The scholarly work on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation can be divided into three broad (and occasionally overlapping) categories. The first category and arguably the most influential work has been done by international relations scholars, typically from the political science and strategic studies fields. By far the most important book here is the debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (2nd ed.; New York: W. W. Norton, 2002). Sagan's article, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb" International Security, 21,3 (Winter 1996/97), 54-86, is also very important. Also useful are T. V. Paul's Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University, 2000), and Nathan E. Busch, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 2004). There are many articles and collected essays written by strategists on these questions, but several edited volumes are particularly good: Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds.), The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results) (London: Frank Cass, 1993), T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), Victor Utgoff, The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U. S. Interests, and World Order (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), and Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2000). The argument that nuclear non-proliferation has become an important global norm is laid out in Nina Tannenbaum's "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," International Security, 29, 4 (Spring 2005), 5-49.
The second category includes work written by policy participants, arms-control professionals and non-proliferation advocates (often associated with policy organizations and think tanks). The best works by participants include Raymond Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Company, 1987), and George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). For the most interesting and comprehensive report in the arms-control policy, see George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon Wolfsthal, and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2004).
The third category is historical work. There is no comprehensive, global history of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation, although Shane Maddock has written an excellent dissertation from the US perspective, "The Nth Country Conundrum: The American and Soviet Quest for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970," Ph. D. dissertation, University of Connecticut (1997). There are terrific histories of both India's and Israel's nuclear programs: George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), and Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). The Soviet nuclear weapons program is chronicled in David Holloway's Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1994), while China's program is explained in John Lewis and Litai Xue's China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). The US reaction to China's nuclear detonation is best captured in William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson's account, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” International Security, 25, 3 (Winter 2000/01), 54-99. For historical treatment's of President Johnson's nuclear non-proliferation policies, see Thomas Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), and Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Nuclear Proliferation and Rogue States before the Bush Doctrine,” International Security (Winter 2005), 100-35. The change in Soviet nuclear non-proliferation policy is covered in Douglas Selvage, The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1963-1965, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 32 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001), 6, Www. isn. ethz. ch/php/research/RelationsWithAllies/Wp32_Selvage. pdf; William C. Potter "Nuclear Proliferation: U. S.-Soviet Cooperation” Washington Quarterly, 8, i (Winter 1985), 141-54; and Joseph Nye's "U. S.-Soviet Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime,” in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.) U. S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, i988).
The best works on the influence of nuclear weapons on international politics during the Cold War include Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1989), John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds.), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb (New York: Oxford, i999), and Marc Trachtenberg's two volumes History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1991) and A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1999). For works that connect nuclear strategy to the question of proliferation and non-proliferation, see Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), and Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” International History Review (December 2001), 847-75. Lawrence Wittner's Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1997) is essential for understanding the global rise of a grassroots movement against nuclear weapons.