Peter r. Bedford
The Achaemenid Persian empire at its greatest extent covered an area from the Indus river in the east to Macedonia in the west, from the Aral Sea in the north to Elephantine in Egypt in the south. It was the largest polity that had yet existed in the world. Cyrus II laid the foundation of the empire when he led a successful Persian rebellion against his Median overlord in 553—550, going on to conquer Lydia in 546 and Babylon, which gave him control of the Near East, in 539. Later kings, notably Darius I (522—486) extended Persian hegemony westwards into Europe and eastwards across Central Asia. In a series of battles over 333—331 Alexander defeated the Persians to lay claim to their empire. The Achaemenid Persian empire thus lasted for slightly over two hundred years. It incorporated a myriad of languages and cultures (some seventy peoples and tribes according to Hdt. 3.90—4), as well as diverse forms of economic subsistence. This chapter focuses on one major region of the empire, the Near East.
Given that the Achaemenid Persian empire inherited and adapted preexisting economic structures in the Near East, some reaching back into the second millennium, if not earlier, and that any consideration of economic growth cannot be confined to just an analysis of the Persian period, it is necessary to draw out the economic history of the Near East in the centuries preceding the rise of the Achaemenid Persian empire, specifically the period of the Neo-Assyrian (c. 950—612) and Neo-Babylonian (612—539) empires.1 While this chapter is organized around topics set out in the Introduction — growth, population, urbanization, institutional framework, production and exchange, stock of knowledge — it will become clear that due to the nature of the available sources it is difficult to give each of these equal treatment.
Like “the Greco-Roman world,” “the Near East” is a construct. For the first millennium it is constituted by three broad geographical areas: southern Mesopotamia (Babylonia), northern Mesopotamia (Assyria and the area west to the Euphrates), and Syria-Palestine, each with differing
Climates, crops produced, modes of exploitation of land and labor, levels of population and urbanization, and types of institutions. While the political unification of these areas under successive empires did indeed have an impact on their economies, it would be preferable to study each area individually. Some attempt is made at this in the present chapter, but the nature and distribution of the evidence remain problematical. For the Persian period much of the documentary evidence on economic matters comes from southern Mesopotamia (Babylonia) and cannot be generalized for the Near East as a whole. The archaeological evidence is predominantly from Syria-Palestine and is similarly specific to that region. Given that the Near East was one (large and important) section of the Achaemenid Persian empire, an understanding of its economy(ies) cannot be divorced from wider imperial economic structures.
The character of the evidence makes it difficult to measure economic performance in any meaningful way. A case can readily be made for aggregate growth in the first millennium, coming off a low base at the close of the Late Bronze Age, but per capita growth is difficult to prove. Rising living standards of the ruling elites are no guide to the experience of the population at large, and in any case regional differences in economic performance have to be recognized and should be taken into account in the discussion concerning the performance of the ancient economy in general. Production in agriculture in Egypt and Mesopotamia was quantitatively so much superior to the production in Attica or Latium, that even if the latter regions experienced substantial growth and the former not, the performance of the former remained much better. Within the Achaemenid Persian empire one should undertake separate studies of southern Mesopotamia (irrigation agriculture), northern Mesopotamia, northern Syria, the Levant and Asia Minor (rain-fed agriculture), southern regions (Syrian steppe lands, suited only for extensive grazing). Other factors are the existence of rivers (for the water supply of humans and animals; as transportation routes) and ports (for any imports or exports).
Regional propensities for growth are highlighted when we focus on southern Mesopotamia (Babylonia). Date cultivation, a regional specialization, and barley were the two staples of agricultural production, while millet, sesame, watercress, mustard, garlic, onions, and leeks were also grown. Flax was grown to produce linen textiles. Sheep were important for the production of woolen textiles, as well as for meat; bovines were bred for traction, and for meat.844 In the Achaemenid Persian period returns on the
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Map II. I The Achaemenid empire Source: Boardman et al. 1988: 2—3
Barley crop in the alluvial soil could often be i:i6 to 1:24, although i:i2 was common.3 In order to obtain these returns investment was needed in the building and maintenance of canals and levees since agriculture was dependent on irrigation. Also, sufficient labor, draft animals, and agricultural tools were needed to take full advantage of the cultivatable area. Due to the fertility of the soil and the use of the seeder plough the soil could be densely sown. In the Persian period, indeed beginning around 650 (or earlier), agricultural production was flourishing in comparison with earlier in the first millennium, paralleled by an increase in population, and we should probably speak of economic growth in this period. In comparison, for example, with the Ur III period (c. 2100) where seeding rates were about 55.5 liters of seed per hectare of barley, producing about 1,200 liters per hectare (i:2i), agriculture intensified in Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods with seeding rates of 133.3 liters per hectare at Nippur, yielding around 2,000 litres (1:15).4 While the seed: yield ratio is lower for the Persian period, the amount produced per hectare is considerably greater.5 Such intensification must have been dependent on improvements in agricultural technique; control ofwaterways and canal maintenance, use ofanimals and tools, and modes of seeding.6
While published data from the immediately preceding periods (reaching back into the second millennium) are lacking for comparative purposes, growth in agricultural production was periodic throughout the history of southern Mesopotamia rather than a steady development. There were earlier occasions when due to political organization and sufficient labor this region saw remarkable levels of agricultural production. One thinks here of the early fourth millennium, which led to the rise of urbanism, the Early Dynastic period (c. 2900-2400), the Ur III period, and the Old Babylonian period (c. 1900—1600). Political stability was a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote agricultural growth. In the Kassite/Middle Babylonian period (c. 1600—1200), for example, Babylonia was politically independent and stable, active on the international stage, and experiencing something of a cultural renaissance. Population density and urbanization were at relatively low levels, however, which hampered agricultural produc-tion.7 The Persian period saw a set of conditions, which will be commented on below, that promoted agricultural productivity.
