The episode for which Seleucus IV Philopator is best known concerns the entrance of his vizier Heliodorus into the vault of the Temple at Jerusalem. Simon, an official working in the Temple, had quarreled with the then High Priest Onias. In his anger Simon went to Apollonius, the satrap of Hollow Syria and Phoenicia, and tattled on Onias, telling him that
The treasury in Jerusalem was groaning with untold amounts of money because of the enormous mass of carry-forwards that had not been applied to the account for sacrifices; and that this money could be requisitioned for the King.
(II Macc. III 6)
The Seleucid treasury sent an annual cash subvention to the Temple in Jerusalem to defray the cost of the sacrifices. At the time in question the High Priest was required to remit any money left over at the end of the year. Instead, the High Priest - so Simon's accusation - had been saving these unused funds, i. e., had been carrying them forward onto next year's budget. After several years a large amount of money had built up.
Given the financial constraints under which the Seleucid treasury was laboring during the reign of Seleucus IV Philopator - every year 1,000 talents had to be paid to Rome -, the authorities reacted immediately to this piece of news. Heliodorus, Seleucus IV's vizier, made a surprise visit to Jerusalem and confronted Onias with the information which Simon had passed on. When Onias claimed that all the funds in the vault were private deposits - mostly small amounts held in trust for widows and orphans -, Heliodorus called Onias' bluff and asked to be taken into the vault immediately so that he could see for himself. For small private deposits would be stored in small jars (the ancient equivalent of safety deposit boxes), and if Onias were telling the truth, then Heliodorus would find a large collection of dusty jars. The putative unremitted carry-forwards, on the other hand, should just have been in a large heap on the floor. Depending on what he saw, Heliodorus would know who had been lying to him. Unfortunately, the story at this point recounts how supernatural forces ejected Heliodorus from the vault before he could see anything (II Macc. III 7-27).
Less spectacular, but perhaps more important historically, than this divine intervention is the financial health of the empire. The ultimate author of this passage in II Maccabees makes no mention of the overall situation since his outlook is exclusively local - he sees only what is happening in the Temple's financial administration. But in fact he reveals a facet in a larger picture of an empire in deep financial crisis with officials scouring provincial treasuries in the hopes of finding an overlooked stash of money somewhere.
Clearly had his doubts about the Romans and preferred a strong Seleucid king. Now that the empire was finally free of the ball and chain of the indemnity, Antiochus IV did his best to revive the Seleucids’ fortunes. He waged war against Armenia, took its king prisoner, and evidently made it tributary again (App. Syr. 45).
In the East, Antiochus IV did his best to maintain the empire’s position. In 165 and 164 he campaigned in Persis and Media (I Macc. III 31-37; II Macc. IX 1-3) and possibly even farther East; the exact status of the satrapies of central Iran at this time is not certainly known.
A revolt, moreover, broke out in one of the sleepiest backwaters of his kingdom, Judea. Antiochus IV had given official sanction to various plans of the High Priest in Jerusalem, one Menelaus, to reform Jewish religion and society. Not everyone in Judea approved, however - especially when what the later tradition cryptically called the “abomination of desolation” was brought into the Temple in Jerusalem in 167 BC (I Macc. I 54). Because Seleucid authorities were involved in enforcing Menelaus’ alleged reforms, the revolt turned against them. One Judas - surnamed for unclear reasons “Mac-cabaeus” - emerged as its leader. In 164, Lysias, whom Antiochus during his absence in the East had placed in charge of the satrapies west of the Euphrates, unsuccessfully campaigned against Judas. Late in 164, Judas Maccabaeus entered Jerusalem at the head of victorious troops and presided over the removal of the “abomination” from the Temple (I Macc. IV 41-52; cf. II Macc. X 1-5). The Maccabaean revolt would cost the Seleucids precious resources over the next decades as the empire crumbled, but it would also in the end see the creation of a new Hellenistic kingdom (see chap. 25).
Antiochus IV’s most spectacular campaign, however, involved Egypt. In this war, the Sixth (and last) Syrian War (170-168), Antiochus IV routed the forces of the young Ptolemy VI Philometor, who in 180 had succeeded his father Ptolemy V Epiphanes, and effectively conquered Eygpt (Porphyry, BNJ 260, Fr. 49a; cf. Burstein, Nr. 39C with n. 5). If Antiochus IV had managed to hold on to Egypt, he might have restored the Seleucid Kingdom’s flagging fortunes. But in the summer of 168, as he was entering Egypt, he found a Roman embassy waiting for him. Its leader, C. Popillius Laenas, handed him a letter from the Senate formally ordering him out of Egypt. When Antiochus IV stated that he needed to confer with his councillors before replying, Popillius took his walking stick and drew a circle in the sand around the heir of Seleucus I Nicator. Popil-lius then told Antiochus IV to give his answer before he left the circle (Pol. XXIX 27).
The Romans had just defeated Perseus at Pydna in the Third Macedonian War. Antiochus IV - for all that his detractors called him a madman - was no fool. He knew that he could not face a Roman army; and any other act than meek acquiescence would call down on his head Perseus’ fate. Roma locuta, causa finita - Rome had indeed spoken with exceptional clarity, and the matter was settled. Antiochus IV left Egypt.
World History
