The theological work undertaken by assemblies of bishops, and the kinds of reasoning used to deal with the topics under consideration, are, for the best part of the fourth century, difficult to assess in any detail. No acts of synods are extant before the Councils of Aquileia (ad 381) in the west and Ephesus (ad 431) in the east. If minutes were taken at Nicaea or Constantinople, they are lost. Discussions frequently resulted, however, in carefully worded statements of faith, and they have been preserved. They sum up the doctrinal positions of those gathered, who thereby laid claim to orthodoxy, and they occasionally reject explicitly opposing views. Frequently, these statements - ektheseis, or creeds - are obviously answering one another. Through allusions to and slight modification of what had been said by another (possibly rival) assembly, they enter into a dialogue or argument. Again, Nicaea set the precedent for this kind of creed-making. The church historian and scholar Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea in Palestine, presented to that assembly (if we can believe his account) a personal creed that was approved as orthodox (Letter to the Church of Caesarea, Opitz 1934: Urkunden 22. 24-6). At Constantine’s instigation, however, a commission drafted a different statement, which would become known as the Nicene Creed. Eusebius insists that the controversial wording was discussed intensely and that he was reassured of the meaning of particular words and phrases before he agreed to sign (Urkunden 22. 9-13).
We learn of the work of similar drafting commissions as late as the Council of Chalcedon (ad 451), and of discussions behind closed doors that resulted in amendments and alterations until a final text was agreed upon. Most scholars now believe the so-called Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, associated with the Council of Constantinople of ad 381, to be such a draft (Ritter 1965: 189-91; Kelly 1972: 325-31). According to this view, it was used as a basis for discussion with a group of bishops who rejected the divinity of the Holy Spirit, but was not formally decreed after negotiations broke down and they walked out. Such creed-making, inextricably linked with the gathering of synods and councils, and indeed the very genre of a creed as such, became typical features of theological debate (Kinzig and Vinzent 1999).
Traditionally, the formation of creeds has been associated with their liturgical use at baptism, from which doctrinal expansions and precisions were supposedly derived. However, there is no evidence before the fourth century for the use of creeds at baptisms - that is, of declarations made by the candidates: rather, they answered basic questions about their belief with a simple ‘‘Yes.’’ Formulae summing up orthodoxy had another Sitz im Leben and took another form. In the second and third centuries, summary statements of essential Christian teaching can be found in many writings. As the rule of faith, they set out key concepts that could be used to define the boundaries within which theological inquiry and exegetical exposition could legitimately be conducted. Crucially, however, the wording and structure of those formulae were fluid, and could be given different emphasis depending on the topic under discussion.
During the fourth century, by contrast, phrasing down to the last word became ever more decisive and divisive - so much so that later generations were baffled by the intense squabbling and heated argument displayed over what could seem at times only a single letter’s difference: should the relationship between God the Father and the Son be defined as homoousios or homoiousios? The repeated efforts of synods to coin an exposition of faith that expressed a correct understanding of God and Christ in precise and definitive wording added a new dimension to theological discourse. Those efforts went hand in hand with pressure put upon individuals to assert their orthodoxy by signing such expositions or by making personal statements of a similar kind. Eusebius’ statement at the Nicene Council was one of those professions of personal orthodoxy, as was a written supplication by Arius to Constantine (Socrates, Hist. eccl. 1. 26. 3; Opitz 1934: Urkunden 30), or the declaration demanded of Eunomius on the occasion of a synod in ad 383 (Eunomius, Expositio fidei), to name but a few. Many such statements have survived (collected in Hahn 1897), and it is likely that even more were drawn up at the time.
In their attempt to define doctrine in carefully phrased statements of belief, and in their insistence on specific technical language exclusively suited to express acceptable theological positions (or conversely, in their rejection of the technical language preferred by their opponents), churchmen focused their attention on the use of key words and the acceptance of certain documents. In the east, eventually, only one creed came to be used in liturgical contexts. Another, similarly exclusive, was developed in the west. The many other formulae of the time functioned exclusively in technical doctrinal controversy, as a test of the orthodoxy of bishops and theological specialists, an expression of the often fleeting agreement between them and of their party solidarity.