Institutional landowners such as temples to promote urban production, particularly for craft goods (for example, jewelry, garments) that were used mainly in the temples, although some of these handicrafts were exported, and a sizeable proportion of the produce was distributed to temple retainers (either those who worked for the temples, both slave and free labor, or who had rights to a temple prebend). The crown was also a major landholder that would have redistributed a part of this surplus to its own retainers.845 846 Investment by both temples and the crown in the building and maintenance of canals and levees, as well as the upkeep of farmland, animals, and implements were economic desiderata. There was also a sizeable amount of land in private hands, although since our documentation for Babylonia in the Persian period largely comes from temple archives and the archives of individuals and family “firms” who managed property on behalf of temples and the crown, private landholding is underrepresented in our sources. Thus it is difficult to determine the percentage of private landholding over that held by temples and the crown.
Northern Mesopotamia (the region around the Assyrian homeland and west to the Euphrates river) was a rain-fed agricultural region for wheat and barley that had great potential with a seed-yield ratio perhaps averaging as high as i:io.9 Sufficient labor to work the land was again a salient issue. The Neo-Assyrian empire imported peoples from elsewhere in the empire, from Syria-Palestine and Babylonia, into this region as is evidenced by a significant increase in the number and disbursement of settlements in the eighth and seventh centuries.847 This resettlement must have resulted in increased agricultural production, the like of which may not have previously been known in the area. Part of this surplus was spent on the building and maintenance of Assyrian temples and their cults as well as on the building of new, large royal cities in the Assyrian homeland. Some of this land and labor was granted to senior officials in the imperial administration, who may have used the surplus in constructing regional palaces and urban centers. This practice was developed further under the Persians in their satrapal system. Texts from or pertaining to these settlements and their agricultural production is scant, but Kuhrt contends that the end of the Neo-Assyrian empire did not necessarily result in the demise of all these settlements, so they were potentially a source of considerable agricultural wealth for the Persian empire.848
The significance of agricultural production in northern Mesopotamia during the Neo-Assyrian period lies in the fact that it was conducted by a population that arguably would have been less productive, from the point of view of the Assyrian economy, had they remained in their home territories. To be sure, some of this population was resettled in new Assyrian cities, but to generalize, residents of Syria-Palestine, a sizeable percentage of them urban residents as the Assyrian royal annals aver, would have been put into agricultural labor. Similarly, peoples from southern Mesopotamia, mainly Arameans and Chaldeans, many of whom would have been involved in pastoralism, as well as urban Babylonians, were deported and given over to agricultural work in northern Mesopotamia. This should have resulted in overall growth in agricultural production (new workers producing more than they consumed, including the costs of housing; how the resettled, formerly urban, population was organized for agricultural production is not directly addressed in our sources). I believe it would be fair to say, as van der Spek notes for the Seleucid period (this volume), that the resettlement of peoples in northern Mesopotamia was not the result of an economic plan with the goal of increasing agricultural production. The Assyrian royal annals state that its purpose was to punish recalcitrant vassals and to pacify their territories. But given the likelihood that for Syria-Palestine, at least, peoples from elsewhere in the empire were moved in lower numbers to replace the deported, largely urban, populations, the Assyrians may have been conscious of what they were doing. A similar policy was pursued by the Neo-Babylonian empire, which, taking Judah as an example, deported a portion of its (urban) population and did not replace them. Does this mean that these empires saw no need to replace urban populations in certain subjugated territories because they were of less economic utility? By the Persian period there was one clear outcome of the Babylonian policy of deportations to southern Mesopotamia: a marked increase in the amount of land under cultivation with consequent increases in agricultural production from the region. The Persians’ own deportation of peoples to Persis increased in agricultural production, construction, and manufacturing, as evidenced in the Persepolis texts.12
By comparison with Mesopotamia, Syria-Palestine was less productive agriculturally due to the nature of the terrain, although it produced regionally specialized produce such as wheat, olives, grapes, and wine, along with peas, lentils, and mustard. The Assyrian empire may have had an effect on agricultural production given that David Hopkins interprets the intensification of olive cultivation in Judah during this period to be the result of Assyrian demands, and Gitin sees the establishment of industrial
Production of olive oil in the Philistine city of Ekron in the same terms.849 In Syria-Palestine the long distance trade conducted by the Phoenican cities had steadily increased during the first half of the first millennium.850 In the early first millennium these cities were involved in regional trade, for example, the spice trade from Arabia, through Israel, to Tyre. The Phoenician coast and north Syria, extending into south-eastern Anatolia formed another zone of economic interaction. By the Persian period Phoenician political control extended from northern coastal Palestine to northern Syria and economically integrated the coastal and inland regions.851 Most importantly, the Phoenician cities are well known for their trading interests focused on the Mediterranean littoral. Some have suggested population pressure as the impetus for establishing trading colonies, but the colonies were established only after a lengthy period of trading contact. The original impetus seems to have been mercantile at root, later intensified under pressure from the demands of imperial overlords. This trade was an important source of raw materials, especially metals, and the value of this trade steadily increased throughout the first millennium. Expanding trade networks were a feature of the first millennium (see further in section vi below). Investment in infrastructure, such as the famous Persian road system, facilitated trade.852 Trade with the Gulf region and beyond, which is attested as early as the third millennium intensified under the Assyrians and was a feature of the Persian period economy.17
