Standing committee of the House of Representatives. The House International Relations Committee shares jurisdiction with other committees on foreign policy and national security matters. It is the primary house committee overseeing U. S. foreign relations, principally through its power to authorize foreign economic and military assistance.
The committee evolved from the Committee of Secret Correspondence established in 1775. In 1777, a name change to the Committee for Foreign Affairs suggested the committee’s additional responsibilities for the new nation’s foreign affairs. With the new federal constitution, approved in 1789, however, foreign affairs powers shifted to the Senate and the executive branch, leaving the house committee without much authority. In 1822, the House of Representatives made the Committee on Foreign Affairs a standing committee, with jurisdiction over U. S. foreign relations. In 1885, the committee gained authority to report germane appropriations measures, a power it lost to the House Appropriations Committee in 1920.
The committee changed its name yet again at the end of the Cold War to reflect new realities in global politics. Its jurisdiction now covers declaration of war and neutrality, military intervention abroad, foreign commercial relations, payments to international organizations, acquisition of official property abroad, protection of American citizens abroad, and foreign relations generally.
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (HPSCI). The HPSCI is the intelligence oversight committee in the House of Representatives that reviews the operations of intelligence agencies, authorizes intelligence activities, and seeks to ensure that intelligence resources are expanded appropriately and in a lawful manner. The HPSCI was established in 1977 in the aftermath of the Pike Committee hearings in the mid-1970s into the activities of U. S. intelligence, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to its enabling legislation, the HPSCI is composed of no more than 18 members, of whom not more than 10 can be of the same political party. In addition, the committee must include at least one member from the Committee on Appropriations, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on International Relations, and Committee on the Judiciary. The HPSCI’s mandate covers all intelligence and intelligence-related activities (IRA) of the U. S. government, including those that fall outside the purview of the intelligence community (IC). See also SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES; SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE; RULE X.
HOWARD, EDWARD LEE (1952-2002). Edward Lee Howard was an operative of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who resigned in 1983 and was identified in 1985 by defector Vitaly Yurchenko as a Soviet spy. Subsequent investigations showed that Howard had met Soviet intelligence officers in Austria in 1984 to receive payment for revealing the identities of U. S. intelligence assets in Moscow. Howard, slated to go to Moscow as a case officer after joining the CIA, was trained in operational tradecraft and thus eluded Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) surveillance. He fled the United States in 1986 and escaped to the Soviet Union. Moscow granted Howard asylum on 7 August 1986. Howard died in Moscow on 12 July 2002 as a result of a fall in his home.
HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT. An amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act that banned assassinations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It also prohibited the use of appropriated funds for covert actions unless and until the president found that each such operation was important to national security and submitted this “finding” to the appropriate congressional committees. The amendment was incorporated into Executive Order (EO) 12333 and was later superceded by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT). Also known as espionage, HUMINT is the collection of intelligence information from human sources, such as spies, emigres, and defectors. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the principal entity in the intelligence community (IC) engaging in HUMINT collection, although other organizations, such as the Defense HUMINT Service (DH), also collect intelligence using human sources. In addition, many consider diplomatic reporting to be human source reporting, although it is normally not included in the definition of HUMINT. See also TASK FORCE 157.
IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT). Imagery intelligence is the use and exploitation of images of target areas taken by platforms like satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and manned spy airplanes, such as the U-2. Prior to the development of digital imaging, the platforms collected information by taking photographs, and so the discipline was then known as photographic intelligence (PHOTINT).
INDIGO. See LACROSSE.
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. Industrial espionage is spying conducted for commercial, not national security, purposes. Both government and private organizations engage in such conduct. At its most innocent, the term applies to such competitive intelligence activities as examining corporate publications, websites, patent filings, and the like to determine the activities of a firm. At the other extreme, it can involve bribery, blackmail, technological surveillance, and even occasional violence. Governments seek industrial secrets, for example, to determine the terms of a government contract.
The United States government has steadfastly denied engaging in industrial espionage. It has, however, acknowledged its role in
Economic intelligence (different from industrial espionage), such as gathering information on a country’s industrial output, gross domestic product, and trade practices. For the United States, industrial espionage poses a legal dilemma, in that stealing the secrets of a foreign company in order to divulge them to an American company would mean favoring one American firm over other American commercial interests. In addition, U. S. corporations oppose such espionage because, they claim, they can do it themselves more effectively than the U. S. government can. When U. S. intelligence agencies come across industrial information, they turn it over to the Department of Commerce, which, in turn, publishes the materials openly for use by all American corporations.
INMAN, BOBBY RAY (1931- ). Deputy director of central intelligence (DDCI) from 12 February 1981 until 10 June 1982. Inman joined the Naval Reserve in 1951 and was commissioned an ensign in 1952. In a naval career spanning 31 years, Inman spent 19 years as an analyst in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); served on an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and a destroyer; and worked in a variety of onshore assignments. Inman was named chief of the ONI in 1974 and vice director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1976. In 1977, he became the director of the supersecret National Security Agency (NSA) and served four years in that capacity until he was named DDCI in 1981. In 1982, he became the first naval intelligence specialist to earn the rank of four-star admiral. In the intelligence community (IC), he was known as one of the nation’s finest intelligence officers. Since leaving the navy, Inman has been involved in business ventures, serving on a variety of corporate boards and acting as an advisor to three presidents, the Department of State, and the Congress.
