evolved from the Church Committee, which in the mid-1970s investigated the activities of the U. S. intelligence, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The SSCI performs an annual review of the intelligence budget submitted by the president and prepares legislation authorizing appropriations for the various civilian and military agencies and departments comprising the intelligence community (IC). The committee makes recommendations to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on authorizations for the intelligence-related components of the army, navy, air force, and marines. The committee also conducts periodic investigations, audits, and inspections of intelligence activities and programs.
In February 2002, the SSCI and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) agreed to conduct a joint inquiry into the activities of the U. S. intelligence community in connection with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
SENIOR BOWL (OPERATION). See TAGBOARD (OPERATION).
SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF (SEIB). A SEIB is a current intelligence publication of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) delivered to a select group of government officials usually six days a week. Formerly known as the National Intelligence Daily (NID), this publication was former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby’ s idea, who recommended during the mid-1960s that the CIA’s daily intelligence report, known as the National Intelligence Digest, be issued in newspaper format. In doing so, Colby sought to offer readers a choice between a headline summary and indepth reports. Judging that the newspaper format was too inflexible, the NID was subsequently produced in magazine format. The SEIB is produced by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and the National Security Agency (NSA) and is distributed to several hundred officials. The text notes dissenting views either in the text of the article or in a separate paragraph. There is no classification limit, although the SEIB is produced in various versions with different classifications and is tailored to different consumers, with some versions cabled to major U. S. posts overseas and some U. S. military commands.
SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP (SIG). See SPECIAL GROUP (COUNTERINSURGENCY).
SHAMROCK (OPERATION). During World War II, military intelligence and three American private cable companies came to an arrangement whereby the companies shared some telegraph traffic involving foreign targets with military intelligence, despite the prohibition of such sharing by section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. In time, the arrangement also included telegrams sent by suspicious American citizens. The secretary of defense renewed the deal in 1947 under the code name SHAMROCK. The companies—RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western Union International—believed that the arrangement had the approval of the president of the United States. The Army Security Agency (ASA) and subsequently the National Security Agency (NSA) scanned hundreds of thousands of communications under SHAMROCK until Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger discontinued it in May 1975. See also YARDLEY, HERBERT O.
SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007. On 1 September 1983, Soviet air defense forces shot down Korean Air Line flight 007, a Boeing 747, in Soviet airspace. The commercial flight apparently had veered off-course for unexplained reasons, but Soviet authorities claimed that the airplane flew erratically and ordered it shot down. Soviet authorities at this time were already suspicious of U. S. intentions, fueled by anti-Soviet rhetoric in the United States, and were already on alert to detect a surprise American nuclear attack. The incident also sparked numerous conspiracy theories, some of which claim that KAL 007 was actually on an intelligence mission for the United States. Investigations have been unable conclusively to explain the reasons why the commercial flight strayed off its course, but Russian president Boris Yeltsin acknowledged in mid-1990s that the Soviet Union was to blame for shooting down the civilian airliner. See also IVY BELLS (OPERATION); SOVIET WAR SCARE.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT). Signals intelligence is the interception and decoding of foreign electronic communications. It is comprised of three subsidiary collection disciplines: communications intelligence (COMINT), which is the interception of communications traffic; electronic intelligence (ELINT), which is the interception of electronic emissions; and telemetry intelligence (TELINT), which is the interception of signals from test vehicles or weapons systems. Although many of America’s intelligence agencies engage in SIGINT collection, the National Security Agency (NSA) is the official manager of the country’s SIGINT programs.
Signals intelligence as a collection discipline has a long and storied past. The British pioneered signals intelligence measures in the interwar years, but SIGINT’s modern era dates to World War II, when the U. S. broke the Japanese military code and learned of plans to invade Midway Island, allowing the United States to defeat Japan’s superior fleet. The use of SIGINT probably contributed directly to shortening the war by at least one year. The establishment of the NSA in 1952 gave coherence to the government’s scattered signals intelligence programs. Some intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), conduct their own specialized form of signals collection, but even these activities must be performed within NSA guidelines.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE CORPS. The Signals Intelligence Corps was the U. S. Army’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) operation in the interwar years that assumed the work of the Black Chamber after its closure in 1929. The corps later worked closely with other elements of the U. S. government to break Japan’s “Purple” code and listen in on Japanese communications during World War II. After the war, the Army Security Agency (ASA) assumed the duties of the Signals Intelligence Corps.