The Persian period should be viewed as a continuation of the NeoAssyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods, although new developments can be detected that would have underpinned increased economic growth. As will be touched on in the following sections, it is possible to identify increases in population and agricultural production, improvements in institutional framework (specifically in Babylonia), and development in trade, but as with the immediately preceding periods the evidence intimates growth rather than offering the means to measure it. Overall, the evidence points to the likelihood of growth throughout the first millennium, especially given the demonstrable, although largely unquantifiable, increase in agricultural production. But if population was rising (see next section), growth depended on production outstripping population increases. Settlement of deported populations on more productive agricultural land should have facilitated this and underpinned growth. After the political and economic breakdown at the end ofthe Late Bronze Age economic performance improved, largely on the back of political stability, from c. 1000 onwards. Empires were at different times conducive to or disruptive to economic growth, but in general the political and economic integration they fostered were positive for the economy. While emphasis is usually placed on the distinctive characteristics of the successive empires (Neo-Assyrian, NeoBabylonian, Achaemenid Persian), the period c. 750 through to Alexander, at least, might be viewed as a single period — the regimes changed, but the form of polity (empire) and economic policies remained consistent. However, significant drivers of economic growth, such as capital investment, improved technology, and investment in human capital, are barely evi-dent.853 This means that in an economy based on agriculture there was very slow growth. If we allow o. i percent growth per annum, which is probably high, then economic growth over the period 1000—300 was 70 percent. Life at the beginning of the Hellenistic period had improved compared with the beginning of the Iron Age. But as Saller notes, “to say, for instance, that productivity and standard of living improved 50 percent sounds ‘significant,’ but takes on a different meaning if one adds ‘over a thousand years’.”854
Iii population
It is generally assumed that the population of the Near East increased throughout the first millennium, but the clear regional differences again highlight problems in viewing the Near East as an undifferentiated unit. The end of the second millennium saw considerable political disruption in Anatolia, Syria-Palestine, and Upper Mesopotamia which led to a decrease in urbanism (particularly in Anatolia and the northern Levantine coast). Despite population movements — Anatolians into northern Syria, Philistines on the southern Levantine coast — population across northern Syria and northern Mesopotamia may have decreased due to a prolonged period of desiccation.855 Population levels in these areas begin to recover in the tenth century. Population fluctuations characterize Syria-Palestine in the first millennium. In Palestine, for example, it is estimated that the population west of the Jordan in iooo was c. 150,000.21 This ballooned to c. 400,000 by 750, the population high point for the pre-Roman period.22 If these estimates are extrapolated for Syria, using a population density of 31 people per km2 (the highest population density for Palestine; cf. 100—140 people per km2 for classical Attica at its peak and 50—75 people per km2 for classical Syracuse), the total population of Syria-Palestine c. 750, that is, around the time of Assyrian hegemony in the region, could be estimated at over 3 million people. The Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods witnessed a sharp decline in population in central and southern Syria-Palestine due to war losses and deportations. Carter estimates the population of late-Persian period Judah (450—332), a considerably smaller territory than the former kingdom of Judah consisting only of the Judean hill country and the area north of Jerusalem, to have been c. 20,000, coming off a low base of c. 13, 500 in the early Persian period (538—445); that is, about one-third of the population per km2 of the same area in the eighth century.856 Using this figure as a guide for inland central Syria and Palestine, and recognizing that population densities on the Levantine coast had recovered, a population of c. 1.5 million could be suggested for the whole of Syria-Palestine for the late-Persian period. This figure coheres with population estimates drawn from Aperghis’ analysis of Herodotus’ tribute list attributed to the time of Darius I (Hdt. 3.89—95) and which includes the extra expenses Babylonia and Asia Minor met by way of providing for the king’s table (Hdt. i.192).857 At the arrival of Alexander in the Near East Aperghis estimates that the population of the Persian empire stood at around 30—35 million (including Egypt and the eastern provinces), but this seems to be on the high side, even accepting his calculations that lead to the conclusion that Mesopotamia would have had a population at the time of around 5—6 million.858 Scheidel’s estimation of 20—25 million, including also the Aegean, is likely to be closer to the mark.859 In summary, the population of Syria-Palestine increased in the early first millennium (1000—750) under the independent kingdoms of the region from c. i million plus in 1100 bc to around 3 million in 800-750 and then went into sharp decline until a slight recovery in the Persian period to about i million plus again. On the basis of these figures, the activities of the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian empires had a devastating effect on the population of Syria-Palestine, which as a consequence must have had profound ramifications for economic production and performance.