IN-Q-TEL. Established in February 1999, In-Q-Tel is a private, nonprofit enterprise funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Its mission is to identify and invest in cutting-edge technology solutions that serve U. S. national security interests. Working from an evolving strategic blueprint that defines the agency’s most pressing technology needs, In-Q-Tel connects with entrepreneurs, established companies, universities, researchers, and venture capitalists to develop technologies that enhance intelligence capabilities. Although In-Q-Tel is a private company that works exclusively for the CIA and the intelligence community (IC), it does not belong to any intelligence agency.
INQUIRY. A secret organization created by President Woodrow Wilson in September 1917 to analyze and evaluate the war aims, including territorial demands, of the belligerents in World War I. The Inquiry also had the mandate to document the geographic, ethnic, economic, and legal bases for the demands of the parties to the war and to identify the various options that might be acceptable to the parties for resolving these claims. Although not a formal intelligence organization, it acted as one by receiving intelligence information from the Department of State, the Military Intelligence Division (MID), and other parts of the U. S. government. It also established intelligence liaison relationships with British and French intelligence, from which the Inquiry received valuable information. President Wilson wanted its existence to stay secret in order to prevent the implication of an imminent end to hostilities. The Inquiry’s studies and evaluations contributed to the development of President Wilson’s 14-point peace proposals. The Inquiry was disbanded at the conclusion of the peace negotiations.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. Intelligence analysis is the systematic processing of intelligence information in order to establish facts and derive significant judgments about a country, region, or issue. Analysis constitutes a critical step in the intelligence cycle, where intelligence analysts evaluate intelligence information from a variety of different classified and open sources and produce judgments on key intelligence and national security issues that are of importance to policymakers. These assessments take the form of either current intelligence or long-term intelligence, including national intelligence estimates (NIEs), which then are disseminated to mid-level and senior government officials.
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1991. This act replaces the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment in the area of intelligence oversight of covert actions. It stipulates that the president is the final approving authority for covert action programs, that he so designates by signing a “finding,” and that he affirms that the programs are in support of identifiable policy objectives. The finding must list all U. S. government agencies that have a role to play in the program, as well as any “third party” foreign governments. The U. S. government cannot use covert action programs to influence U. S. political processes, media, policies, or public opinion. Finally, no part of a covert action program can violate the Constitution or any federal laws in force.
INTELLIGENCE BUDGETS. See JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM; NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM; TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC). The U. S. intelligence community is now comprised of 15 agencies, 14 of which belong to specific policy departments. The agencies of the Department of Defense (DOD) are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); army intelligence; Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); air force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; marine corps intelligence; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The intelligence offices of the Departments of Treasury and Energy and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are also members. The Coast Guard—which is within the DHS—the counterintelligence component of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) are official members of the intelligence community. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the only member of the IC that is independent of a policy department; the CIA reports directly to the president of the United States through the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to the National Security Act of 1947, the IC existed informally as a conglomeration of existing agencies. However, with the passage of the 1947 act, the IC became a legal entity and grew from a handful to the 15 competing and highly fractious entities they are today, under the nominal control of the director of central intelligence (DCI).
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF (ICS). The Intelligence Community Staff was the director of central intelligence’s (DCI’s) instrument for coordinating and managing the intelligence community (IC). The ICS was reconstituted as the Community Management Staff (CMS) in 1992.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC) 21 REPORT. Commissioned by the members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in 1997, IC 21 was a staff study of the entire American intelligence apparatus, ranging from issues like the appropriate structural arrangements to an examination of all collection disciplines and their impact on intelligence performance. While identifying specific dysfunctions in each area, IC 21’s most important finding was the lack of collection synergy and structural integration in the intelligence community (IC).
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE. The intelligence cycle refers to the specific steps in the intelligence process. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identifies five steps in the process. Planning and direction come from policymakers in the form of requirements or needs. Collection, the second step, is the acquisition of intelligence information by secret or open means. Processing, the third step, converts collected information into a suitable form for intelligence analysis. Analysis is the transformation of information into intelligence through the systematic evaluation, integration, and interpretation of data and the preparation of intelligence products. Dissemination, the final step, is the delivery of the intelligence products to policymakers.
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES ACT OF 1982. This law imposes a 10-year prison term on anyone knowingly disclosing the identity of a covert intelligence officer. The act is applicable only when the identified person has served in a covert capacity abroad or in a post involving foreign counterintelligence at least five years under a cover intended to shield that identity. Congress enacted the law after several disgruntled former intelligence officers published exposes that disclosed the identities of officers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other agencies in the 1970s.
INTELLIGENCE LIAISON. Intelligence agencies often establish and maintain liaison relationships with their counterparts in other countries. These relationships serve several purposes, the most important of which is to share intelligence information and thereby supplement each other’s collection capabilities. Occasionally, they liaise to cement ties between their countries. Frequently, they establish intelligence liaisons in order to discern each other’s activities.
The intensity of a liaison relationship for U. S. intelligence agencies depends in large measure on whether or not the United States maintains a formal defense arrangement with the country in question. Where there is no formal defense relationship, intelligence liaison is issue specific and sporadic. Where a formal defense relationship exists, such as an alliance treaty or a friendship pact, the intelligence liaison relationship tends to be close. However, even in this context, there are gradations of closeness, and intelligence relationships often depend on additional factors, such as the degree of “friendship,” like the “special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom.
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT. Intelligence oversight refers to the authorities ascribed to external entities to review and authorize intelligence programs, appropriate funds for them, and investigate, evaluate, and audit intelligence activities. Intelligence oversight also refers to the accountability of intelligence agencies for their actions. While the concept refers both to executive and legislative oversight, it is generally associated with the activities of congressional oversight committees.
The history of modern American intelligence is replete with executive oversight but little by way of legislative oversight. From the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 onward, various executive bodies have exercised considerable oversight. The National Security Council (NSC), its covert action review committees, and other entities like the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and its successor, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), have maintained significant executive control over intelligence agencies.
