The Persian Advance and Greek Strategy
From Doriscus, Xerxes set out for Thrace, gradually conscripting new contingents from the subject peoples. He crossed the Strymon on the bridge that had been built previously (VII. 105, 118-16). The troops had been divided into three contingents, each assigned to a high official (VII.121). When they reached Acanthus, he sent the navy to await him atTherma at the mouth of the gulf (VII. 121). After the armies were recombined in this town, the force turned toward Pieria, where he learned that most of the peoples and cities of central Greece had agreed to “give [tokens of submission of] earth and water” (V1I.132<-). Of course, as Herodotus explains (VII.172), they scarcely had any choice. Shortly before, the Greeks gathered at the Isthmus of Corinth had sent a contingent near Tempe to bar the way. But as soon as they learned from King Alexander of Macedonia that the royal army was able take a different route, the troops departed: “The result of it was that the Thessalians, finding themselves without support, no longer hesitated but whole-heartedly worked in the Persian interest, so that in the course of the war they proved of the greatest use to Xerxes" (VII.174-0-). Herodotus was certainly simplifying. It is clear that from the start some of the Thessalian leaders (the Aleuadae) favored alliance with the Persians (VII.6). As in 490, the Persians understood how to exploit internal differences among the Greek states, many of which were prepared to "Medize." In a passage that is very favorable to Athens, Herodotus even goes so far as to say, whether his listeners would believe him or not, that the majority of Greeks “were all too ready to accept Persian dominion,” since the inequality of the military forces appeared to be an insurmountable problem (VII. I S8->). As for the Phocaeans, if they were the only central Greek people who did not join the Persian cause, it was, Herodotus says, because of their age-old enmity toward the Thessalians (VIII.30). Let us also recall that Demaratus of Sparta remained in Xerxes’ entourage, and there were also representatives of the family of the Pisistratids with him. One of the objectives of the expedition, therefore, must have been to install client governments in many of the Greek states (cf. VIII.54-55).
After lengthy discussions, the Greeks decided to face Xerxes at a line of defense on land at Thermopylae and at sea at the Artemisium Promontory, two sites very close together (VII. 175). When a detachment of royal ships sailed as far as Therma, the Greeks left Artemisinin and dropped anchor at Ghalcis, “intending to guard the Euripus, and leaving look-outs on the high ground of Euboea” (VlI. lSBo-). As Xerxes continued his march toward Thermopylae (VII. 198-201), part of the fleet (moored near Cape Sepias) was destroyed by an unexpected storm (VII. 190-92)—a real disaster according to Herodotus, since a large number of warships and grain transports were lost, “and men beyond reckoning.” On land, despite the resistance of the Greeks (to whose heroism Herodotus devotes a passage of disproportionate length; VII.201-39), the Persians took the pass at Thermopylae. Meanwhile, the Greek navy (commanded by the Spartan Euiybiades) had dropped anchor near Artemisium. Herodotus says that the Athenian Themistocles managed to persuade the Greeks to hold their position despite the defeat at Thermopylae. Persian losses were heavy, not only at the hands of the Greeks, but also because another storm had struck a portion of the royal ships that were attempting to skirt Euboea to fall on the Greeks from behind. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the Persian general staff, the objective had been achieved: the road to Greece was open (August 480). The royal army immediately entered central Greece, receiving the support of the "Medizers" (VIII.34-39).
From Thermopylae to Salamis
The most significant result of the Persian victories was probably on the political plane. On the authority of Themistocles, the Greek ships had moored in the harbor of Salamis. According to Herodotus, the Athenians were disheartened by the attitude of the Peloponnesians, who rather than advancing into central Greece had fortified the Isthmus of Gorinth to create a barrier against the Persian advance. The Athenians’ “object was to give themselves an opportunity of getting their women and ehildren out of Attica, and also of discussing their next move” (VIII.40'0-). To make a long story short, the Athe-nian/Spartan quarrel, which had already surfaced in the context of choosing a commander, broke out again. The question regarding strategy was taken to the council of the commanders of the Greek naval contingents that had meanwhile all returned to Salamis. Despite Spartan reluctance to do battle far from their bases, Themistocles managed to convince Eurybiades that the only solution was to confront the royal fleet in the Bay of Salamis. Additional plans were formed: on land, the Lacedaemonians would continue to mass their forces on the isthmus (VIII.70-74); the Athenian population w'as forced to leave the town and countryside and go into exile (VIII.40-64). The battle that ensued in the Bay of Salamis ended with a resounding defeat of Xerxes’ fleet (VIII.76-96; September 480).