SKYHOOK SYSTEM. Skyhook was a navy aerial retrieval system, perfected in 1958, that employed some of the principles of the All American system. It featured a harness, for cargo or person, that was attached to a 500-foot, high-strength, braided nylon line. A portable helium bottle inflated a dirigible-shaped balloon, raising the line to its full height. The pickup aircraft, with two tubular “horns” on its nose, would fly into the line, snag it, and secure it to the aircraft by means of an anchor. As the line streamed under the fuselage, the crew snared it and brought it onboard by using a winch. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in cooperation with the navy, incorporated the system into packages dropped from aircraft for agents. See also TROPIC (OPERATION).
SMITH, GENERAL WALTER BEDELL (1895-1961). Fourth director of central intelligence (DCI) between 7 October 1950 and 9 February 1953, General Smith presided over the growing intelligence community (IC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Korean War. His appointment in October 1950 marked the Harry S. Truman administration’s acceptance of the CIA as a permanent feature of the bureaucratic landscape.
General Smith made his reputation during World War II as General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s chief of staff for the European theater. President Truman sent General Smith, considered an efficient administrator, to Moscow as his ambassador after the war. The surprise attack on South Korea in June 1950 raised fears of a third world war. President Truman appointed General Smith to be DCI in order to prevent future surprises and to wage clandestine war on the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China (PRC).
During General Smith’s tenure as DCI, Congress expanded the national security budget, tripling intelligence spending in the process.
General Smith also adopted the recommendations of an early 1949 report to the National Security Council (NSC) by a commission chaired by Allen W. Dulles to streamline procedures for gathering and disseminating intelligence. He also created a new Office of National Estimates (ONE) specifically dedicated to producing national estimates. The newly established Board of Estimates (BOE), moreover, set the procedures for the estimative process that lasted over two decades. DCI Smith stepped up efforts to obtain current economic, psychological, and photographic intelligence (PHOTINT).
By the end of 1950, DCI Smith had reorganized the CIA by forming, on 1 December 1950, the Directorate of Administration, beginning a process of reorganization that divided CIA operations by function into three directorates—Administration, Plans, and Intelligence. The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), formed in 1948, continued to exercise control over covert action, but DCI Smith began its gradual assimilation under his control. In early January 1951, DCI Smith made Allen Dulles the first deputy director for plans (DDP), to supervise both the OPC and the CIA’s separate espionage organization, the Office of Special Operations (OSO). In January 1952, the DCI unified all analytic functions under a deputy director of intelligence (DDI). He also merged the OSO and the OPC—each of which had its own culture, methods, and pay scales—into an effective, single Directorate of Plans (DP) in August 1952. DCI Smith left an enduring legacy as a director who shaped U. S. intelligence effectively to fight the Cold War.
SONS OF LIBERTY. A radical patriotic association of colonists during the American Revolution, Sons of Liberty organizations came into existence in 1765 in reaction to the Stamp Act. The first chapter was located in Connecticut, but local groups quickly sprang up in all the colonies, with New York and Massachusetts being most active. Through mob action, the Sons of Liberty intimidated British officials, and through propaganda, they stimulated the patriots to action. In some instances, local groups engaged in intelligence collection and assumed government functions. See also COMMITTEE OF SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.
SOUERS, REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY (1892-1973). First director of central intelligence (DCI) between 23 January and 10 June 1946. President Harry S. Truman appointed Souers the first chief of the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG), America’s first post-World War II central intelligence processing organization. DCI Souers served a mere five months, but in that time, he set some important precedents for U. S. intelligence. As former deputy chief of naval intelligence and one of the authors of the directive establishing the CIG, Souers was aware of the need for central coordination of intelligence. He gathered a cadre of experienced intelligence professionals, mostly from the military, around him, and he successfully engineered to acquire the substantial foreign intelligence capability the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had built up during World War II.
At President Truman’s request, the CIG collated the vast amounts of army, navy, and Department of State cables, dispatches, and reports that arrived daily and produced a comprehensive intelligence summary for the White House. Souers was unable to get much cooperation from the State Department, and the military services refused even to provide the CIG with information on their capabilities and intentions. Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg succeeded Souers as DCI in June 1946.
SOURCES AND METHODS. See PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS.
SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT. Southern Air Transport was a proprietary company of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) acquired in August 1960 to support CIA’s covert actions. Southern Air Transport grew quickly to have semiautonomous corporate divisions for Atlantic and Pacific operations. It also won an air force contract to move cargo and passengers on interisland routes to the Far East. The company absorbed many of the personnel and aircraft of Air America, another CIA proprietary, which had supported CIA operations in the 1950s and early 1960s.