Until the late 1970s, however, legislative oversight was confined to occasional meetings between the director of central intelligence (DCI) and chairmen of the congressional authorizing committees, such as the Armed Services Committees, which had jurisdiction over intelligence. In response to past misdeeds, identified in the “Family Jewels” document and congressional investigations, Congress established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in 1976 and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI) in 1977 for the purpose of permanently and regularly conducting oversight of U. S. intelligence activities. The armed services, foreign relations, and appropriations committees in both chambers also asserted some jurisdiction.
Since the late 1970s, legislative oversight has been both rigorous and ongoing, prompting some intelligence officers to complain of congressional “micromanagement.” Former DCI Robert M. Gates has asserted that reporting requirements now place U. S. intelligence, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), halfway between the White House and Congress. In addition to providing information about their activities to executive bodies, intelligence agencies now report on a regular basis to Congress. They do so through oral briefings, testimonies, and myriad intelligence products, which routinely find their way to the oversight committees. As such, Congress now serves in the dual roles of overseer and consumer of intelligence. See also INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1980; INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD; ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION.
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1980. A congressional attempt to firm up legislative oversight of covert actions in the wake of the revelations in the 1970s, the act provided that the heads of intelligence agencies would keep the oversight committees “fully and currently informed” of their activities including “any significant anticipated intelligence activity.” The legislation also established detailed ground rules for reporting covert actions to Congress and limited the number of congressional committees receiving notice of covert actions to the two intelligence oversight committees. Prior to the passage of the act, intelligence agencies reported to more than eight congressional committees, including those overseeing foreign relations and the defense establishment.
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB). The Intelligence Oversight Board was established in 1976 to review and oversee the activities and programs of U. S. intelligence agencies and assess their legality, efficiency, and effectiveness. Executive Order (EO) 12334, issued on 4 December 1981 by President Ronald Reagan, placed the IOB within the Executive Office of the President and gave the board its legal authorities. In 1993, the IOB was made a standing committee of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), with four members of the PFIAB appointed by its chairman. Executive Order (EO) 13301, issued by President George W. Bush on 14 May 2003, increased the IOB’s membership to five. The IOB conducts independent oversight investigations as required and reviews the oversight practices and procedures of the inspectors general and general counsels of intelligence agencies.
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT. Passed by Congress in December 2004, the legislation reorganized the intelligence community (IC) by creating the position of the director of national intelligence (DNI) and transferring some significant powers to him from the director of central intelligence (DCI) and the secretary of defense. Specifically the law created the National Intelligence Authority (NIA)-akin to the one created in January 1946 to oversee the activities of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)-and placed the DNI at its head. It established a civil liberties board to monitor government counterterrorism agencies for violations of civil and privacy rights and an Analytic Review Unit within the ombudsman’s office to review the estimative and analytic process. The law also mandated a unified network for information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector. Moreover, it included provisions for adding border patrol agents; installing cameras in baggage-handling areas of airports; increasing cargo inspections; taking measures designed to secure borders transportation and critical infrastructure; and promoting outreach to the Muslim world in order stem terrorist recruiting and improve the image of the United States.
INTERAGENCYWORKING GROUPS (IWGs). IWGs are committees of the National Security Council (NSC) that coordinate implementation of decisions made at the higher levels of the NSC. Some IWGs are permanent and some are ad hoc. Under the supervision of the NSC’s Deputies Committee, IWGs are organized both along issues of national importance—for example, on proliferation issues — and along regional lines, to correspond to important national security and foreign policy areas. Usually staffed at the assistant secretary level, each IWG includes those departments and agencies that have an interest in the issue of country of concern.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (IIC). An executive directive, dated on 26 June 1939, consolidated responsibility for espionage, counterintelligence, and sabotage matters in the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the military intelligence services. The directive also established the IIC to coordinate and oversee these intelligence activities. By doing so, President Franklin D. Roosevelt probably hoped to bring order to the chaos that had thus far marked the U. S. government’s response to internal espionage threats. Despite the onset of war in Europe, IIC members fought jurisdictional conflicts over their mandates, including over covert action, which none of them wanted to take on. To overcome their disputes, the IIC as a corporate body proposed an interdepartmental and independent foreign intelligence organization, but President Roosevelt instead ordered on 26 June 1940 that foreign intelligence gathering be split between the FBI in the western hemisphere and the military services in the rest of the world. The IIC continued to operate throughout World War II, becoming redundant with the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946.
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950. The Internal Security Act, or McCarran Act, of 1950, named after Nevada senator Pat McCarran, required communist and communist-front organizations to register with the attorney general. It also stipulated that members of these groups could not become citizens, and those who already were citizens of the United States could be denaturalized.
President Harry S. Truman, who had imposed the loyalty order on federal employees in 1947, intially vetoed the legislation, but Congress overrode the veto. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, working closely with J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), conducted hearings for the next 27 years.
One of the more controversial provisions of the McCarran Act was its authorization of concentration camps “for emergency situations.” Gradually, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled portions of the act to be unconstitutional, and the court repealed the legislation completely in 1990.
IRAN. A key country in the Middle East, possessing vast oil reserves and strategically located between the Fertile Crescent and the Indian subcontinent, Iran was a focal point of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. American intelligence restored the pro-American shah to his throne in 1953 and trained his security service, SAVAK, which sparked intense opposition to American policies among many influential Iranians. The shah’s heavy-handed approach to his own people produced intense hatred of the Iranian monarch and culminated in the Islamic revolution in 1979, which ousted the shah and transformed Iran into a radical Islamic republic. See also AJAX (OPERATION); DESERT ONE; IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR.