Population decreases in Syria-Palestine were partly offset by increases in Mesopotamia where deported peoples were resettled as a result of Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian imperial policies. The Assyrian royal annals claim that well over one million persons were relocated throughout the empire in order to quell rebellions.860 Even if that figure is suspect, there is no doubting the sizeable population movement. As already mentioned, the marked increase in village settlements in northern Mesopotamia, particularly in the late-Assyrian period (from Tiglath-Pileser III, c. 750 onwards) is evidence of where much of the deported populations were resettled. We should expect a natural increase in the population of Assyria during the Neo-Assyrian period as a factor as well. Figures for deportations under the
Babylonian and Persian empires are not available, but it is clear that populations were not moved on the scale undertaken by the Assyrian empire.861 The example of the Judean exile under the Babylonians and restoration under the Persians is clear evidence of the undertaking. According to the regional survey of Adams, the population of southern Mesopotamia was steadily increasing from the mid-seventh century, or perhaps a century earlier, with many new villages of various sizes coming into existence, some of this increase being due to resettlement of deportees.862 Another factor in the increase in settlements in both northern and southern Mesopotamia was the sedentarization of formally (semi-)nomadic groups, a process that had already begun in Syria-Palestine with the formation of independent kingdoms in the early to mid-first millennium. In summary we can say that Syria-Palestine went through a sharp population increase in the period iooo—8oo, then a sharp decline, with some recovery in the Persian period. Northern Mesopotamia went through a steady population increase from iooo until the Persian period. Southern Mesopotamia underwent a population decline until it was arrested by the early seventh century, at which point it saw a steady increase. As a general trend there was a shift in population from Syria-Palestine to Mesopotamia. A total population for the Near East (Herodotus’ fifth satrapy [excluding Cyprus] and ninth satrapy) at the end of the Persian period of c. 7 million can be compared with an estimated population of 4.5 million at iooo, and 5.5 million at 750. While recognizing the regional differences, the population of the Near East as a whole increased around one-and-one-half times over the period iooo— 350 (cf. a probable ten-fold increase in Mediterranean—Greek population between 900-300).863
In the Persian period, the economic ramifications of population density and urbanism can be seen in contrasting Judah in the Palestinian highlands with its neighboring coastal region. In Judah the population was in difficult economic circumstances as reflected in contemporary biblical texts (Haggai, Zechariah i—8, Ezra-Nehemiah). The population struggled to subsist and found it difficult to generate a sufficient surplus to rebuild the Jerusalem temple and the city wall of Jerusalem. Jerusalem had few residents until Nehemiah enforced a synoikism (ca. 440). In comparison, the city of Der on the coast prospered in trade, building, and quality of life.31 Throughout the Persian period the inland areas of central and southern Syria-Palestine were generally in economic decline in comparison both with the coastal regions and with the period preceding the arrival of the Mesopotamian empires. The comparison regarding economic performance can be further extended when southern Mesopotamia, undergoing an economic boom and population increase, is brought into the picture, as will be touched on below.
As already noted there was considerable population movement in the NeoAssyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods. This led to increased urbanization in the Assyrian home provinces and, later, in Babylonia, while urban centers decreased in central and southern Syria-Palestine. North Syria was relatively well urbanized with around a dozen cities in the 20—50 hectare range.864 Cities in central and southern Syria-Palestine were few and generally considerably smaller than their Mesopotamian counterparts. Jerusalem, for example, might have been as large as 50 hectares at its height in c. 700, which would have given it a population of 5,000, assuming a population density of 100 persons per hectare. Urbanism was not extensive with most “cities” less than 10 hectares; for example Megiddo, redeveloped as an Assyrian provincial capital, was 6 hectares in size. Broshi estimates that in Iron Age II Judah and Israel about 34 percent of the population lived in “urban” settlements larger than 5 hectares (although it is questionable that a site under 10 hectares should be considered “urban”).865 Tyre was arguably the largest of the coastal cites at 53 hectares.866 The Assyrian capitals of Assur, Nimrud (Kalhu), Khorsabad (Dur Sharrukin), and Nineveh were 75, 360, 300, and 750 hectares respectively. Although much of the area of these sites was not devoted to housing, residential areas may have been densely populated.867 The Assyrian empire also promoted regional centers, such as Carchemish and Til Barsip/Kar Shalmaneser (60 hectares) in northern Syria and Dur-katlimmu on the Habur (55 hectares), a program followed by the Persians with their satrapal capitals. Few sites in northern Mesopotamia were larger than 10 hectares.868 Babylon at its height in the early sixth century covered 850 hectares. Population estimates for Babylon and the main Assyrian cities have been resisted here due to the size and number of palatial buildings and temples on the sites, the extent of gardens and orchards, and the lack of estimates for the extent of private housing. A population for Babylon of 8o, ooo is generally accepted.869 Babylonia from the seventh century was highly urbanized with a number of cities over 50 hectares (Babylon, Sippar, Borsippa, Nippur, Uruk). In southern Babylonia there were a further twenty-five sites in the 10—40 hectare range.870 The largest cities in inland Palestine in this period — Lachish and Gezer — were only 7.2 hectares.871
With the decline of the Assyrian empire, the former royal cities in northeastern Mesopotamia were probably reduced in size as the tribute that had supported them now went to Babylonia and, later, also Pasargadae, Perse-polis, Susa, and other cities holding Persian treasuries.872 Like the Assyrians, the Persians invested revenues in constructing new royal cities in their home province (Pasargadae and Persepolis in Persis). The rise of empires in the first millennium saw urban centers clustered in discrete areas: north-eastern Mesopotamia under the Assyrians, southern Mesopotamia under the Babylonians, and southern Babylonia and the Levantine coast under the Persians. The Hellenistic period marked a new era of urbanization in the Near East.873
The role of cities in the imperial economies is difficult to establish. They demanded considerable labor and materials in their construction.874 Some of these cities were for royal display and were centers of imperial administration. The relationship between cities and their agricultural hinterland, which included villages, is difficult to establish on the basis of extant sources. Cities were not only centers of administration and specialist craft production, they were also agricultural centers with a large portion of their population directly engaged in agricultural production. Large cities commanded a hinterland of 5—6 km. radius, some of which was tilled by the people who lived within the city walls.43 Cities situated on rivers could also be supplied from a wider economic region.44
