The hidden instigator’s grand strategy for Afghanistan would be the same as it was in the late 1980’s, if not for two subsequent developments: (1) what can now be determined through electronic surveillance, and (2) what has worked for the Iraqi insurgent. His Afghan proxies have had to disperse and become much more secretive about what they do. To compensate for the decrease in martial activity, he has moved into the other 4GW arenas—politics/media, religion/psychology, and economy/infrastructure. To isolate the central government and non-Muslim occupier, he has encouraged a warlord society. And to fund their operations, he has permitted the widespread growing of opium. Once the occupier has been evicted and the central government either subverted or defeated, he plans
Map 14.1: Likely Safe-Area and Resupply Route Locations
(Sogrc«: Bear Trap, by Brigadief Mohammad Yousaf and Ma| Mark Adkin, O n. d. by Lao Cooper)
To bring the warlords together (by whatever means) and control the drug trade. At that point, his dream of a fundamentalist theocracy will again be possible.
While the instigator’s battlefield objectives have remained about the same, his tactics haven’t. As in Iraq, his objectives are shutting off basic commodities, defeating/undermining security forces, and limiting foreign intervention. To accomplish those objectives, he has already resorted to more hostage taking and lEDs than was used against the Russians.
World History