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. The Iran-Contra Affair was a political scandal that took place from mid-1985 until the early months of 1988. The scandal involved a two-stage covert action run out of the National Security Council (NSC), first, to sell weapons to Iran in exchange for exerting its influence on the terrorist group holding American hostages in Lebanon, and, second, using the profits from the weapons sale to secretly fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.
The operation became a messy scandal for a number of reasons. One, the administration of President Ronald Reagan had previously announced publicly that it would not negotiate with terrorists nor trade weapons for hostages. Two, the U. S. Congress had already terminated lethal and nonlethal funds for the Contras, who were allegedly involved in human rights violations in their fight against the Sandinistas. And three, the covert operation was directed by the NSC, in contravention of U. S. law, which requires the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), not the NSC, to conduct American covert actions. The scandal resulted in a series of highly visible prosecutions of administration officials, including members of the NSC and the CIA, and marred President Reagan’s second term.
ITEK. A technical contractor for sophisticated satellite reconnaissance cameras employed in CORONA from 1957 until 1965. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was Itek’s principal consumer, such that by 1963, Itek’s classified operations produced 57 percent of the firm’s sales and accounted for 75 perecent of its pretax income. This dependence on a single consumer eventually stripped Itek of its competitive advantage and thrust the company into financial difficulties. In 1965, Itek’s leadership decided to withdraw from its CIA contracts, and Itek did not receive any subsequent CIA contract after its decision to pull out of its CIA commitments. In the 1966-1967 period, Itek made some gadgets for the space program. It also continued to build CORONA satellites until the program’s end in 1972. Litton Industries bought the firm in the early 1980s. See also IN-Q-TEL.
IVY BELLS (OPERATION). Ivy Bells was a joint navy-National Security Agency (NSA) operation initiated in the 1970s to tap into Soviet communications in the Sea of Oskotsk in the Pacific. The action involved stealthy U. S. submarines entering the denied area and placing wraparound, nonpenetrating pods around the undersea cable carrying highly classified Soviet communications. The pods were designed to fall off in the event the Soviets raised the cable. U. S submarines would return every six to eight weeks to collect the recordings in the pods. The tapes were then delivered to the NSA for processing and distribution to military and civilian consumers.
The operation came to an end in 1981 when Soviet authorities discovered the pods. A postmortem investigation revealed that Ronald Pelton, an NSA employee, had sold the secret to the Soviets. Considered one of the more successful intelligence gathering operation of the Cold War, Ivy Bells provided U. S. intelligence with significant information on Soviet military operations in the Pacific.
JENNIFER (PROJECT). Jennifer was a secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) effort to raise a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific seabed in the summer of 1974. The Soviet submarine had sunk on 11 April 1968, and the Soviets had been unable to raise their sunken vessel. Henry A. Kissinger, national security advisor, approved the plan to raise the wreckage. A special ship, the GlomarExplorer, was built by a mining company owned by billionaire Howard Hughes. On 12 August 1974, the Glomar Explorer and a submersible barge used a large mechanical claw to recover about half of the submarine, along with some weapons and the remains of several sailors. The operation gave the United States valuable information about the design of soviet nuclear submarines and their capabilities. The U. S. government gave the Soviet sailors full military honors and returned their remains to the Soviet Union when the operation became public. See also COVERT ACTION.
JEREMIAH COMMISSION. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George J. Tenet in the summer of 1998 asked Admiral David Jeremiah to investigate the performance of the intelligence community (IC) in assessing India’s nuclear tests, which had taken place in May 1998 to the surprise of the IC. The commission found that the work of intelligence analysts was based on faulty assumptions, which were not examined; information was too compartmented to be usefully integrated; there was inadequate utilization of existing collection resources; policymakers paid little attention to intelligence requirements; and intelligence structures and jurisdictions continued to be ambiguous. However, the commission did acknowledge the fact that the Indian tests posed difficult collection problems, largely because India went to great lengths to hide its preparations, and only a few Indian leaders were aware of the test plans.
JOHNSON, LYNDON BAINES (1908-1973). The 36th president of the United States between 1963 and 1969. Lyndon B. Johnson rose to prominence in 1960 when Democratic Party candidate John F. Kennedy chose Johnson as his vice president. Until then, Lyndon B. Johnson had represented Texas in Congress. When President Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963, Vice President Johnson was sworn in as president.
Initially, President Johnson focused on domestic issues, vowing to continue President Kennedy’s legacy. In 1964, after being elected by the widest margin of votes in American history, he put forth a civil rights bill and a tax cut and urged the nation to build a “great soci-
Ety.” This new program became Johnson’s centerpiece for Congress in January 1965, with new initiatives in education, urban renewal, conservation, antipoverty, and voting rights. He also succeeded in passing the 1965 Medicare amendment to the Social Security Act.
His foreign policy initiatives were less popular and successful. Despite efforts to end communist aggression and achieve a settlement in Vietnam, President Johnson used the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as a pretext to escalate American military involvement to the point that, by 1968, there were more than a half-million American soldiers in Southeast Asia. By that year, moreover, the American public had become highly fractious over the Vietnam War. Consequently, President Johnson startled the world in 1968 by withdrawing as candidate for reelection in order to pursue peace but did not live to see the success of the Vietnam negotiations. He died of a heart attack at his Texas ranch on 22 January 1973.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff is an organization that combines the chiefs of the military services. Its chairman serves as advisor to the president, secretary of defense, and the National Security Council (NSC) on military matters. The chairman of the JCS acquired this highly political role as a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.