From Salamis to Sardis
Not content to celebrate the victory—understandably—every Greek author, to a man, stresses the indecision and cowardice shown by Xerxes, who was concerned more than anything else with “impassioned flight” (Aeschylus) in order to escape the consequences of the defeat. It is clear that the news of the defeat at Salamis dumbfounded the Persians, who were undoubtedly very conscious of their superiority, including the Persians remaining in the royal residences who, according to Herodotus, were already preparing to receive Xerxes in triumph (VIII.99). These are the circumstances on which
Herodotus built the exchange that he recounts between Mardonius and the king after the battle (VIII.100-101). Mardonius, anxious to clear himself of the accusation of having recommended an expedition that turned out badly, suggested to Xerxes (of whose preparations for flight he was not unaware: VIII.97) that he leave him an army with which he would “deliver Greece to him in chains" (VIII. 100->). Again according to Herodotus, Xerxes had his young illegitimate sons leave for Asia Minor under the protection of Artemisia of Caria (VIII. 103-4). And, several days after the battle, he departed Attica with the army (VIII. 113). When he arrived in Thessaly, he left Mardonius an army of elite troops and traveled to the Hellespont in 45 days (VIII. 115), after which he pressed on to Sardis (VIII. 117). Herodotus portrays Xerxes’ retreat apocalyptically;
He reached the crossing in forty-five clays, but with hardly a fraction of his army intact. During the inarch the troops lived off the country as best they could, eating grass where they found no grain, and stripping the bark and leaves off trees of all sorts, cultivated or wild, to stay their hunger. They left nothing anywhere, so hard were they put to it for supplies. Plague and dysentery attacked them; many died, and others who fell sick were left behind.
. . . The Persians having passed through Tlirace reached the passage over the Hellespont and lost no time in getting across to Abydos. They crossed, however, in ships, as they found the bridges no longer in position, bad weather having broken them up. Food was more plentiful at Abydos than what they had been making do with on the march, with the result that the men over-ate themselves, and this, combined with the change of water, caused many deaths in what remained of the army. The remnant proceeded with Xerxes to Sardis. (V1II.115, 117<-)
Herodotus probably got this version —repeated by many ancient authors (e. g., Justin
II. 13.11-12) —from Aeschylus (lines 480-515). First of all, it is a literary theme, doubtless bearing only the most tenuous connection to reality. Even if the retreat faced difficult climatic conditions, it is hard to believe that the quartermasters' stocks were completely exhausted. Herodotus records other versions that were circulating in his day, suggesting that Xerxes had returned to the Asian coast by sea. Each version highlights the Great King’s cruelty (VII. 118-19). But Herodotus rejects these stories, contending that Xerxes had indeed passed through Abdera and thanked the inhabitants with a pact of friendship and with a gift of a gold akinakes ('sword’) and a gold-embroidered headband (VII. 120). Nonetheless, Glassical tradition preserves the versions contested by Herodotus, as in Justin’s tale, which is both dramatic and moralizing (II. 13.9-10);
Xerxes found the bridges broken and crossed hastily in a fishing boat. This was quite a sight, and it really brought the men’s circiunstances home to them, after an amazing turn of events, to see him huddled in a little craft—a man that formerly the entire ocean could barely contain and that had overworked the land with his countless ground troops—and now he was without a single slave to serve him.
Tire potential criticisms of the ancient stories should not lead us to believe, however, that the Persian situation was the same in September 480 as it had been a few months earlier. The defeat had certainly weakened some imperial positions. When he returned to Asia Minor (where he had accompanied Xerxes), Artabazus besieged Potidaea (albeit unsuccessfully); “The people of Potidaea... had openly thrown ofiF the Persian yoke as soon as Xerxes passed them on his march to the eastward and they knew of the flight of the Persian fleet from Salamis” (VIII. 126’0’). Herodotus’s story of the king’s retreat makes it very clear that several Thracian peoples had severed their ties of allegiance (VII. 115—16). It probably goes too far to suggest that the cities of Asia Minor were ready to rebel at this date; tliis comes from a somewhat suspect view worked out by Herodotus and fourth-century autliors, especially Ephorus, wlio was extensively used by Diodorus. Some time before the defeat at Salamis, according to Herodotus (Vni. l9, 22-23), The-inistocles had attempted to detach the Ionian contingents from the royal navy—witlr no success (VIII.85). We also know that after Salamis, the Greek victors sent ships to the Cyclades, besieging Andros there and extorting money from the other islands (Herodotus VIII. 111-12); but Herodotus explains that they were not in a position to undertake an assault on the islands that Datis had conquered in 490.
All in allj despite the resounding defeat, the military oittcome was not catastrophic. The Persian army was practically intact; it was able to hold the countryside, even to move against the fortifications raised by the Lacedaemonians at the entrance to the isthmus (as the Spartans were perfectly well aware). As for the navy, it was certainly not completely destroyed: the Greeks still feared it. One of the reasons offered by the Greek authors for Xerxes’ retreat to Sardis was that he feared the Greeks would cut the bridges at the Hellespont, which would trap him in Europe {VIII,97). According to a widespread (but surely imaginary) tradition of the Greek authors, it was Themistocles Iiiinself who secretly iiad a message sent to Xeixes to that effect, in order to force him and the Persians to return to Asia. Many Greek leaders believed, after the battle, that the Persian general staff was preparing a new offensive.
But Xerxes and his advisers chose a different strategy; tlrey decided to divide their forces. Mardonius was given the job of pursuing the offensive in Greece, with the army. Xerxes returned to Sardis, along with the navy. He must have remained there throughout the summer of 479. Thus, tlrere was never the possibility that the Great King would hurl himself into “headlong flight.” At Sardis he was in constant communication with Mardonius, and lie continued to oversee the entire operation. The plan had a further advantage; the presence of Mardonius in Greece prevented the Greeks from embarking on a cruise through the islands, and thus everyone knew that the decisive battle would take place on Greek soil.
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