In comparison with other aspects of the Near Eastern economy outlined in this chapter, information regarding institutions and organizations is relatively plentiful seeing that most extant documentary sources are generated by organizations (the state, temples, families, firms) and reflect institutional matters. This permits an extended discussion, although it is of course possible to obtain only a partial picture. The central concern of this section is the impact of imperialism on institutions and organizations, specifically regarding the control and exploitation of agricultural land. An imperial polity is a type of organization, but in our period it was determinative for many other organizations and institutions in the economy. It should be noted, though, that the documentary base for this discussion is skewed. For the Neo-Assyrian period, most texts are generated by the imperial administration, so we obtain a reasonable understanding of the concerns and attitudes of those organizing the empire, although much of the information pertains to northern Mesopotamia.875 In contrast, for the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods, the texts are generated by temples and by important urban families that have close connections with the temples and the crown.876 The geographical focus is southern Mesopotamia. We have little by way of administrative texts from Babylonia for these later periods, although it is possible to deduce information from the extant temple and family archives. The Persepolis Fortification and Treasury texts offer insight into aspects of the administrative organization of Fars (Persis), the heartland of the Persian empire, which, when taken together with sources from elsewhere in the empire, also afford an opportunity to make some generalizations.877
Regarding the control and exploitation of agricultural land, a regional approach again proves a fruitful way forward. In the first millennium Syria-Palestine underwent a series of developments in political organization. From around iooo and continuing into the eighth century, the political landscape of Syria-Palestine changed from city states, that had characterized the Bronze Age, to a series of independent kingdoms controlling much larger territories.878 On the face of it all these polities were organized under a king, had a clear sense ofborders, and must have had established taxation regimes. They arguably also were characterized by family/kin-based land holding and “free” labor. Neo-Assyrian hegemony over the region developed from c. 745 and these independent polities were gradually extinguished and brought into the provincial system of the successive empires (Neo-Assyrian; NeoBabylonian; Achaemenid Persian). By the Persian period Syria-Palestine had been under indirect or direct imperial rule for some two hundred years. What was the impact ofimperial regimes on the Syro-Palestinian kingdoms? The first stage of Assyrian imperialism in Syria-Palestine was the extraction of tribute as an acknowledgment of political hegemony. This not only put pressure on the economies of client states, it arguably had an impact on production and trade (see section on Growth above). The Arabian tribes maintained this status under successive imperial regimes. The second stage of integration into the empire, evident also in the Neo-Babylonian empire, was provincialization, the form of imperial organization inherited by the Persians. The client state, formerly independent, at least in respect of having indigenous kingship and institutions, was incorporated as a province. Kingship was eradicated and an Assyrian governor installed, portions of the population were deported and replaced by others from elsewhere in the empire; cities were destroyed. For the Syro-Palestinian kingdoms deportation meant the end of the family/kin-based agricultural holdings. It is unclear on what basis either the remaining population or those who were imported into the area held land. Did provincialization extinguish the property rights of the remaining indigenous population? The example of Jeremiah’s purchase of a plot of land just prior to Judah’s incorporation into the Babylonian provincial system (Jeremiah 32.1—15) might prompt one to think that it did not, but it could be viewed as a symbolic act expressing hope for a return to economic and social normalcy. In Babylonia under the Assyrians, by way of comparison, it appears that property rights were upheld, although it might be asked whether the favored status of Babylonian cities was a significant factor here. In Persian period Judah property rights are difficult to determine. Nehemiah 5.3—4 has Judeans mortgaging their fields to obtain grain during a famine and also borrowing to pay “the king’s tax on our fields and vineyards,” which likely point to ownership of land. Perhaps more salient is Leviticus 25.23, conventionally dated to the Persian period, which states that land is inalienable because it is “owned” by the deity. Judeans are merely granted usufruct by the deity. This was arguably a means of shoring up private ownership of land.
Under the Assyrians it is less likely that deported peoples received property rights, even usufruct. The problem is sharpened when we consider the deportation of peoples to northern Mesopotamia under the Assyrians. Land sales are scarce for the Neo-Assyrian period, and those that exist are clearly from “Assyrians,” not deportees.879 It is worth mentioning in passing that this land was likely to have also been held by family/kin groups since the witness lists on these sales include relatives of the vendor. Deportees would have had fewer legal and property rights than native Assyrians, and it appears that numbers of them were placed on agricultural land that was gifted to leading members of the Assyrian bureaucracy as a means of shoring up support for the incumbent king. Such grants are also evidenced in the Persian period where not only the royal family but also satraps and other officials controlled land in various parts of the empire (for example,
Arsames). Babylonian and Persian practices (the latter indebted to the former) are seemingly different from those of the Assyrian empire. The Babylonian and Persian empires placed deportees from the same area together in villages on the alluvial land and, as noted below, they could have usufruct rights to land.880°
Liverani contends that throughout the first millennium landed property had been moving from the hands of private owners into the control of large organizations such as the crown and temples and also leading families favored by relations with the crown.51 Part of the explanation lies in imperialism; the crown commandeered the lands of subjugated territories, some of which was ceded to temples and the ruling elite. Another important factor for Liverani is debt burden. Private landholders forfeited their lands to creditors with the result that land was concentrated in fewer hands and the former landowners were reduced to hired labor or to working the land on behalf of its new owners. This is seemingly an accurate representation of northern Mesopotamia in the Neo-Assyrian period. However, for southern Mesopotamia in the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods the picture is somewhat more complicated.