During World War II, the JCS acted as a combined command for theater and area commanders. However, the National Security Act of 1947 made the JCS an advisory, not command, institution. Yet, a 1948 agreement allowed the JCS to serve limited command responsibilities. Congress abolished this authority in a 1953 amendment to the National Security Act. Goldwater-Nichols reaffirmed the exclusion of the JCS from command responsibilities by asserting that the chain of command runs from the president to the secretary of defense and from the secretary of defense to the commander of the combatant command. The chairman of the JCS may transmit communications to the commanders of the combatant commands from the president and secretary of defense but does not exercise military command over any combatant forces.
Goldwater-Nichols also created the position of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who performs such duties as the JCS chairman may prescribe. By law, he is the second ranking member of the armed forces and replaces the chairman in his absence or disability. Although the vice chairman was not originally included as a member of the JCS, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1992 made him a full voting member of the JCS.
The military service chiefs play a somewhat ambiguous but dual role in the process. As members of the JCS, they offer advice to the president, the secretary of defense, and the NSC. As the chiefs of the military services, they are responsible to the secretaries of their military departments for management of the services. The service chiefs serve for four years. By custom, the vice chiefs of the services act for their chiefs in most matters having to do with day-to-day operation of the services. The duties of the service chiefs as members of JCS take precedence over all their other duties.
The JCS chairman has a staff, called the Joint Staff, that assists in providing strategic direction of the combatant forces and their operation under unified command, and for their integration into a “joint” force. The Joint Staff is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the army, navy, marine, and air force personnel. In practice, the marines make up about 20 percent of the number allocated to the navy. The director of the Joint Staff has authority to review and approve issues when there is no dispute among the services, when the issue does not warrant JCS attention, when the proposed action conforms to policy, or when the issue has not been raised by a JCS member.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (JIC). One of the least known of U. S. intelligence organizations that emerged during World War II, the JIC survived well into the late 1950s despite the reorganization of U. S. intelligence in 1947 and the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Officially established on 11 February 1942, the JIC, like its British cousin, produced intelligence reports for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and “higher authorities” of the United States. Reporting to the JCS’s Joint Planning Staff, this agency initially contained representation from the coordinator of information (COI)-predecessor to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)-although there was concern that civilian representation in a military organization would set a dangerous precedent. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and its director, J. Edgar Hoover, were specifically excluded from sitting on the JIC.
The JIC’s wartime charter called for it to furnish current intelligence for use by the JCS, but it did succeed in producing national intelligence estimates (NIEs) as well. The JIC’s Joint Intelligence Staff drafted all the memorandums, summaries, and, eventually, intelligence estimates for JCS approval. The JIC produced a significant number of intelligence estimates and policy papers during the war and the early postwar period. According to one report, the JIC completed 16 major intelligence estimates and 27 policy papers between 15 June and 9 August 1945. It dratted assessments and estimates on the Soviet threat, including specific analyses of Soviet air power, missiles, nuclear war planning, and economic outlook. One of the JIC’s policy papers, JIC 397, anticipated National Security Council 68 by laying out the emerging Soviet strategic and conventional military threat in stark and clear terms.
Yet, the JIC never did manage to acquire sufficient influence to compete with the nascent intelligence community (IC). Duplicating some of the CIA’s work, for example, made it suspect in the eyes of the new civilian intelligence professionals. Its critics also maintained that the JIC was a cumbersome bureaucracy that reflected the ongoing rivalries of the military services. Although the JIC was disbanded in 1958, retrospective evaluations show that it produced studies of “national” scope that provided significant contributions to military, and sometimes national, decision making.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE INQUIRY. On 14 February 2002, the House of Representatives and the Senate intelligence oversight committees announced the establishment of an unprecedented joint inquiry into the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The inquiry’s original mandate was to determine why the intelligence community (IC) did not learn of the attacks at their planning stages and to recommend reform. The joint inquiry held public and secret hearings and produced a report that identified deficiencies in the intelligence process and recommended structural reforms. The families of the 9/11 victims, however, charged a whitewash, which gave greater credence to calls for an independent commission to investigate the terrorist attacks. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES.
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE (JMIC). The JMIC is the intelligence school of the Department of Defense (DOD), providing professional military education in intelligence, national security, and regional issues. First established in 1962 as the Defense Intelligence School, it consolidated existing army and navy academic programs in strategic intelligence. In 1980, Congress authorized the school to award the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree. In 1981, the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools accredited the school. That same year, the Defense Department rechartered the institution as the Defense Intelligence College (DIC), placing additional emphasis on its research mission.
Renamed the Joint Military Intelligence College in 1993, the JMIC offers a highly diverse curriculum. It also sponsors research and publication opportunities for students and faculty, attracts noteworthy individuals as distinguished speakers, and provides field trips to key intelligence activities. Its students come from throughout the intelligence community (IC), including the Coast Guard and other federal civilian agencies, and participate in field exercises and simulations in partnership with their peers at the military staff and war colleges. The JMIC’s campus is located on Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D. C., but it also provides off-campus programs at various intelligence agencies.
