Whether most Europeans consciously subscribed to it or not, the societies in which they have lived during the twentieth century increasingly have taken as their point of orientation not God but science. Europeans may, if asked, have continued to proclaim a personal belief in the existence of God, but they came to lead their everyday lives largely without reference to an extra-worldly authority. The twentieth century saw the completion of what Max Weber described as the ‘de-mystification of the world’, a world in which phenomena apparently can be explained with reference to the laws of science. Nevertheless, new obstacles have formed to an unambiguous, optimistic belief in science, a faith in improvement through technology. Certainly during the twentieth century the fruits of scientific discovery and progress were widely disseminated: medical advances and professional medical care were extended to European populations; the majority of Europeans came to enjoy the benefits of clean water supply and efficient waste-disposal systems; electricity entered millions of homes, as electricity grids were developed and electricity supply extended into the European countryside from Brittany to the Urals; new energy supplies brought adequate heating into millions of European homes. However, after the horrors unleashed by Europeans in two world wars and countless other conflicts, campaigns of mass murder, deep economic crises, the collapse of ‘scientific socialism’, the threat of nuclear terror, and the spectre of Chernobyl, it has become rather more difficult for Europeans to put their faith in science.
Against this background processes of secularization were felt across Europe. This had a number of manifestations: declines in church attendance, reductions in state-provided religious education, a tendency towards civil rather than religious marriage ceremonies, the effective disestablishment of Churches in most European countries, and a declining influence of Church teachings in such matters as divorce and abortion. Of course, these trends have been neither universal nor uncontested, as the recent growth of evangelical Christian Churches and the heated reactions to reforms in the Catholic Church and the Church of England testify—to say nothing of the bitter conflicts among differing religious groups in Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia. Yet there can be little doubt that formal religion came to occupy a rather less secure place in the lives of most Europeans towards the end of the century than it had done at the beginning.
It is not just religious teaching and religious influence which has altered in European societies. The position of Europe as religious focus changed profoundly during the twentieth century. Most of the major religions which had their centres in Europe at the outset of the century experienced profound dislocations. Russian Orthodoxy spent decades cowering before a regime which preached earthly progress, materialism, and militant atheism. The classic centres of Jewish culture in central and eastern Europe were wiped out by the Nazis, and whereas the overwhelming majority of the world’s Jews lived in Europe at the beginning of the century the major centres of world Jewry lie outside Europe as the century nears its end—in Israel and the United States. The majority of the world’s Catholics no longer are Europeans, putting the Italian and European domination of the Church of Rome into question. And as the twentieth century nears its end, the fastest growing religion in what once was the centre of Christendom is Islam.
Conclusion
European societies have undergone many revolutions during the twentieth century. They have been rocked by political revolutions, which led to the destruction of old elites which ruled much of the continent at the outset of the century, and which were followed by the establishment of totalitarian systems of unparalleled brutality. They have been engulfed in world wars which produced mass violence and mass bereavement. They have witnessed economic revolutions — not only the failed attempts to impose socialist planned economies but also the advent of a prosperity (at least in western Europe) which had no precedent and which spread far beyond the narrow stratum of the rich. They have experienced demographic revolutions, as Europe came to house the world’s oldest and slowest growing populations. They have experienced cultural revolutions, as modernist culture has shown both the extent and limits of its potential. At the same time, however, Europe has lost its unique position in the world. Post-revolutionary, post-postwar, postmodern Europe no longer can be regarded as being in the economic, political, or cultural vanguard. As a consequence of the developments outlined above, Europe has emerged much like the rest of the developed world. Simultaneously, the myopic selfconfidence and concept of Europe which were in place at the outset of the twentieth century have been shattered—through the horrors of war, revolution, mass violence, and totalitarianism, and by massive economic and social changes.
While it is tempting to discuss the history of western and eastern Europe in separate categories—the one developed, the other backward; the one capitalist, the other socialist for much of the century—to retrace the iron curtain here would be inappropriate. For if there has been such a thing as European society, then eastern Europe has been as much a part of it as western Europe. Virtually all the trends and developments discussed above were played out in eastern as well as in western Europe, and the socialist experiment which was imposed upon eastern Europe reflected many of the same desires which motivated Europeans in the western half of the continent. This is not to assert that there necessarily is a thing such as a single coherent European society. There have been many European societies, not all of whose members are Europeans and not all of whose locations are in Europe.
The European society which provided a model for the rest of the world at the outset of the twentieth century was the society of only a small minority of Europeans: of the London, Berlin, or Paris bourgeoisie, not of the Bulgarian or Andalu-cian peasantry. At the end of the twentieth century European society no longer provides a model for anything in particular. At the same time, European society has become both more fragmented and more embracing of the peoples of Europe. As Europe became more urban, European urban society lost its apparent coherence and paradigmatic quality. As Europe reflected more the social and cultural influences of peoples from beyond the European continent, it simultaneously became less a model for the rest of the world. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a combination of advanced economic development, imperialism, and cultural myopia allowed European society to become a model for the rest of the world; at the end of the twentieth century a democratization of culture and society has meant that there no longer is a coherent idea of European society which necessarily provides a model for others. As the rest of the world has caught up with Europe, Europe has become like the rest of the world and European society as a coherent idea has evaporated.
World History