The differentiation between various groups in Babylonia during the NeoBabylonian and Persian periods has been a recurring topic in a number of studies by Dandamaev.52 He sees three economic “classes” (although he seeks to qualify this term to distinguish it from modern conceptions): first, those “who owned property in the means of production but did not engage in productive labor.” This is the smallest group, consisting mainly of high royal and temple officials, large landowners, merchants, and businessmen (but slaves involved in business could be included). Second, the bulk of the population that “consisted of persons who possessed the means of production and were engaged in productive labor but did not exploit the labor of others.” Free peasants and craftsmen, both “citizens” and deportees, constituted this group. Third, “the sector of compulsory labor,” consisting of slaves, “the dependent populace deprived of property in the means of production,” and free citizens working as debt slaves and hired workers. These “classes” cut across the legal status of the population. Here four groups can be identified. First, “fully fledged citizens” who were members of city or town assemblies; second, “free-born persons deprived of civil rights” who did not own land within the urban district’s precincts (some settled on temple or royal land, others craftsmen and merchants); third, “various dependent groups” who were dependents of temples, the state, and private individuals; fourth, slaves, who could be distinguished from the third group as they could be sold. These legal and economic relations are not necessarily generalizable across the empire, but they are suggestive. The problem remains lack of sources from other areas for comparative research.
An important development under the Persians was the hatru, a corporate group formed of smallholders to whom the government had allotted land.881 It first appeared in the late Neo-Babylonian period, but flourished under the Persians. Hatrus could be constituted of military personnel who received land on which was incumbent an obligation to supply a soldier, a horse, or military equipment. Other hatrus were named for administrative, craft, or agricultural occupations of their members, for the estates or administrative organizations to which their members were attached, or for the geographic or ethnic origins of their members (including deported populations). Here it is clear enough that settlement policies served the needs of the state by both expanding the amount of land under cultivation (increasing agricultural production and taxation) and having an obligated population for military service. We know that in the Assyrian empire landholding placed obligations on its owners, but from the available evidence this extended only to “Assyrians,” not to deportees.882 Deportees were incorporated into the Assyrian army, but not on the basis that we see in Babylonia under the Persians (this system was arguably used elsewhere in the empire; see the Jewish and Aramean military colony at Elephantine in Egypt).
Land held in hatrus was not alienable, but it could be inherited and passed on in dowries. It could also be used as a pledge in exchange for a loan. The significance of pledging land is summarized by Wunsch:
... if the debtor fell behind with interest payments, the land converted into an antichretic pledge.. . [The creditor] thus became the virtual owner of the land and was entitled to rent it out. This shift in the control of the land through debt did not necessarily change the land’s use or occupancy. The most appropriate tenant was the debtor himself. He ended up working the field, performing the duties that were linked with it while trying to repay the capital amount of his debt. This was of course more difficult under such conditions, as a substantial part of his crop had to be paid as rent to the creditor-lessor. Indebtedness therefore created a long-term dependency that provided the creditor with access to land and its usufruct even though no actual transfer of title took place.55
This is seemingly similar to the development Liverani sees for northern Mesopotamia under the Assyrians where debt led to loss of land, with the difference that the members of the hatru were not the “owners” of the land; that remained in the hands of the crown. It further coheres with Liverani’s argument that throughout the first millennium land was increasingly in the control of the crown, temples, and elite families at the expense of “private” (families/kin groups) owners.
This discussion raises the vexed issue of land “ownership” in the Near East. We need concern ourselves here only with the first millennium, but it is worthwhile to be aware of the protracted debate over forms of ownership in third and second millennium Mesopotamia.883 In the above paragraph both “control” and “ownership” of land in Babylonia were used, highlighting the problem of their relationship. In contrast to Liverani, Dandamaev holds that there was an increasing privatization of land in the Persian period.884 If by “privatization” one means that the usufruct of land was dispersed more widely through the introduction of hatru organizations, this is true. However, if “privatization” is construed as ownership, in the sense that the land was alienable, it is not. As has already been mentioned, that land remained a crown possession. It is worthwhile to note in this context the common misperception, albeit now receding from the literature, that the crown was the actual owner of all the land in the empire. There were royal lands and lands that had been ceded to satraps and other members of the ruling elite, which might also be construed as part of the royal estate. There were also lands in the hatru class, which also belonged to the state. But taken together these accounted for but a fraction of all agricultural land. In Babylonia, for example, temples were arguably the largest landholders, although, as mentioned earlier, this too might be a misperception based on the extant sources from temple archives. Private property was considerable in Babylonia, even if it is underrepresented in our sources. This situation arguably obtained throughout the empire.