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (JMIP). Established in 1995, the JMIP is one of three intelligence budgets of the U. S. government, consolidating all defense-wide intelligence programs under navy executive authority, so long as they involve more than one defense component. As such, the JMIP incorporates three major aggregations: The Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP), the Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP), and the Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program (DGIAP). Prior to 1995, these and other similar defense intelligence programs were within the tactical intelligence and related activities (TIARA) budget, but defense planners established the JMIP to centralize planning, management, coordination, and oversight of defense-wide programs and to produce greater effectiveness in defense-related intelligence activities. The JMIP allocations increased to around $7 billion in fiscal year 2002, but defense planners expect a steady decline to about $4.2 billion in fiscal year 2005. See also GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM; NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
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KENNAN, GEORGE F. (1904- ). Renowned American diplomat and historian, George F. Kennan was the architect of the containment policy, first enunciated during the administration of Harry S. Truman. Specifically, Kennan advocated a strategy of patient, long-term “containment” of the Soviet Union and a simultaneous all-out effort to establish a stable balance of power by rebuilding Western Europe and Japan. While in Moscow, he set down his views in a diplomatic cable to Washington, which Foreign Affairs published under the pseudonym “X.” In accordance with his philosophy, Kennan played a major role in both the Marshall Plan and the rebuilding of Japan as well as overall U. S. strategy toward the Soviet Union. He also espoused giving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) a covert action capability, something he later came to regret.
Over time, Kennan became increasingly skeptical about the direction of U. S. foreign policy. In his view, U. S. foreign policy suffered from confusion, ignorance, narcissism, escapism, and irresponsibility. His disillusionment compelled him to leave the Department of State in the early 1950s to join Princeton University’s Institute for Advanced Study and write and speak about American foreign policy and the deleterious effects of the arms race. With the end of the Cold War, Kennan argued that the United States should limit its foreign policy to maintaining its alliances with Western Europe and Japan and to addressing domestic problems.
KENNEDY, JOHN F. (1917-1963). The 35th president of the United States between 1961 and 1963. John F. Kennedy, the scion of a politically connected New England family, entered politics after World War II as senator and served in that capacity until becoming Democratic Party candidate for president in 1960. Voters in the 1960 presidential election chose Kennedy, a relatively unknown politician with impeccable connections, over Republican challenger Richard M. Nixon because they distrusted Nixon, not because they endorsed Kennedy.
President Kennedy brought in young political entrepreneurs with new ideas to run his administration, and they infused a sense of energy, renewal, and dynamism into American politics. The Kennedy administration championed civil rights, space exploration, and economic progress for everyone. President Kennedy’s foreign policy initiatives, however, were more tumultuous than his more successful domestic programs. He assumed a confrontational approach with the Soviet Union, authorized the Bay of Pigs invasion, began America’s long and painful involvement in the Vietnam War, sanctioned Fidel Castro’s ouster and assassination as part of Operation Mongoose, and presided over the near-calamitous Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. President Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963 in Dallas, Texas. He was succeeded by his vice president, Lyndon B. Johnson, the same day.
KENT, SHERMAN (1903-1986). The legendary pioneer in analysis and estimative intelligence and chair of the Board of National Estimates from 1957 until 1967. Kent, a professor of history at Yale University, joined the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1941. He showed uncommon talent in applying rigorous scholarship to producing intelligence and persuading academicians to work in teams, meet tight deadlines, and satisfy the needs of action-oriented policy consumers. At the end of World War II, Kent wrote his seminal book, Strategic Intelligence for World Policy, prior to returning to Yale in 1947. In 1949, however, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith recruited Kent into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and appointed him to the Office of National Estimates (ONE). Because Kent’s genius lay in his recognition that scholarship had to adapt to the policy world—not the other way around—he eventually became director of the ONE and chair of the Board of National Estimates. Kent retired from the CIA in 1967. See also NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.
KEYHOLE (KH). The designation Keyhole refers to the entire range of unarmed U. S. satellites operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1960 onward. The early KH satellites used photographic film on spools that were ejected and returned to earth in capsules. KH-11, deployed on 19 December 1976, was the first U. S. satellite to provide real-time digital telephoto television signals, but it was also a signals intelligence (SIGINT) platform. The United States has developed more recent versions of KH as well as other more sophisticated and capable satellites, but KH-11 is still in use. See also CORONA.
KGB (Komitet Gosdarstvennoi Bezopasnotsi/Committee on State Security). The political and security police of the former Soviet Union, the KGB was established in 1954 to guard Soviet borders, conduct espionage and counterintelligence, protect Soviet officials, suppress political dissidence, and maintain its own independent armed forces. It evolved from the secret police of the early Stalinist era into a highly autonomous and centralized organization that, by the 1960s, had become firmly established as the security watchdog of the Community Party of the Soviet Union. At its peak, the KGB also was the largest secret police and espionage organization in the world. It became so influential in Soviet politics that several of its directors moved on to become premiers of the Soviet Union. Russian president Vladimir V. Putin is a former head of the KGB. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, KGB’s far-flung operations were consolidated into two separate agencies — the FSB, Russia’s domestic federal security service and the SVRR, Russia’s external intelligence agency. See also GRU.
KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH (1894-1971). Nikita S. Khrushchev was the Soviet Communist Party chairman from 1954 until 1964. He rose to prominence by unquestioningly supporting Josef Stalin’s bloody purges in the 1930s that consolidated his political power. Although a peasant by birth, Khrushchev rose quickly to become Moscow Communist Party chief in 1935. During World War II, he was head of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and after the war, became a top advisor to Stalin.
Stalin died in 1953 and, after a power struggle, Khrushchev emerged as the new leader of the Soviet Union. He immediately set out to remake the Soviet system by undoing Stalin’s excesses. In a 1956 secret speech to the 20th congress of the Communist Party, Khrushchev denounced Stalin for his crimes and proposed reforms, which gave Soviet citizens hope for the future and emboldened East Europeans to strive for independence. However, Khrushchev’s moderation did not include toleration of dissent. Soviet forces brutally crushed the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and Khrushchev made sure that Soviet client states knew the limits of his benevolence.
