In the first two centuries of this era, the central government dispatched in any given year around 160 elite officials to govern its 55 million subjects. These officials fall roughly into two groups: holders of imperium (‘‘right of command’’), formally, at least, properly elected magistrates exercising power within an assigned domain; and supervisors of the government’s finances (on the geographical limits placed on magisterial authority see Ulpian, D. 1.16.1, ‘‘A proconsul holds his proconsular insignia as soon as he leaves the City, but he exercises power only in the province that is assigned to him’’ [cf. Paul D. 1.18.3]; on financial agents see A. H. M. Jones 1960: 117-25). In theory, governors of provinces under the empire fell into two categories: magistrates elected at Rome and later assigned to provinces notionally under control of the Roman people, and officials acting on the emperor’s behalf, holding imperium delegated by him, and assigned to provinces subordinated to the emperor’s long-term control by legislative act. In practice, emperors and Senate often worked together: each received embassies from individuals as well as provincial communities, and they consulted each other in formulating and enacting responses and policies. More importantly, provincials looking in do not seem to have noticed such niceties of Roman constitutional law: they implicitly understood monarchy, and it was the emperor who instructed them to honor the Senate (Millar 2002: 271-320; cf. Ando 2000: 152-74).
The separation of fiscal authority from other juridical and administrative responsibilities, on the other hand, represents one of the most significant changes in Roman government between republic and principate: under the republic, the formal subordination of quaestorian accountants to praetorian and consular magistrates on the one hand, and the political influence of the private tax-collecting corporations on the other, had granted enormous scope for abuse of provincial populations, which was in principle largely removed in the early empire (cf. Brunt 1990: 53-95, 487-506).
When speaking of ‘‘the government’s finances,’’ furthermore, we must remember that Rome recognized a distinction between the emperor’s personal property and the property of the state, although the nature of that distinction and its development remain highly controversial (Millar 1977: 175-201; Brunt 1990: 134-62). Among their holdings, emperors owned vast estates in the provinces, and the number and size of these grew rapidly over time (Millar 1977: 175-89; Kehoe, this volume). The effects of this growth were not simply economic; the emperor’s personal financial interests were managed by procurators who came to exercise great extra-judicial and extra-constitutional influence (although much about the legal framework that structured their relations with provincial governors remains under debate: see Millar 1964b and 1965; Brunt 1990: 163-87).
In theory, the scope of an elected magistrate’s power was broad, and this was particularly true of his authority over non-citizens (cf. A. J. Toynbee 1965: 2: 148). In the words of the early third-century jurist Ulpian, ‘‘since a proconsul has the fullest judicial authority [sc. in his assigned province], he possesses there the powers of all those who preside over courts at Rome, whether magistrates or extraordinary commissions; there is, therefore, no matter in his province that cannot be admitted to judicial examination on his authority’’ (‘‘On the Duties of the Proconsul’’ bk. 2 = D. 1.16.7.1 and 9.pr.; see also Ulpian D. 1.18.6; Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.22 for a similar formulation in the first century bce). Governors were, moreover, required to travel a regular, publicized circuit around their provinces, making themselves accessible to those they governed (section 4 below). What is more, governors could and routinely did delegate jurisdictional and administrative authority of many kinds (cf. Ulpian, ‘‘On the Duties of the Proconsul’’ bk. 1 = D. 1.16.4.6 and 1.16.6.pr.-1). All this might seem to allow for the wide and frequent exercise of authority by Roman magistrates throughout the provinces of their empire.
And yet, the size of governors’ staffs was surprisingly small: beyond attendants - lictors, heralds, messengers, scribes, and a bodyguard (Oliver 1966) - those accompanying a governor into his province included a very limited number of official and unofficial assistants (cf. Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.10-14; Brunt 1990: 271; Nelis-Clement 2000). The former were normally of equestrian rank and formally separable into civil and military grades, both of whom were called legati, ‘‘legates,’’ a term widely used to designate someone exercising delegated or derivative imperium. In practice, to the provincial seeking a representative of the government, these distinctions in rank and authority seem to have mattered little: provincials are attested accosting centurions without any jurisdictional capacity whatsoever, importuning them to adjudicate disputes. Procurators supervising imperial estates in particular seem to have multiplied in number and grown vastly in their influence, often extra-constitutionally (cf. Gascou 1999). What is more, Roman law recognized the importance of its officials making themselves available even in transit to and from their provinces (Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis = RS 12, Cnidos copy, col. IV, ll. 31-9; cf. Cic. Fam. 1.9.25); this haphazard system largely came to an end in the notionally more ordered world of the empire (Paul D. 1.18.3; cf. Peachin 1996).
A governor’s unofficial staff consisted of his amici, his ‘‘friends’’; the orator Fronto wrote to Antoninus Pius that ‘‘he diligently requested the aid of friends in all matters that related to the ordering of his province’’ (Ant. 8.1). Such men typically ranged widely in age and experience, from those who might offer genuinely well-informed advice on matters of politics and law to friends and relatives seeking experience and patronage at the start of their careers.
In practice, then, Roman government was extraordinarily circumscribed (Hopkins 1980: 120-1). Given its limited investment in personnel, it could scarcely be otherwise. Its extraordinary efficiency, both mechanical, in its construction and exploitation of roads and networks of communication, and human, in the dedication of its officials, aided its cause. But in the end, for the maintenance of order, collection of information, and extraction of revenue, Rome must have relied heavily on the institutions of government in the cities and territories it ruled (Hopkins 1980: 121; Galsterer 1986). It is to them and their relations with Rome that I now turn.
World History
