Peace found the Republicans in Congress no more united than they had been during the war. A small group of “ultra” Radicals were demanding immediate and absolute civil and political equality for blacks; they should be given, for example, the vote, a plot of land, and access to a decent education. Senator Sumner led this faction. A second group of Radicals, headed by Thaddeus Stevens in the House and Ben Wade in the Senate, agreed with the ultras’ objectives but were prepared to accept half a loaf if necessary to win the support of less radical colleagues.
Nearly all Radicals distinguished between the “natural” God-given rights described in the Declaration of Independence, and social equality. “Equality,” said Stevens, “does not mean that a negro shall sit in the same seat or eat at the same table with a white man. That is a matter of taste which every man must decide for himself.” This did not reflect personal prejudice in Stevens’s case. When he died, he was buried in a black cemetery. The moderate Republicans wanted to protect the former slaves from exploitation and guarantee their basic rights but were unprepared to push for full political equality. A handful of Republicans sided with the Democrats in support of Johnson’s approach, but all the rest insisted at least on the minimal demands of the moderates. Thus Johnsonian Reconstruction was doomed.
Johnson’s proposal had no chance in Congress for reasons having little to do with black rights. The Thirteenth Amendment had the effect of increasing the representation of the southern states in Congress because it made the Three-fifths Compromise meaningless (see Chapter 5). Henceforth those who had been slaves would be counted as whole persons in apportioning seats in the House of Representatives. If Congress seated the Southerners, the balance of power might swing to the Democrats. To expect the
Republicans to surrender power in such a fashion was unrealistic. Former Copperheads gushing with extravagant praise for Johnson put them instantly on guard.
Southern voters had further provoked northern resentment by their choice of congressmen. Georgia elected Alexander H. Stephens, vice president of the Confederacy, to the Senate, although he was still in a federal prison awaiting trial for treason! Several dozen men who had served in the Confederate Congress had been elected to either the House or the Senate, together with four generals and many other high officials. Voters in the South understandably selected locally respected and experienced leaders, but it was equally reasonable that these choices would sit poorly with Northerners.
Finally, the so-called Black Codes enacted by southern governments to control former slaves alarmed the North. These varied in severity from state to state, but all, as one planter admitted, set out to keep the blacks “as near to a state of bondage as possible.”
When seen in historical perspective, even the strictest codes represented some improvement over slavery. Most permitted blacks to sue and to testify in court, at least in cases involving members of their own race. Blacks were allowed to own certain kinds of property. However, blacks could not bear arms, be employed in occupations other than farming and domestic service, or leave their jobs without forfeiting back pay. The Mississippi code required them to sign labor contracts for the year in January, and, in addition, drunkards, vagrants, beggars, “common night-walkers,” “mischief makers,” and persons who “misspend what they earn” and who could not pay the stiff fines assessed for such misbehavior were to be “hired out... at public outcry” to the white persons who would take them for the shortest period in return for paying the fines. Such laws, apparently designed to get around the Thirteenth Amendment, outraged Northerners.
•••-[Read the Document The Mississippi Black Code at Www. myhistorylab. com