Two other developments in the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods are significant in the economic life of Babylonia. The first is the emergence of family “firms.” We have archives from a number of urban families that attest their close economic relationships with both the crown and local temples.885 Two of the most closely studied are the Egibi and the Murashu families. Both families obtained management contracts to oversee production on land held by the crown and temples. Because temples held more lands than they were able to exploit with their own labor resources, they contracted with firms such as the Murashus to place the land under cultivation. The Murashus negotiated rental terms with the temples then rented on portions of the land to various farmers, often organizing for them labor, draught animals, equipment, water rights, tax payments, and the like, all as part of their contract.886 The Murashus were able to realize a profit from these transactions, leading scholars to characterize them as “entrepreneurs.”887 Other “entrepreneurial” activities of the Murashus included contracting with hatru landholders to meet their tax payments through exchanging produce on their behalf, and charging a fee. This short-term credit facility has been considered “banking” by some commentators. While the Murashus were clearly fulfilling a need for credit, they were lending their own silver as a business venture, not lending silver invested with them for a profit.888 The activity of the Murashus as middle-men between both temple and the state, on the one hand, and agricultural producers, on the other, is also an innovation of the Persian period. It facilitated agricultural production and arguably constitutes an economic advance over arrangements in the earlier first millennium.
The Egibis also managed large tracts of crown land in a manner similar to the Murashus. They were further involved in harranu partnerships, a business partnership in which the two parties involved drew up a contract to share both profits and losses on a commercial agricultural venture.889 As Wunsch explains it:
One partner supplied the financial backing, while the other oversaw the field work, i. e., lending the silver to farmers, collecting the payments due in commodities at the time of harvest in the countryside (usually at the canal), negotiating with officials about taxes and transport fees, renting boats for shipment, and storing and selling the products (although textual evidence is lacking for this last step).890
Seeing that the normal rate of interest for loans was 20 percent, the partners expected to see a return of over 40 percent on the investment to obtain a net return of at least 20 percent each. There are no examples where the capital to be loaned in a harranu partnership had first been borrowed in order to be invested; one of the parties had the capital at hand to invest. A sense of the political stability that underpinned business transactions in Babylonia is given by a long-term lease contract drawn up by the Murashus with a certain Bagavir. He rented two fields to the Murashus for sixty years with a penalty clause should he withdraw the land. The total amount of rent was paid in advance.64
The second significant development is the role of temples in the economy. Beside the crown, temples were the main landholding organizations in Babylonia and were thus major agricultural producers. They were also sites of specialized craft production, they were major slave holders (although it must be remembered that slavery in Babylonia was not as extensive or as economically important as it was in classical Greece or the Roman empire), and they were major employers of free labor (both for agriculture and crafts).891 Babylonian temples were always significant in the regional economy, and for the first millennium their importance reached a peak during the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods. While Finley is correct to contrast temples as major landholders in Babylonia with “private” landholding in the Greco-Roman world,892 it is important to note that the temples could be construed as a mechanism for agricultural production that served the interests and needs of the citizens of the city in which the temples were located (as well as serving the interests and needs of the organization and its elites). Following Dandamaev, who highlights that citizens obtained prebends or other rights to temple-managed production, we might say that the temples, while technically not “owned” by the citizens, were companies in which citizens were silent shareholders. That is, the temples held land on behalfof the citizens of a city. This is arguably an idiosyncratic view of Babylonian temples, but it deserves closer attention. It further serves to problematize the significance and role of “citizenship” in Babylonia in order to compare it with citizenship in, for example, Greek cities, specifically by bringing the issue of the relationship between citizenship and land holding into sharper relief.
It bears pointing out in respect of institutions that the Near East had a well-developed legal system based on a long-standing tradition; by the Persian period it was millennia old. In the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods there is evidence for the drawing up of contracts, leases, “wills,” land sales, slave manumissions, dowries, and the like, which is predicated on their enforceability. Babylonia had a system of courts and judges — some appointed by the crown, others appointed by the city, others appointed by the temple, as each of these organizations had their own jurisdictions — to whom disputes could be referred for resolution.893 While witnesses could be called, the most significant element in any case was the written text. Courts would test the accuracy and legitimacy of documents in order to determine the outcome of a case. This is why private archives feature in the extant sources. Families and family “firms” needed to retain the written record of an economic or legal transaction in order to defend their claim to rights, ownership or legal status. Persian support for local legal traditions is evidenced throughout the empire.894
Both the Neo-Babylonian and Persian empires fostered the activities of harranu partnerships and family “firms” such as the Egibis and the Murashus, thereby making a number of leading urban Babylonian families wealthy. The close relationship between the state, the temples, and these families was mutually advantageous economically. While the state kept a watchful eye on the economic and social power of Babylonian temples, including, in the Persian period, taxing the temples, they were careful to manage the relationship so that temples remained economic engines in their respective areas of southern Mesopotamia.895 This is understandable for the Neo-Babylonian period when the temples were, of course, indigenous organizations. It is significant that the Persians continued in broad terms the Neo-Babylonian policy towards Babylonian temples. Such an attitude was not limited to Babylonia. As a generalization, the Persians fostered good relations with organizations and leading persons in subjugated territories as a means of pacification and thus lowering the costs of running the empire. Respect for the cults of subjugated peoples, the use of local elites as administrators of subjugated territories, and the fostering of an imperial ideology that encouraged a view of mutual benefit (reciprocity) all enhanced the opportunity for economic performance.896 The Assyrians were similarly concerned but had proven unable to integrate the empire sufficiently so that they were forced to undertake provincialization and mass deportation.