In his relations with the West, Khrushchev advocated “peaceful coexistence” but presided over a series of crises that marred East-West relations—the downing of Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 spy craft in May 1960, the building of the Berlin wall in 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. His internal reforms and external accommodations alienated the more conservative elements of the Soviet Communist Party, who ousted Khrushchev from power in 1964.
KHRUSHCHEV’S SECRET SPEECH. Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered a secret speech before the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956. In the speech, Khrushchev detailed the crimes of Josef Stalin, his predecessor. The Soviet government maintained strict secrecy over its contents, although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) acquired a copy of the speech, probably from the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, had it translated and printed by the Department of State, and then leaked it to the New York Times. By doing so, the CIA hoped to foment discontent in East European countries occupied by Soviet forces and to boost the chances of its Red Sox/Red Cap covert action to foster rebellion in Soviet-occupied East European countries by the end of 1959.
KISSINGER, HENRY A. (1923- ). Dr. Henry A. Kissinger was the 56th secretary of state of the United States from 1973 to 1977 while also serving as assistant to the president for national security affairs (APNSA), a position he filled from 1969 until 1975.
Born in Germany, Dr. Kissinger came to the United States in 1938 and was naturalized a citizen in 1943. From 1943 to 1946, he served in the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and from 1946 to 1949 was a captain in the military intelligence reserve. He attended Harvard University, earning MA and PhD degrees in 1952 and 1954, respectively. From 1954 until 1971, he was a member of the faculty of Harvard University, both in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs, and headed various centers, task forces, and projects during this time. Kissinger took a leave of absence from Harvard between 1969 and 1971 to serve in the Richard M. Nixon administration and subsequently became a highly controversial figure in American foreign policy.
As architect of President Nixon’s Vietnam War policy of negotiating through strength, Kissinger presided over the heavy bombing of
North Vietnam, the incursion into Cambodia, and the peace negotiations in Paris. He also authorized various controversial covert operations in Chile, Angola, and elsewhere. Despite his closeness to President Nixon, Kissinger was not implicated in the Watergate scandal. President Gerald R. Ford retained him as secretary of state upon President Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. After leaving government in 1975, Dr. Kissinger founded Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm, of which he is chairman. See also FEATURE (OPERATION); FUBELT (OPERATION); NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM 93.
KOREAN WAR. The Korean War began with North Korea’s surprise invasion of its southern neighbor on 25 June 1950; a truce was signed on 27 July 1953. The conflict had its origins in the deal between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, in which Korea, a colony of Japan until the war’s end, was split between the Soviet controlled part north of the 38 th parallel and the American-controlled south. The war was also the first proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union in the nascent Cold War.
For U. S. intelligence, the Korean War constituted an embarrassing intelligence failure. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) not only failed to forecast the North Korean invasion but also the entry of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the war on 19 October 1950. The CIA had warned American policymakers in 1949 that a North Korean attack was “probable” if the United States withdrew troops from South Korea, but many in the policy community, including the Department of Defense (DOD), attributed the warnings to the CIA’s pessimism and dismissed them. After the attack, President Harry S. Truman replaced Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Roscoe Hillenkoetter with General Walter Bedell Smith, who promptly reorganized the CIA for greater efficiency and established its analytic capability. See also OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES.
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LACROSSE. A project to develop a space-based imaging radar satellite was initiated in late 1976 by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George H. W. Bush. This effort led to the successful test of the INDIGO prototype imaging radar satellite in January 1982. Although the decision to proceed with an operational system was controversial, development of the Lacrosse system was approved in 1983. Later known as VEGA, this set of intelligence satellites carry imaging radar that can penetrate cloud cover.
The distinguishing features of the design of the Lacrosse satellite include a very large radar antenna and solar panels to provide electrical power for the radar transmitter and a resolution of better than one meter, which presumably is adequate for the identification and tracking of major military units such as tanks or missile transporter vehicles.
The first version of Lacrosse was launched on 2 December 1988 by the Space Shuttle; Lacrosse 2 was launched on 8 March 1991; and Lacrosse 3 was launched in the fall of 1997, replacing Lacrosse 1. See also CORONA; KEYHOLE.
LANDSAT. Landsat is a satellite of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that was launched on 23 July 1972 to conduct a detailed survey of the earth’s surface. The first Landsat originally was called the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS), but there are now at least seven later versions of the satellite in use. The satellites monitor important natural processes and human land use such as vegetation growth, deforestation, agriculture, coastal and river erosion, snow accumulation and fresh-water reservoir replenishment, and urbanization. In addition, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) uses Landsat data to spot the amount and condition of dry biomass on the ground, which are potential sources for feeding wildfires that can threaten humans, animals, and natural resources. Farmers and land managers use Landsat data to help increase crop yields and cut costs while reducing environmental pollution.
LANGER, WILLIAM L. (1896-1977). William L. Langer was the founder of the Office of National Estimates (ONE) in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1950 and the chief of research and analysis in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. AHar-vard historian by profession, Langer also was the author of several books on U. S. foreign policy just prior to and during the war. In 1950, he took a leave of absence from Harvard to organize the ONE, which he headed until leaving government in 1952. Langer served a brief period as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB) in 1961, but he remained at Harvard until his death in 1977.
LANSDALE, EDWARD G. (1908-1987). Covert operative, military officer, and Cold War counterinsurgency specialist, Edward G. Lans-dale had colorful and lengthy careers in both the military and intelligence in the formative years of the cold war. His dual career began in World War II when he worked simultaneously for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and army intelligence. After the war, the air force (to which he had transferred) loaned him to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which became part of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1952. Although he was never an employee of the CIA, Lansdale often worked on its behalf as an air force officer.
