Both Polybius (III 2,8; cf. XV 20) and Appian (Mac. 4) claim that Antiochus III and Philip V made a pact whereby they agreed to divide up Ptolemaic possessions between themselves. Antiochus III did make diplomatic arrangements in advance to facilitate his wars, and half a century earlier Antigonus Gonatas and Antiochus II Theos had cooperated against Ptolemy II Philadelphus in a similar fashion, so such a pact is not improbable.
The way in which Polybius and Appian describe the pact, however, casts doubt on its genuineness and many scholars have dismissed it as fiction. According to Polybius (III 2) the two kings agreed that Antiochus III would take Hollow Syria with Phoenicia whereas Philip V would take Egypt, Caria, and Samos. In another reference to this pact (XV 20), Polybius speaks of how "Fortune" brought it to the Romans' attention. Eckstein (2005) argues that Polybius is concretely thinking of the fortuitous arrival of an embassy which apprised the Romans of the pact. That embassy (presumably the Rhodian one which Appian mentions - see below) may of course have exaggerated and distorted matters to make the pact more frightening to the Romans, and Polybius may have believed that version. Nonetheless, it does not seem likely that Antiochus III would have ceded to Philip V the biggest prize of them all, Egypt, and for himself taken only Hollow Syria with Phoenicia.
Appian describes the pact as a "rumor" and lets a Rhodian embassy tell it to the Romans. In this version Antiochus III takes Egypt and Cyprus while Philip V takes Cyrene, the Cyclades, and Ionia. Here, the grant of Cyrene to Philip arouses suspicion in its turn. Finally, the way in which in both Polybius (on Eckstein's interpretation) and Appian the pact is revealed by foreign ambassadors suggests, despite the differences in detail, that the two sources represent one and the same tradition. Appian's account could derive, ultimately, from Polybius' (or from Polybius' direct source). Whether the differences in detail derive from errors of transmission along the way or from a difference in ultimate source after all, can no longer be determined.
Despite the skepticism which the details of the proposed division of Ptolemaic territory invite and despite Appian's presentation of the pact as a "rumor," a recently discovered inscription strongly suggests that some sort of undertaking between Antiochus III and Philip V did exist. The relevant portion of the inscription, found in Bargylia in Caria, reads:
. . . after war had arisen on the part of King Antiochus against King Ptolemy, the one who is reigning now, the troops from King Antiochus had taken possession of the [. . .]sians and of the Thodasians, before the [troops (?)] from King Philip were present. . . (W. Blumel, EA 32 [2000], pp. 94-96)
The Antiochus and Philip in question can hardly be any other than Antiochus III and Philip V, and troops from both appear to be cooperating in the taking of two communities in Caria, the Thodasians and one other, whose name is mostly missing.
Antiochus III's "governor" in Asia Minor, Zeuxis, may well have taken some towns in Caria for his king and in doing so cooperated with Philip V. Two additional passages in Polybius (XVI 1 and 24) show Zeuxis cooperating with Philip V. When Philip needed supplies during his campaigns in Caria, he requested and received them from Zeuxis, as Polybius states, "according to the agreements." While this could have been a private arrangement between Zeuxis and Philip V, in the light of the other evidence it seems more likely that Polybius is here referring to the pact which he mentions at III 2.
Attalus I of Pergamum as well as the Rhodians were thoroughly alarmed - after all, if the stories of a pact between Philip V and Antiochus III were true (see Box 24.2), then the only Hellenistic state which was capable of stopping Philip V, the Seleucid Kingdom, was cooperating with him. That left Rome. Rhodian and Pergamene embassies accordingly traveled to Rome and made much of Antiochus III’s and Philip V’s alleged pact. The Romans took it seriously enough to send an embassy to Antiochus III (Pol. XVI 27); in one version it actually advised him not to conquer Egypt (App. Mac. 4).
The temerity of the Roman embassy, if indeed it did proffer this advice, no doubt took Antiochus III by surprise. But Antiochus III - regardless of his ultimate objectives - usually took care to limit the number of his enemies when waging a war and in any case was alert to the uses of diplomacy in achieving his objectives. As his next actions show (the conquest, among other things, of Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor), he certainly planned additional steps against Egypt. But if he had no immediate plan to conquer Egypt proper, then nothing hindered him from politely assuring the Roman envoys of this. Antio-chus III had no qualms about double-crossing erstwhile friends and allies, as his actions against Philip V in the next few years show. As he conquered the Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor, he conquered the Macedonian ones too, his recent pact with Philip V (positing its existence in some form) notwithstanding - for Philip V was facing a greater problem than the defense of a few towns in Asia Minor.
World History
