Conclusions

In its perpetuation of a centralized, monotheist, and monarchical state, the caliphate was a direct inheritor of the legacy of Late Antiquity. Like the emperors of Rome and of Iran, the caliph claimed to be the representative of God on earth. Swift conquest meant that the institutions that underpinned an imperial state could be appropriated and maintained. Although the taxation system came to be explained in ‘‘Islamic’’ terms, its origins lay in the mechanisms of the Roman and Iranian fiscal administrations. The caliphate did not develop, however, into a simple calque on either Rome or Iran: a distinctive Islamic identity emerged from the encounter of the Arabs with the populations they conquered. This was because the Arab conquerors (or, at least, their leaders) already had a well-defined religious identity at the time of the conquests in the mid seventh century. The unique position of the Hijaz on the margins of the late antique world, beyond the direct control of the imperial powers but within a wider monotheist koine, had allowed the formation of a distinctive, unifying religious ideology that was preserved by settlement apart from the established populations. The result did not resemble the ‘‘classical’’ Islam of the sources that survive from the ninth and tenth centuries. Nonetheless, the Qur’an does seem to have been brought out of Arabia, and with it ideas that limited the range of action of the Near East’s new rulers. Ideology was not simply constructed by an ‘‘elite’’: rather, it supplied the context in which they made their claims to authority (albeit a context that they sought to influence). The abandonment of various Umayyad experiments, such as coins with images and the Dome of the Rock as a rival shrine to Mecca, is testament to how the nascent ideology of Islam limited the public expression of authority. Had Constantinople fallen, perhaps things would have been different. As it was, the failure of the siege of AD 717 seems to have increased the already important influence of Iran in administration and at the caliphal court. Iran was important in another sense, too: it was in the territories formerly ruled by the Sasanians that hostility to Syrian rule eventually proved to be beyond the Umayyads’ control. The absence of a priestly class was a significant departure from the pattern of previous late antique polities - a departure of great importance for the subsequent development of the caliphate.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

In The World of Late Antiquity, Peter Brown (1971b) argued persuasively that the rise of Islam belonged, in some senses, to the history of Late Antiquity. Garth Fowden (1993) developed this argument further. A recent reassessment of the idea that Islam was part of the late antique world is found in Robinson 2003.

The best general narrative history of early Islam remains Kennedy 2004. On the Umayyad caliphate, see Hawting 2000. The place of Arabia in the late antique world and the origins of Islam remain controversial. Hawting 1999 is a recent, thought-provoking development of John Wansbrough’s ideas (see Wansbrough 1978). Donner 1998 provides a less skeptical analysis.

The development of the political theory of the caliphate is covered by Crone 2004. Dagron 2003 provides a useful comparison with the situation in the Roman Empire. The administrative and fiscal history of the caliphate has received no such synthetic treatment. Morony 1984 focuses on the transition from Sasanian to Islamic rule and is magisterial in its scope. Robinson 2000 deals with Mesopotamia in detail. These volumes also treat some aspects of social change. Two studies that examine the encounter between the Arabs and the populations of the late antique world are Steven Wasserstrom 1995 and Bashear 1997.