The outcomes of provincialization and mass deportation inherited by the Persians from the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian empires nevertheless served their political and economic interests well. Increased agricultural production and economic activity in Babylonia are only part of the picture. The provincial system was developed by the Persians into the satrapal system of discrete regions headed by members of the Persian elite.897 Within satrapies smaller polities were usually governed by indigenous leaders.898 One significant development was in the area of taxation.899 There can be no doubt that the Assyrians and Babylonians extracted taxes from their provincial holdings, just as they extracted tribute from client states. We do not know, however, how the central administration determined the amount to be paid by provinces, or what the amounts were for that matter, and tribute from clients seems to have been imposed on an ad hoc basis. While the Persians continued forms of taxation inherited from the preceding empires,900 Darius I is commonly credited, on the basis of Hdt. 3.89—95, with implementing a taxation regime for the empire that took into account regional productivity, perhaps determined in part by a considered assessment of the amount of land under cultivation, yields, and, for the Arabian tribes at least, the value of traded goods. In Babylonia, fields were measured and yields estimated, while in Judah individual families’ concern to meet “the king’s tax” (Nehemiah 5.4) could point to a similar system.
Herodotus 3.89—95 is a problematic text.901 We do not know if the amounts listed account for all forms of taxation, including tariffs, payments made to the satrap and local governor, and the like, or are only taxes imposed by the central administration on production and trade. Further, the amounts are given in silver. Does this mean that all taxes were due in silver or are these amounts silver equivalencies for taxes that could be paid in silver and/or in kind? Nehemiah 5.4 again points to payment in silver, but the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury texts attest that taxes were received in both silver and in kind. And the satrapal treasuries included granaries from which one might conclude that some taxes were paid in kind. The Murashu texts show that the Murashus were involved in receiving payment in kind from landholders and paying taxes on their behalf in silver.76 This is a significant matter, since if most taxes were paid in silver, it was incumbent on landholders to market at least some their produce in order to meet their tax liability. This would have a direct impact on “exchange” in the economy.
Vi production and exchange
Agricultural production has been introduced above. Three points can be mentioned in passing here. First, to reiterate, imperialism and debt broke down traditional family/kin-based land holdings. As a generalization, agricultural production was reorganized so that large landholders (the crown, temples, elites) exploited the labor of formerly “free” peasants to work the land. The hatru as a form of tenancy in Babylonia was expanded under the Persians, but it reinforced the dependency of agriculturalists on these large landowners. Second, pastoralism was an important part of the Near Eastern economy, and exchange between the (semi-) nomadic and sedentary populations was necessary for both groups.77 Pastoralists provided animal products to the sedentary and received agricultural or craft products in exchange. Pastoralists hired themselves out as shepherds for the villagers’ herds, and nomadic pastoralists grazing their herds on the stubble of agriculturalists’ fallow fields provided animal dung as fertilizer. Even in the first millennium it is not correct to see a sharp divide between these two modes of subsistence, especially in areas near the 250mm isohyet that marked the limit of dry farming. In changing climatic and political conditions some sedentary agriculturalists could switch to pastoralism in order to survive, while pastoralists could engage in agriculture. Rowton understands the relationship between pastoralists and agricultural villages to be “dimorphic,” and the connections between the two groups, including their exchanges, was based on kin connections.902 If so, reciprocity rather than market exchange was likely to be operative. Third, I can currently see no way of determining the scale of non-agricultural production. In comparison with agriculture which could be taxed on the basis of expected yields, or livestock owned either privately or by organizations such as temples which could be taxed on the basis of the increase in animals, the scale of (semi-) nomadic pas-toralism is much more difficult to judge. Regarding craft production, much of it would have been undertaken in families for their own use. We know of the production of elite craft goods (carved ivory, metalwork, garments) from Phoenicia, northern Syria, and Babylonia, but they must have been but a fraction of all craft production.903 Babylonian temples were centers of craft production, including garments, largely for their own use. We have evidence in the Neo-Assyrian through Persian periods of merchants who sold manufactured goods locally and others operating over long distance.904 The percentage of all production that manufactured goods accounted for is impossible to determine from our sources.
As a generalization, trade increased throughout the period.905 With the domestication of the camel Arab tribes were active in the spice trade and were integrated into successive imperial economies.906 The increase in longdistance trade is also evident with the Phoenicians, who established colonies throughout the Mediterranean littoral, while Greeks founded new settlements on the Levantine coast. For the Phoenicians a major impetus for trade was the demand for raw materials by their imperial overlords.83 These materials, sometimes with value added by craft production, were passed on to the imperial powers as tribute rather than via market exchange.84 The Phoenicians obtained the materials by means of exchange with local populations, and the agreed rate of exchange must have been sufficiently advantageous to them to meet the costs of supporting the colonies and trading fleets while leaving a surplus that funded the home communities. The tribute extracted by the imperial powers did not leave the Phoenician cities impoverished. Phoenician trading activities seem to have been organized by the city states rather than by private entrepreneurs. This raises the issue of the extent to which other long-distance trade was organized privately. There is some evidence for this, texts from the Egibi family of Babylon (specifically Itti-Marduk-balatu) attest to it, and Dandamaev considers private individuals to have been dominant.907 But it is likely that throughout the first millennium it was conducted by operatives acting on behalf of the state or large organizations (Babylonian temples). The volume of this trade is difficult to substantiate.
World History
