The Case: U. S. Supreme Court decision concerning the use of legislative vetoes on immigration rulings Date: Decided on June 23, 1983
Significance: Based on the constitutional principles of separation of powers and
Bicameralism, the Chadha decision prohibited legislation authorizing one house of Congress from overriding a decision made by the executive branch.
One section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 authorized the attorney general to allow particular deportable aliens to remain in the United States, but the act also provided the option of a “legislative veto,” which authorized a single chamber of Congress to invalidate the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). From 1932 until 1983, Congress included legislative vetoes in almost three hundred laws. The use of the procedure was considered an effective way of retaining legislative control over the president and regulations of the executive agencies.
Born in Kenya to Indian parents and holding a British passport, Jagdish Rai Chadha had studied in the United States with a student visa. When his visa expired, neither Great Britain nor Kenya would accept him, so he applied for permanent residence in the United States. Based on Chadha’s character and “extreme hardship,” the INS approved his application, but the House ofRepresen-tatives voted to veto the decision.
By a 7-2 vote, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the U. S. Constitution did not authorize the use of the legislative veto. With this ruling, the Court struck down more congressional enactments than it had previously in its entire history. Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that “explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive.” Any valid congressional mandate, he explained, must include passage by both houses of Congress, followed by presentment to the president, whose veto could be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in both houses. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued that if Congress could delegate powers to the executive branch, it should be able to place limitations on these powers.
Thomas Tandy Lewis
Further Reading
Craig, Barbara H. Chadha: The Story ofan Epic Constitutional Struggle. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
Maltz, Earl. Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969-
1986. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000.
See also: Citizenship; Congress, U. S.; Constitution, U. S.; Due process protections; Immigration law; Supreme Court, U. S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza
The Case: U. S. Supreme Court decision on the constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants
Date: Decided on July 5, 1984
Significance: The Lopez-Mendoza decision upheld very minimal application of Fourth Amendment rights to deportation proceedings, thereby allowing immigration officials to use some improperly acquired evidence when deciding whether noncitizens should be expelled from the country.
In 1976 and 1977, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials arrested Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, respectively, at their place of employment. Authorities disregarded rules based on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. After both men admitted to INS officials that they had unlawfully entered the country from Mexico, their deportation was ordered in separate proceedings. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders, ruling that because a deportation proceeding is a civil action, the mere fact of an illegal arrest is irrelevant to a deportation order. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling and held that the confessions, as fruit of an unlawful arrest, should be suppressed as customary in the exclusionary rule.
By a 5-4 majority, however, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule do not apply in deportation proceedings. Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor made four major arguments. First, the BIA was correct in asserting that the protections in criminal trials do not apply to civil actions. Second, the INS maintains an adequate oversight program for monitoring compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements. Third, deportation hearings, unlike criminal trials, have the function of stopping the continuation of an illegal situation, and the social costs of releasing a defendant whose mere presence in the country violated the law would be excessive in comparison to the minimal benefits of the exclusionary rule in such contexts. Finally, O’Connor affirmed that the federal courts continued to have the authority to exercise judicial review of any egregious actions of immigration officials. Justices William J. Brennan and Byron R. White both wrote strong dissenting opinions.
Thomas Tandy Lewis
Further Reading
Aleinikoff, Thomas A., et al. Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy. 6th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West, 2008.
McFeatters, Ann C. Sandra Day O’Connor: Justice in the Balance. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006.
See also: Citizenship; Congress, U. S.; Constitution, U. S.; Deportation; Due process protections; Illegal immigration; Immigration law; Supreme Court, U. S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr
The Case: U. S. Supreme Court decision on deportation procedures Date: Decided on June 25, 2001
Significance: The St. Cyr decision held that recent federal legislation did not eliminate the federal courts’ jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions from resident aliens who were deportable because of felony convictions.
In 1996, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful resident alien from Haiti, pleaded guilty to selling controlled substances in Connecticut. As a result, immigration officials brought deportation proceedings against him. Two complex federal statutes of 1996, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), severely restricted the jurisdiction of the federal courts to exercise "judicial review” over immigration officials’ deportation proceedings and deportation orders. Despite the statutes, St. Cyr petitioned a U. S. district court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition was granted.
The major issue before the U. S. Supreme Court was whether the district courts continued to have habeas corpus jurisdiction over deportable aliens, as it did before enactment of the AEDPA and IIRIRA. In a 5-4 opinion, the Court ruled in the affirmative. Arguing that the relevant wording was ambiguous, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the terms "judicial review” and “habeas corpus” had distinct legal meanings and that denial of the opportunity of habeas corpus relief would perhaps be unconstitutional. He wrote: “if an otherwise acceptable construction would raise serious constitutional problems and an alternative interpretation is fairly possible, the statute must be construed to avoid such problems.” In a strong dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia that the privilege of habeas corpus relief was not guaranteed in the U. S. Constitution and that the plain language of the two statutes stripped the district courts of jurisdiction to entertain petitions from deportable aliens.
Thomas Tandy Lewis
Further Reading
Gordon, Charles, Stanley Mailman, and Stephen Yale-Loehr. Immigration Law and Procedure. New York: Matthew Bender, 2001.
Phelan, Margaret, andJames Gillespie. Immigration Law Handbook. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
See also: Citizenship; Congress, U. S.; Constitution, U. S.; Deportation; Due process protections; Immigration law; Supreme Court, U. S.
World History
