So far this discussion has focused upon expressions of democratic values (with particular emphasis on equality and the extent of popular participation) in a general Greek context. Owing to the fact that the best-attested form of Greek democracy is that which existed in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries, the following discussion of Greek democratic institutions will draw exclusively on the testimonia for democratic Athens: it should be pointed out, however, that democratic practices elsewhere, in places such as Erythrai, Kos, Rhodes, lasos or the cities of Sicily were quite different (see O’Neill 1995). Given that comprehensive overviews of Athenian democratic institutions already exist (Hansen 1987,1999; Rhodes 1972,1981a), this section will focus on the ways in which Athens’ political institutions encouraged political equality by promoting wide popular participation in governance.
The exclusion of noncitizens (metics, foreigners, and slaves) from the workings of democracy was a product of the polis centeredness of its organization. Participation, of course, was envisaged by the Athenians not as a human right but as a privilege of male citizens of the Athenian polis, who, from 451 bc, were legally defined as those who were born of a citizen father and mother (Arist. Ath. Pol. 26; Davies 2004). Women too were excluded from all political privileges; they were not permitted to represent even their own cases in the courts (Just 1989: 26-39).
The extent to which the institutions of Athenian democracy set in place absolutely equal privileges of participation for all citizens is unclear. Among the reforms connected with Solon was the division of the citizen body on the basis of agricultural productivity into four socioeconomic classes (Ath. Pol. 7). At the time of Solon, the lowest class, known as the thetes, were deemed ineligible for magistracies, and this restriction was probably never repealed, though, in all likelihood, it was ignored by the second half of the fourth century (Rhodes 1981a: 145-6). Thetes however appear to have possessed the right to attend, vote, speak, and propose legislation at the ekklesia (Assembly) and to initiate prosecutions at the law courts.
The history of Athenian democratic institutions to the end of the fifth century bc is narrated in the fourth century Athenaion Politeia (this is the Constitution of Athens attributed to Aristotle: see Rhodes 1981a: 58-63). Over the course of the sixth and fifth centuries, political participation was extended to an expanding proportion of the citizen body (Hansen 1999: 27-54; Sinclair 1988: 13-23). Solon, the traditional date for whose reforms is 594 bc, was connected with the right of all Athenian citizens to bring grievances (either their own or those of a fellow citizen) to the courts (Ath. Pol. 9) and the selection of magistrates by lot (Ath. Pol. 8). Cleisthenes appears to have overseen the enlargement to 500 members of the Athenian boule (council), the body which prepared the agenda of the ekklesia (Robinson 2004: 95122); he is accredited also with the introduction of a system by which members of that council were drawn from the 139 demes, the subpolis institutions which were the main form of civic organization across the territory of Athens (Ath. Pol. 21). The establishment of demes as political entities (with their own magistrates and decisionmaking bodies) was a vital step in the introduction of political activity to a wide spectrum of citizens (see the next section). Pericles is accredited with introducing payment for jury service in the courts (Ath. Pol. 27); he may well also have been responsible for introducing payment for councilors and the other magistrates (Hansen 1999: 37-8). The introduction of payment for attending the ekklesia in the early fourth century (Ath. Pol. 41.3, 62.1) marked the zenith of institutional encouragement to popular participation in the decision-making process.
Ideas about popular political intervention were expressed in Athenian laws and decrees, and in particular those which aimed to guard against tyranny. In the aftermath of a short nondemocratic period of government, in 410 the Athenians passed a decree which said that all citizens were to take an oath to assassinate anyone plotting to overthrow democracy (Lyc. 1.127). While such institutional impositions of political participation were far from the norm in democratic Athens, it is likely that institutional pressure was exerted on Athenian citizens to fill offices when there were too few volunteers (Rhodes 1981a: 511-12). In addition to the discussion about the value and necessity of popular participation, and the social expectation that prominent politicians would make a contribution to a debate (see the second section above), the fact that the debate of the first item on every assembly’s agenda was introduced with the question ‘‘Who wishes to speak?’’ (Hansen 1987: 91) suggests that contribution to political activity could also be construed as an opportunity or a privilege.
Popular participation and initiative were central to the working of Athenian democracy. The Assembly was at the heart of direct democracy inasmuch as it offered opportunities for the male citizen to get involved in the decisions made on behalf of his city. This was the body which made decrees (psephismata), though these usually followed the general guidance or the specific recommendation of the boule (R. Sinclair 1988: 88-101). The workings of the Assembly were reliant on both individual initiative and participation: some decisions required ratification by a quorum of 6,000 (Hansen 1987: 15). But at the same time it is quite unlikely that the Pnyx, the auditorium at which the Assembly usually met, could ever have accommodated even the fourth century Athenian male citizen population of 30,000 (Hansen 1987: 17). In the fourth century, the statute-making mechanisms of the Athenian state were divided between a number of institutions also reliant on volunteerism: laws ( nomoi) proposed by Athenian citizens were passed to the nomothetai, a board which was drawn from the pool of 6,000 volunteer jurors, who decided whether the law was to be enacted or not (Rhodes 2003b). The law courts themselves were important institutions for the functioning of Athenian politics: in the fourth century Athenian citizens were able, by the process known as graphe paranomon, to prosecute a proposer of a law or decree for making an illegal proposal. If the prosecution was successful, the proposal was annulled (Hansen 1974). Accordingly, both in the law courts and in the Assembly there was room for an individual citizen to make a political impact. The council (boule) was the other important organ of popular government: it prepared the agenda of the Assembly and took responsibility for the everyday affairs of the polis. Citizens, selected probably by lot, sat on the council for a year at a time and were forbidden from holding a seat either for more than one year consecutively or more than twice in a lifetime (Rhodes 1972). The fact that councilors were drawn from the whole territory of Attica and from the across the board of socioeconomic classes meant that its consistency and interests, in all likelihood, would have replicated that of the whole community of citizens. Councilors would have represented the interests of their fellow demesmen (Osborne 1985a: 92); in this sense the council acted as a representative force in Athenian democracy. The institutions of Athenian democracy, therefore, made room for a high degree of political participation; in fact the legislative and judicial workings of Athens were reliant upon popular initiative, participation, and debate. As will become clear in the next section, the existence of elected offices (principally the generalship) and the premium placed on the power of persuasion meant that political expertise was at the same time highly valued.
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