Anthropologists have long complained of the faddishness of anthropological theory. Rather than a slow accumulation of knowledge with a corresponding increase in explanatory potential, it seems that each new generation is rewarded for creating new theories, new questions, and new critiques of past work—whether or not the new theories are particularly new and whether or not the older theories had any real deficiencies. Anthropologists dismiss older theories out of hand, often for little more reason than that they are old. As argued by Sahlins (2002:73-74),
In the social sciences, paradigms are not outmoded because they explain less and less, but rather because they explain more and more—until, all too soon, they are explaining just about everything. . . . Paradigms change in the social sciences because, their persuasiveness really being more political than empirical, they become commonplace universals. People get tired of them. They get bored.
Anthropologists do not reject older theories because they are wrong; anthropologists embrace newer theories because they allow for the study of interesting new questions and concerns. By this view, anthropology has not progressed by replacing bad theories with good theories, but rather by replacing boring theories appropriate for the study of one aspect of human life with interesting theories for the study of a different aspect of human life.
To the degree that subsequent generations of anthropologists limit themselves to the study of whatever new questions and concerns are in vogue, there is no real harm. There are far worse sins than anthropologists studying things they find interesting, using theoretical perspectives well suited to their investigation. The problems arise when anthropologists attempt to use the latest theory du jour to explain “just about everything,” to study questions and concerns best approached with older, boring theories well suited to those older, boring issues. Where an anthropologist is investigating a complex, multifaceted question, the reliance on a single theoretical approach is an impediment to understanding. The long-term development of Indian Buddhism is one of those complex, multifaceted questions that cannot be approached using only the latest theory du jour. It must be approached using multiple theoretical perspectives—old and new—each applied to the specific contexts to which they are best suited.
Whatever the theoretical perspective, to a large extent, the modern study of religion has consisted of a long conversation with Karl Marx. It is not just that many of the modern understandings of religion can be traced back to Marx, but rather that even the inconsistencies and problems within Marx’s work continue to be the points of contention within modern debates about the nature of religion. In his writings, Marx sometimes portrayed religion as the product of the material and economic conditions of people within any given society or, in other writings, he described religion as a strategy by which the elite legitimize their privileged social position. In the first view, religion is the product of human agency in relation to people’s real material circumstances. In the latter view, religion is imposed from above, with those people following religious practices losing a significant portion of their agency. This same tension is found in most modern theoretical approaches to religion. Where some theorists emphasize the creative agency of people in creating or manipulating religious practices, others take a more structural approach, viewing abstract religious principles or cosmologies as more determinative of human behavior. Marx attempted to resolve this tension through calls to the dialectic, arguing that the contradictions in the material foundation of society create imbalances and the possibility of radical social change. In this sense, Marx shaped most modern debates concerning religion, with different theorists employing dialectical thinking to place themselves along a continuum between structure and agency, stasis and change, and tradition and revolution.
In this chapter I introduce the theoretical perspectives that I employ in my analyses of Indian Buddhism. As I introduce these theoretical perspectives, I also present the specific material indicators that allow these theories to be applied to archaeological contexts. Given his centrality to almost all subsequent approaches, I begin with a discussion of Marx and the neo-Marxists of the twentieth century. I then move to a discussion of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. In some sense, this is the point where the two halves of Marxist theory began to diverge. Today, those theorists who emphasize practice theory and materiality trace their lineage back to Marx through Weber and the neo-Marxists of the Frankfurt School. Anthropologists with a more structural bent trace their Marxist lineage through Durkheim. I complete my discussion of previous theorists with the semiotic approach of Charles Sanders Peirce. In some sense, Peirce is the one theorist I discuss who lays outside the dialectical framework that Marx established, though I argue that his theories can be productively incorporated within it.
I conclude the chapter with an extended discussion of the fundamental incoherence of religion. By this view, religions are shot through with theological contradictions, social disjunctures, and periodic ruptures that constitute the history of any specific religion. It is this incoherence, I argue, that necessitates the use of multiple theories that can address the discordant elements. If Indian Buddhism is incoherent, then the study of Indian Buddhism can only benefit from the incorporation of multiple theoretical perspectives, each capable of explicating contradictory religious practices and beliefs.
World History
