In the fifth century b. c.e., Athens established a naval empire that controlled much of the Greek world and revolutionized Greek warfare.
Date: 478-404 b. c.e.
Category: Military
Locale: Greece, Aegean Sea, Western Asia Minor (later Turkey)
Summary The city-state of Athens rose to prominence during the Greco-Persian Wars of the fifth century b. c.e. After their victory over the Persians at Marathon (490 b. c.e.), the Athenians constructed a fleet of two hundred triremes in preparation for the return of the Persians, and these vessels formed the backbone of the Greek fleet that defeated the Persian navy at Salamis (480 b. c.e.). The Spartans led the allied Greeks in this phase of the war, but when fighting moved across the Aegean Sea, the behavior of the Spartan Pausanias, who was in command, grew intolerable. Pausanias was relieved, and the Greeks of the Aegean islands and Asia Minor invited the Athenians to lead them. The Athenians readily agreed, and late in 478 b. c.e., they invited all Greek states to join them in a new, anti-Persian alliance.
The island of Delos served as the headquarters for the alliance, which became known as the Delian League. Members included maritime Greek cities from around the Aegean Sea and beyond. Representatives came to Delos annually to vote on military operations; each state had an equal vote. The Athenians, however, supplied the largest number of ships, and they dominated the league’s administration. Athenian generals commanded expeditions, and the Athenians determined which states were to provide ships and men and which were to pay tribute to support campaigns. Ten Athenian officials oversaw the league treasury.
The Delian League originated as an anti-Persian alliance, but the Athenians displayed imperialistic tendencies almost from its foundation. The first league expedition expelled a Persian garrison from the Thracian city of Eion (476 b. c.e.). Similar campaigns drove the Persians out of the
Aegean Sea, and a decisive victory over the Persians at the Eurymedon River in southern Turkey (466 b. c.e.) removed the threat of Persian invasion. However, the Athenians also compelled some Greek cities to join the league, prevented others from withdrawing, and interfered in the internal affairs of their allies.
The Piraeus and the Long Walls of Athens allowed the Athenians to withstand long sieges. (F. R. Niglutsch)
In the First Peloponnesian War (460-446 b. c.e.), Athens sought to extend its empire both in mainland Greece and in the Mediterranean. Central Greece fell under Athenian control, and the Athenians launched campaigns against Cyprus (460 b. c.e.) and Egypt (459-454 b. c.e.). When the latter campaign ended in disaster in 454 b. c.e., the Athenians may have transferred the Delian League treasury to Athens. A truce with Sparta followed in 451 b. c.e., and after an unsuccessful campaign against Cyprus (451-450 b. c.e.), a peace treaty was signed with Persia (c. 449 b. c.e.). This peace, called the Peace of Callais, formally ended the Greco-Persian Wars. Some historians question its historicity, but fighting between Greeks and Persians ceased until the late fifth century b. c.e. The Athenians, however, continued to demand tribute from their allies, and any doubts that the Delian League was an Athenian empire were dispelled. Subsequent unrest among the allies led to the loss of central Greece, but the Athenians quashed a revolt of Euboea (446 b. c.e.), and in the Thirty Years’ Peace with Sparta, they gained recognition of their empire (446 b. c.e.).
The Athenians maintained and extended their power with a fleet of triremes manned, at first, by their own citizens. This fleet numbered 300 vessels on the eve of the Second Peloponnesian War (431 b. c.e.), and, according to the biographer Plutarch, sixty of these ships remained at sea for eight months of the year. Tribute paid by Athenian allies supported this fleet. Allies had originally contributed either ships or money to the Delian League, but by the 440’s, all paid tribute except for a few island states. By paying tribute instead of serving on expeditions, the allies lost the military experience with which they might have challenged Athenian power, and the Athenians acquired the financial resources they needed to enforce their will. Tribute also provided the funds that paid for the Parthenon and other splendid buildings in Athens itself.
Spartan fear of Athenian imperialism was a major factor in the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War (431-404 b. c.e.). Revolts by Mytilene (427 b. c.e.) and in northern Greece (424 b. c.e.) strained Athenian resources, but most allies remained loyal, despite a sharp rise in tribute. Only after the failure of the Athenian expedition against Sicily (415-413 b. c.e.) did large numbers rebel, and even then, the Athenians held out for nearly ten more years. After losing their fleet at Aegospotami (405 b. c.e.), the Athenians surrendered to Sparta in 404 b. c.e. and lost their empire.
The Athenians never abandoned hope of regaining their overseas possessions. In 378 b. c.e., they founded the Second Athenian League, a naval alliance designed to block Spartan aggression. It eventually grew to include more than fifty states. Its charter, however, included safeguards against Athenian imperialism, and the Athenians never enjoyed the power or resources they had possessed in the fifth century b. c.e.
Significance The establishment of the Athenian Empire marked the first time a single Greek state had subjugated other Greeks on a large scale. The empire’s naval basis also changed the nature of Greek warfare. Earlier conflicts between Greek city-states had been land based and localized. Wars were fought between neighboring states over disputed borderlands and seldom lasted more than a few months. However, the Athenian navy could campaign far from home and for extended periods of time. In addition, the construction of the Long Walls connecting Athens to its port of Piraeus allowed the Athenians to withstand a long siege, and Athenian control of the sea ensured the steady inflow of tribute and other supplies. Henceforth, naval power and financial resources were key factors in Greek warfare.
Further Reading
Badian, Ernst. From Plataea to Potidaea: Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentecontaetia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.
MacGregor, Malcolm. The Athenians and Their Empire. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987.
Meiggs, Russel. The Athenian Empire. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1971.
Rhodes, P. J. The Athenian Empire. New Surveys in the Classics 17. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1985.
Samons, Loren J. Athenian Democracy and Imperialism. Problems in European Civilization. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998.
Sekunda, Nicholas. Greek Hoplite, 480-323 B. C. Oxford, England: Osprey, 2000.
Wees, Hans van. Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities. London: Duckworth, 2004.
James P. Sickinger
See also: Aegospotami, Battle of; Athenian Empire; Athenian Invasion of
Sicily; Athens; Cyprus; Greco-Persian Wars; Marathon, Battle of; Pausa-
Nias of Sparta; Peloponnesian Wars; Salamis, Battle of; Trireme; Warfare
Before Alexander.