In 1972, a director of central intelligence directive (DCID) ordered that Air America be retained only until the end of the Vietnam War. The same directive ordered that Southern Air Transport be sold off immediately, which was done to private concerns at the end of 1973.
SOVIET UNION (SSSR/Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Re-spublik). Established officially in 1922, the Soviet Union was the first state to be based on Marxist principles. Until 1989, the Communist
Party controlled all levels of government, the party’s politburo effectively ruled the country, and its general secretary was the country’s most powerful leader. The state owned and managed all industry, and agricultural land was divided into state farms, collective farms, and small, privately held plots.
From 1940 until 1991, the USSR was divided politically into 15 constituent or union republics ostensibly joined in a federal union, but until the final year or so of the Soviet Union’s existence, the republics had little real power. The Soviet Union’s intelligence services—the KGB and the GRU — and their clients were the principal intelligence threats during the Cold War.
The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 into its constituent republics, with Russia assuming the obligations of the former Marxist state. The Russian Federation’s security services—the FSB and SVRR—now cooperate extensively with U. S. intelligence on a variety of issues, but they also constitute a significant intelligence threat.
SOVIET WAR SCARE. The Soviet war scare refers to the 1983 alert in the Soviet Union of a possible war with the United States. Alarmed over the hard-line rhetoric of the Ronald Reagan administration that had come into office in 1981, Soviet intelligence had been placed on alert to monitor indications of a U. S. surprise nuclear attack on the USSR and its allies and to provide early warning of U. S. intentions. The Soviet intelligence collection program, known by the acronym RYAN, came to dominate the work of the KGB and GRU during this time. Soviet intelligence officers in the West received requirements in November 1981 and January 1982 to collect, on a priority basis, information on: key U. S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) political and strategic decisions regarding the Warsaw Pact; early warning of U. S./NATO preparations for launching a surprise nuclear attack; and new U. S./NATO weapons systems intended for use in a surprise attack.
Although the origins of RYAN are unclear, it may have been in response to a set of events that, taken together, alarmed the Soviet leadership: a series of new psychological operations against the Soviet Union and its client states; naval exercises near and incursions into Soviet maritime approaches; and ongoing covert operations within Soviet territorial waters, such as Operation Ivy Bells.
President Reagan’s 23 March 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) probably was the catalyst for the emerging
Soviet war scare. Soviet leaders became very skittish after the announcement, which may have contributed to the erroneous shootdown of Korean Air Lines 007 on 1 September 1983. Coupled with suspicions over a NATO command exercise in November 1983, codenamed ABLE ARCHER 83, that simulated release of nuclear weapons, the Soviet leadership perceived a genuine threat and whipped the Soviet public in late 1983 into a frenzy of fear. Radio Liberty (RL) interviews with Soviet citizens traveling abroad suggested that the Soviet public was genuinely alarmed. Even though the alert gradually subsided, RYAN continued until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. See also RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY.
SPACE SIGINT. See NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898. The Spanish-American War took place between April and August 1898, with the goal of liberating Cuba from Spanish occupation. At its end, the U. S. had acquired the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands. The war also elevated the United States to a world power.
The United States, through its Monroe Doctrine, which stipulated U. S. opposition to any European colonial encroachment into the Americas, had long been concerned over Spanish misrule of Cuba. In 1895, a revolution broke out on the island, possibly encouraged by the U. S. government and private interests, which Spanish forces were not equipped to quell. American newspapers, through their sensational accounts and exaggerated reports of Spanish oppression, did much to stir up popular sentiment for the war. Americans also began to demand that the United States should also become an imperial power by acquiring naval and military bases.
In March 1898, President William McKinley sent demarches to Spain, demanding full independence for Cuba. On 19 April 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution asserting that Cuba was independent. The resolution also authorized the use of the army and navy to oversee the Spanish withdrawal. Based on this resolution, the U. S. on 25 April 1898 formally declared war against Spain.
During the brief conflict, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) tapped into the undersea Spanish cables running in and out of Havana, Cuba, enabling the ONI to read Spain’s war plans, an operation credited with the American win. In addition, American military units on the island fought beside the rebel forces. As part of the American war effort, U. S. naval vessels landed in Puerto Rico and the Philippines and defeated the Spanish occupation forces. The war ended on 10 December 1898 after the conclusion of a treaty in Paris, which granted Cuba its independence and ceded Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the United States. The United States, in turn, paid Spain $20 million for the Philippine Islands.
