During the NESC briefing, General Johnson expressed his firm belief that the Soviets must have made the same calculations as the Americans and must have been equally convinced of the futility of nuclear war, but this conviction was based on "mirror imaging" rather than concrete intelligence. After the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet leaders wanted to avoid crises and risks of nuclear war, but they supported nuclear force buildups to minimize risks of exposure to political coercion and to be in a more advantageous position should superpower conflict break out. Indeed, to deter and thwart feared US aggression, military planners embraced a preemptive strategy which shaped Soviet war plans until the early 1970s.128
In a major open-source publication in 1962, senior Soviet officers headed by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii showed how their apprehensions shaped preemptive thinking. Should conflict break out, it would be a "nuclear rocket war." Of "decisive importance" to the outcome of war would be the immediate destruction of the adversary’s nuclear weapons complex, chief military installations, and military-industrial resources. Sensitive to the danger of first strikes because of the German attack in June 1941, Sokolovskii and his colleagues feared that Washington was preparing for a "sudden nuclear attack against the Soviet Union." Recognizing the devastating potential of a single nuclear strike, they underscored the need to repel a surprise attack with the "timely infliction of a shattering attack upon [the adversary]." While the massive destruction of nuclear war would be catastrophic, allegedly the Soviet Union would prevail to the extent that its counterattack destroyed the "aggressor. "
Secrecy, even more pervasive than on the US side, makes it impossible to know how Soviet war planners targeted their nuclear capabilities in the Plan of Operation of the Strategic Nuclear Forces. But they were determined to frustrate the enemy’s "aggressive designs" and, just like SIOP planners, most likely gave priority to strikes on their adversary’s nuclear forces. Nevertheless, they also recognized that the limited accuracy of their forces and the dangers of a US retaliatory strike made preemption a perilous choice. In fact, the civilian leadership never supported it. 129 130
The "aggressive definition of deterrence" assumed by Soviet strategy required, first of all, continued rapid expansion of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the production and deployment of nuclear delivery systems. This stockpile had increased rapidly during the late 1950s, but not quickly enough to overcome the US lead; between 1956 and 1961, the Soviet stockpile of warheads increased from about 400 to 2,450 (compared to 3,620 and 23,200 respectively for the United States). Moscow especially lagged in the production of intercontinental delivery systems. In 1960, the newly organized Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) had hundreds of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of striking NATO Europe but, despite three years of testing and Nikita S. Khrushchev’s missile rattling, the Soviets probably had only four ICBMs capable of reaching the United States. The Kremlin’s strategic bomber force remained small compared to Washington’s because missiles were its chief priority.131
US plans to build and deploy hundreds of Minutemen ICBMs, along with lessons drawn from the Cuban missile crisis, motivated Khrushchev and the high command to develop a missile force rivaling that of the United States. Determined never again to be caught in a strategically vulnerable position, Soviet leaders decided to deploy large numbers of ICBMs, including the huge SS-9s, designed to match the US Titan, and the relatively cheap SS-ii, designed to be produced in large numbers so that Moscow could reach parity quickly and end US nuclear preponderance. The Soviets aimed some SS-iis east to counter Beijing’s developing nuclear capabilities. While the Soviets were building formidable numbers of missiles, unlike US ICBMS, theirs had short service lives, making it necessary to build new generations on a regular basis. Moreover, Moscow’s SLBM program was underfunded and Soviet submarines were vulnerable to detection.
World History