During the early decades of the Cold War, he became legendary for identifying and funding effective noncommunist alternative leaders, engineering psychological warfare (PSYWAR) operations in North Vietnam, and channeling U. S. support to the new Republic of South Vietnam and its president. Under President John F. Kennedy, Lansdale was put in charge of Operation Mongoose, which involved attempts to eliminate Fidel Castro and disrupt the economy of communist Cuba. Lansdale’s exploits provided the backdrop for two fictional charaters: Alden Pyle in Graham Greene’s The Quiet American (1955) and Col. Edwin B. Hillandale in William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick’s The Ugly American (1958). Lansdale retired from active duty as a major general in 1963.
LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION. On 28 February 1803, Congress approved President Thomas Jefferson’s request for an appropriation to fund the Corps of Discovery to explore the American Northwest. President Jefferson chose his secretary, Meriwether Lewis, and Lewis’s friend, William Clark, to lead the expedition. Although billed as a voyage of exploration, the Lewis and Clark expedition was an intelligence mission to collect basic intelligence information about the lands acquired under the Louisiana Purchase, announced on 4 July 1803. The expedition, comprised of nearly 50 men, set off from St. Louis, Missouri, on 14 May 1803 and traveled thousands of miles through the Great Plains, up the Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers, and into the Columbia River basin until it reached the Pacific coast in December 1805. On the way, Lewis and Clark recorded their observations about the lay of the land and the Native Americans who inhabited it. The Corps of Discovery returned to St. Louis on 23 September 1806. The explorers submitted their report to President Jefferson later that year.
LIBERTY INCIDENT. Israeli fighter planes and torpedo boats attacked the U. S. Navy spy ship USS Liberty on 8 June 1967 while the ship was gathering electronic intelligence (ELINT) off the coast of Egypt and Israel during the Six-Day War. By the end of the attack, 34 U. S. sailors were dead and 171 injured. Israel subsequently claimed that the attack was a mistake caused by misidentification of the Liberty as an Egyptian vessel. Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd was directed to put together a panel of inquiry that in a short time concluded that the Liberty incident was in fact a case of mistaken identity.
The findings of the panel, however, were controversial. According to some experts, the ruling was entirely political, especially since Admiral Kidd was ordered by President Lyndon Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to conclude that the attack was indeed a mistake. The critics of the panel’s decision suggest that Israel wanted to stop the Libertyfrom spying on its military during the Six-Day War.
LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (LNTBT). Formally known as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, the treaty was opened for signature on 5 August 1963 and entered into force on 10 October 1963. The LNTBT was one of the earliest arms control agreements of the Cold War, initiated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in October 1958 and concluded by President John F. Kennedy in August 1963. The treaty sought to limit nuclear weapons testing to identifiable and verifiable areas of the earth’s surface by excluding atmospheric, space, and oceanic testing as permissible venues. The role of U. S. intelligence was to monitor nuclear tests in order to determine compliance with the terms of the treaty.
LINCOLN, ABRAHAM (1809-1865). The 16th president of the United States between 1861 and 1865. President Lincoln apparently saw the need for intelligence during the Civil War but did not seek to establish it within the federal government. The Confederate side went further by actively putting together a variety of units, including the Confederate Secret Service, to carry out operations against the North. The plot to assassinate President Lincoln allegedly was carried out by Southern intelligence operatives.
LONG-TERM INTELLIGENCE. Long-term intelligence refers to indepth research projects on a region, country, or issue that may not necessarily have current importance but may contribute to understanding the intelligence problem or to developing future policy options.
LUMUMBA, PATRICE EMERY (1925-1961). Patrice Lumumba was the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 1959 Belgium announced a plan to grant the Congo its independence over a five-year period, and Lumumba’s political party won a convincing majority despite his incarceration at the time. A 1960 conference in Belgium agreed to bring independence forward to June with elections in May. Lumumba formed the first government on 23 June 1960, with Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president.
Yet, the province of Katanga, with Belgian support, declared a separate independence under Moise Tshombe in June 1960, plunging the Congo into civil war. To counter what he considered to be Western manipulation, Lumumba sought Soviet aid, setting in motion Western actions to remove him from office. On 14 September 1960, a coup d’etat, headed by Colonel Joseph Mobutu, later to be known as Mobutu Sese Seko, ousted Lumumba and arrested him on 1 December 1960. Mobutu declared that Lumumba would be tried for inciting the army to rebellion and other crimes.
On 17 January 1961, Lumumba was moved to a prison and was executed two months later, along with his two aides. On February 2002, the Belgian government admitted to “an irrefutable portion of responsibility in the events that led to the death of Lumumba.” In July 2002, released documents showed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had played a role in Lumumba’s assassination, aiding his opponents with money and political support, and in the case of Mobutu, with weapons and military training.
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MAGIC. See PURPLE.
MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE. According to the Marine Corps, its intelligence mission is to provide commanders at every level with seamless, tailored, timely, and mission-critical tactical intelligence and to ensure this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process. Two-thirds of all intelligence marines serve in the operating forces, with the majority assigned to the staffs and units of tactical commands.
The Marine Corps director of intelligence (DIRINT) is the commandant’s principal intelligence staff officer and the functional manager for intelligence, counterintelligence, and cryptologic matters. Through his staff within the intelligence department at Marine Corps headquarters, DIRINT allocates resources and manpower to develop and maintain specific expertise in the areas of human and technical reconnaissance and surveillance, general military/naval intelligence duties, human intelligence (HUMINT), counterintelligence, imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and tactical exploitation of national capabilities.
The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) is the service production center and is collocated with the navy’s National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). The MCIA p