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES. “Special activities” is the formal phrase denoting covert actions. The 1947 National Security Act authorizes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to engage in special activities that the National Security Council (NSC) may from time to time direct. Legal experts have interpreted this provision of the law to grant covert operations authority to the CIA.
SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE FACILITY (SCIF). SCIFs are specially constructed and vaulted installations designed to protect classified information and intelligence activities. “SCIFed” facilities encompass not only physical security components, such as guards and combination locks, but also mechanisms intended to prevent electronic emissions out of the facility or remote penetration of the facility from the outside. All intelligence installations containing classified and compartmented intelligence information are “SCIFed.” See also COMPARTMENTATION.
SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED). The Special Group (Augmented) was a committee of the National Security Council (NSC) established in November 1961 to review and approve covert actions associated with Operation Mongoose, the program aimed at overthrowing Cuba’s Fidel Castro. The committee consisted of the national security advisor, representatives of the secretary of defense and the secretary of state, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the attorney general. President John F. Kennedy appointed Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale to act as chief of operations. The Special Group (Augmented) was disbanded in October 1962. See also 5412 SPECIAL GROUP.
SPECIAL GROUP (COUNTERINSURGENCY). Established on 18 January 1962 by National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 124, the Special Group (CI) was a committee of the National Security Council (NSC) set up to coordinate counterinsurgency activities separate from other covert action mechanisms, previously established by NSC directive 5412/2 on 28 December 1955. The Special Group (CI) was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counterinsurgency activities abroad to the secretary of state, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) to assist in discharging these responsibilities. See also 5412 SPECIAL GROUP; SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED).
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS). Mandated by order of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 24 June 1940, the SIS was established within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on 1 July 1940 to engage in foreign intelligence collection activities in Latin America. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover found the mandate far removed from the bureau’s main mission of fighting crime and internal subversion and tried on repeated occasions, without success, to divest the FBI of foreign intelligence responsibilities. Resigned to having to conduct espionage in Latin America, Director Hoover demanded and received assurances that the SIS would be unfettered in its activities abroad. Consequently, SIS agents, who numbered in the hundreds during the course of World War II, became experts in tracking down Axis agents, breaking up Axis signals intelligence (SIGINT) channels, and identifying laundered Axis funds. SIS agents were also highly successful in tracking down German clandestine radio stations that were used to send wartime intelligence back to Germany. The Central Intelligence Group (CIG), established on 22 January 1946, assumed the responsibilities of the SIS, which were then transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947.
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (SNIE). SNIEs are national intelligence estimates (NIEs) that focus on a specific policy issue or intelligence problem within a short time frame.
SNIEs usually look into the immediate future, defined as up to two months ahead. However, they do go through the same production process as NIEs, including coordination. See also NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE (SOE). The SOE was a secret British unit established in June 1940 to conduct guerrilla warfare against Nazi Germany. SOE agents, including women, were trained in the use of guns, explosives, sabotage, and infiltration. They were sent to any country under Nazi occupation, in part to organize resistance against the occupiers and in part to control operations against German forces. SOE representative in Washington, D. C., William S. Stephenson, also known by his code name INTREPID, is generally credited with convincing President Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish the position of coordinator of information (COI) in 1941 and later the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The SOE was fully incorporated into Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) at the end of World War II.
SPOT (SYSTEM). SPOT is a French commercial imaging satellite whose images are at times employed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping forces. The first SPOT satellite was launched in 1986 and was followed by later versions in 1988, 1993, and 1998. The latest version, launched on 4 May 2002, has increased resolution and spectral capabilities.
SPOT satellites have the capability to view areas that are under different orbital tracks. According to Jeffrey Richelsen, a noted observer of satellite capabilities, color and black and white images can be recorded simultaneously with the satellite’s two imaging sensors and then digitally merged.
SPUTNIK. Sputnik refers to a series of artificial satellites launched by the Soviet Union beginning on 4 October 1957. The first four Sputniks were unmanned, but Sputnik 5, launched on 15 May 1960, carried animals that were recovered alive after their return to earth the next day.
The launch of the first Sputnik satellite shocked the United States and contributed to the “missile gap” controversy in the late 1950s. In response, the U. S. government undertook a crash program to catch up with the Soviet Union, first establishing the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) and then beginning to develop the first of the photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) satellites, CORONA, which went into service in 1960.
World History
